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ABSTRACT
TOWARD A MODEL OF TEAM SITUATION AWARENESS
Alexis Anne Fink 
Old Dominion University, 2000 
Director: Debra A. Major
Situation Awareness (SA) is a construct that is considered important to safety in dynamic, 
risky, time-constrained and complex environments, such as military aviation, nuclear 
reactors and emergency management. Research consideration of SA is complicated by the 
fact that there is no clearly superior methodology for SA measurement. Typically, SA is 
considered at the individual level; however, the nature o f the SA context often requires 
more than one individual for safe and effective operations. Team SA is a qualitatively 
different phenomenon than individual SA. Few models o f team SA have been proposed. 
The primary purpose of this paper was to develop and test a model o f team SA. Existing 
models of team SA were reviewed, an integrated model was put forth, and each of the 
models was tested. Additionally, the paper explored and compared several methods for 
quantitatively assessing SA. Results indicate that one measure of SA  SALIENT (Muniz et 
al, 1997) has the best measurement characteristics. Model testing revealed that all models 
put forth fit the data adequately, but the summation model yielded the best fit to the data. 
Implications and suggestions for future research were outlined.
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1INTRODUCTION
Human operators in a wide array of occupations are increasingly asked to perform 
tasks that are more complex and to perform them with fewer errors. Technology at once 
increases our capabilities and increases the demands placed on human operators. Surgeons 
of centuries ago performed their procedures without benefit o f monitors and modem 
surgical gadgetry, but their outcomes were significantly poorer than those we expect and 
accept today. Similarly, when the Wright Brothers made their famous flight, they were 
unconcerned by landing gear indicators, autopilot functionality, GPS or LORAN data, 
horizon indicators, electrical malfunctions or evading enemy detection. Yet, the simplicity 
of the system in which they operated also limited them significantly.
While technological advances provide us with increased information, capabilities 
and safety, they also exact a higher demand on our cognitive abilities. Where once tasks 
were easily managed by a solo operator, often with cursory training, now multiple 
operators, each extensively trained, are often required. While the demands may be 
manageable given the luxury o f time and optimal operating conditions, when elements of 
risk and time-constraint are added, the difficulty o f operations in these complex 
environments increases exponentially.
Clearly, to be effective, human operators in these situations must monitor 
numerous systems for changes, constantly updating their understanding of relevant pieces 
as well as the whole and using this updated information to guide their decisions and
The Journal model for this dissertation is: Murphy, K. R. (2000). Journal o f Applied 
Psychology, 55(1).
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2actions. Failure to do so effectively can have disastrous consequences. For example, crew 
error has been identified as the primary causal factor in 70% of aviation accidents 
(specifically, hull loss accidents with known causes for the period 1988-1997; Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group, 1998). Situation awareness (SA) is the term used to describe 
the state o f consciousness, both process and product, required by these contexts.
S A has proved a rich ground for both theoretical and empirical work. Yet, despite 
the fact that teams are often necessary to operate effectively in these S A environments, 
research on team level SA is sparse. Furthermore, research that has addressed team level 
S A has generally ignored social and team processes as a means of understanding and 
facilitating SA team performance. This dissertation represents an effort to clarify the 
process by which team SA is achieved. The ultimate goal o f this research was to 
empirically identify a model or models of team S A.
A few models o f team SA have been discussed in the literature. This dissertation 
reviewed these models, and built an integrated model that drew from each of the models 
present in the literature. Specifically, this dissertation reviewed a summation model of 
team S A, two communication models and the shared understanding model of team SA.
The summation model essentially holds that team level S A is the sum o f individual 
level S A. The communication models adds one level of complexity by proposing that team 
level SA is built by communication within the team. Third, the shared understanding model 
suggests that team SA is developed through shared understanding among the team. The 
integrated model builds upon elements of each o f the models extant in the literature.
Clearly, individual level SA is a necessary component of team SA. However, the 
integrated model suggests that good SA at the individual level is not sufficient to ensure
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
good SA at the team level. Rather, as each team member will possess important 
information that is not possessed by other team members, communication within the team 
is required for good team SA. Third, the integrated model includes the concept o f shared 
understanding as an important element of team S A.
This dissertation tested each of the models presented in the literature, as well as 
the integrated model developed in this dissertation. The strategy was designed to reveal 
which model accounted for the greatest proportion o f variance as well as revealing which 
individual elements in the models make the greatest contribution to S A at the team level, 
and ultimately to team performance.
This dissertation also had a secondary aim. Although multiple measurement 
strategies for SA have been proposed, there is scant data with regard to the measurement 
characteristics, such as reliability and validity, of these measures. Thus, it is challenging for 
the SA researcher to select measures of SA with confidence. The secondary aim of the 
research was to empirically test the measurement characteristics of these metrics.
This secondary aim was also expected to support the primary aim of the 
dissertation, which was model testing. On the basis of the empirical evaluation o f the 
metrics included in the study, it was possible to identify those measures which appear to 
be most reliable and valid. By including only those observed variables that possess good 
measurement characteristics in model testing, it was possible to eliminate some random 
error in each o f the models described. Thus, the metric validation component of the study 
provided information that was vital to the central purpose of this dissertation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Situation Awareness 
Conceptualizing SA
Over the years, authors have put forth a wide variety o f different definitions for 
SA. The definition has evolved since Bolman’s (1979) theory o f the situation was first 
proposed. Shrestha, Prince, Baker and Salas (1995) reviewed the definitions outlined by a 
host o f authors and determined that five main attributes have been identified: 1) 
environmental and 2) temporal awareness in dynamically changing situations, 3) mission or 
goal awareness, 4) the ability to “observe, integrate, assess and act upon” (Shrestha et al., 
1995, p. 51) the relevant information (environment, temporal, and mission or goal data), 
and 5) anticipation of future changes and events. Nearly all the definitions reviewed 
included awareness of surroundings. Thus, SA can be described as the state o f  one’s 
awareness o f elements in the context (surroundings, temporal place and goals or mission), 
the interactions o f those elements and anticipation of future changes in those elements.
This description makes clear the importance of cognition in SA. Reviewing the 
elements identified by Shrestha et al. (1995), several cognitive factors are relevant; 
specifically, at a minimum, attention, working memory and mental models contribute to 
SA. Durso and Gronlund (1999) suggested that, in addition to these three, pattern 
recognition and naturalistic decision making are important cognitive factors in SA. 
However, Wickens (1999) was careful to clarify that cognitive processes such as attention 
are not S A in an o f themselves, but rather processes that support S A.
Context is an important element to consider in researching SA. A certain amount 
of SA is required for even mundane tasks such as walking across one’s living room; Durso 
and Gronlund (1999) point out that divided attention may provide a floor effect,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5maintaining a minimal level o f S A even in the absence o f operator attention. However, S A 
is generally researched in relationship to the requirements to operate in complex 
environments, as a failure o f S A in a complex environment is likely to have more dire 
consequences than a failure o f S A in a more mundane environment. Sarter and Woods 
(1991) point out that the contexts in which SA is most critical have several characteristics 
that make them particularly difficult to work within. In general, these contexts are 
characterized by multiple elements that are in a constant state of change, they typically 
have an element of substantial risk, and they are time-constrained (Sarter & Woods,
1991).
Given these attributes, developing and maintaining good SA can become quite 
literally a matter of life and death. Gaba and Howard (1995) further specified that critical 
elements or contextual cues may be challenging to perceive and integrate into overall SA. 
Cues may be available only briefly, or they may be subtle but meaningful deviations from 
normalcy. Further, certain combinations of elements, while individually unimportant, may 
have critical significance when combined. Thus, these are cognitively demanding contexts. 
The environment must be constantly scanned for relevant information, which must be 
processed, prioritized and incorporated in planning.
There is some disagreement in the literature as to whether SA is a state or a 
process. Although most authors treat SA as a state, some treat SA as a process (e.g.,
Sarter & Woods, 1995). Other authors have argued for the term situation assessment for 
the process and situation awareness for the state (e.g., Billings, 1994; Pew, 1994). Still 
others argue that the process/state debate is an artificial division, and that SA is in fact an 
element of consciousness (Smith & Hancock, 1995). Smith and Hancock (1995) argued
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that SA “is a dynamic concept that exists at the interface between the agent and its 
environment” (Smith & Hancock, 1995, p. 139). In the interest of clarity and consistency 
with the majority o f the literature on this subject, this dissertation will treat SA as a state. 
However, it is explicitly recognized that the processes involved in developing and 
maintaining S A are critical to the state of S A.
Another important conceptual point must be made with regard to whether or not 
to include outcomes, such as decision making and performance, as a part of S A. Certainly, 
Bolman’s (1979) discourse on theories of the situation included decision making as a part 
o f S A, and other authors have treated decision making and action as incorporated into SA 
(e.g., Flach, 1995; Smith & Hancock, 1995). However, many authors (e.g., Endsley, 
1995a) have taken the position that SA is distinct from decision making as well as 
performance. Endsley (1995a) pointed out that, “Even the best-trained decision makers 
will make the wrong decision if they have inaccurate or incomplete SA. Conversely, a 
person who has perfect SA may still make the wrong decision (from a lack of training on 
proper procedures, poor tactics, etc.) or show poor performance (from an inability to 
carry out the necessary actions)” (Endsley, 1995a, p. 36).
In defining S A to exclude outcomes, however, is it important not to discount the 
critical role that SA plays in those outcomes. SA is a necessary but not sufficient factor for 
good decision making and performance. S A not only provides the foundation for decision 
making, but may actually influence the decision making process (Endsley, 1995a). It has 
long been recognized that framing has a significant impact on decision making (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981); here, one’s level o f SA provides the decision frame, and thus does 
exert a direct influence on the decision. Adding another layer of complexity onto the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7matter, Venturio, Hamilton and Dvorchak (1989) found that both SA and decision making 
predicted performance. Thus, although each of the concepts (SA, decision making, and 
performance) are distinct, they are also intimately intertwined.
There may be considerable overlap in the processes that lead to the state o f high 
SA and the processes that lead to good decisions. Adams, Tenney and Pew (1995) 
suggested that there is much to be gained through thoughtful examination of the 
interdependence o f the processes which contribute to S A  this is also the case with the 
interdependencies in decision making processes. There is perhaps even greater benefit in 
examining the interdependencies among the processes that SA and decision making have 
in common. Ultimately, although good decisions and good performance are not in and of 
themselves S A they may be considered post hoc indicators o f SA to the extent that SA 
provides the framework upon which decisions and ultimately performance are based. SA 
acts as a limiting factor on decision making and performance; outstanding decision makers 
and individuals with considerable expertise in the task at hand can only perform as well as 
their SA will permit.
Before leaving the topic o f definitions, it is important to discuss the matter o f 
terminology. Although the majority o f the SA literature discusses situation awareness, 
there are some authors who use the term situational awareness. In the interest of clarity 
and consistency, this work uses the former term, situation awareness. Endsley (1994) 
pointed out that the former term (situation awareness) is the more precise term, in that it 
literally means “awareness of the situation,” whereas the latter term (situational 
awareness) is an noun modified by the adjective “situational,” and literally means “a type 
of awareness relating to situations.” The term situation awareness is more direct and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
clearer than situational awareness, and thus, in the interest o f parsimony, the better term to
use.
Importance o f SA
Accidents and mishaps in the types of contexts where SA is critical end all too 
often in tragedy. Aviation mishaps are particularly costly, both in financial (lost or 
damaged equipment) terms as well as in human (casualty) terms. The scientific community 
has recognized for quite some time that the majority of aviation accidents stem from 
human error (Foushee, 1984). Over the past decade, flight crew errors have accounted for 
seven times as many major aviation incidents (aircraft missing or beyond repair) as 
airplane failures, the next most common cause (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,
1998). O f the 149 hull loss (missing or beyond repair) accidents for which causes have 
been identified during this period, 105 were primarily due to flight crew factors (Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group, 1998). Over a 10 year period, 6,792 fatalities resulted from 
aviation accidents, and 213 aircraft were lost or damaged beyond repair (Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group, 1998).
Overall, aviation safety records are extremely good (1.2 accidents per million 
departures for scheduled passenger operations and 4.4 accidents per million departures for 
all other operations; Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1998). However, despite the 
fact that aviation accidents are fairly negligible in a relative sense (very few incidences as a 
percentage o f flights), the absolute impact is substantial, in terms o f needless loss of life, 
financial losses due to missing or irreparable aircraft and possibly due to lost aviation 
industry revenue as a result of public perceptions of unacceptable safety.
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Controlled flight into terrain, where a crew pilots an aircraft that is functioning 
normally into the terrain, e.g., the ground or a mountain, is the number one cause for 
aircraft incidents, by a substantial margin (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1998). 
Controlled flight into terrain is a classic example of a loss o f SA by the flight crew; 
typically the crew simply does not know where they are or what is happening. Controlled 
flight into terrain accounted for 36 (17%) of the accidents, and 2806 (41%) of the 
fatalities over the past decade (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1998). The next most 
common cause, loss o f control in flight, accounted for 31 accidents and cost 1932 lives 
(Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1998). There were only 2 incidents of the third most 
common cause of death, midair collision, which accounted for 506 deaths (Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group, 1998). Together, these three accident categories, all of 
which suggest a loss o f S A by the crew, cost 5244 lives, and accounted for 77% of all 
aviation-related deaths over the last decade.
Although the accident rate dropped substantially between 1959 and 1971 
(approximately 45 hull loss or fatal accidents per million departures in 1959 versus fewer 
than 5 hull loss or fatal accidents per million departures in 1971; Boeing Commercial 
Airplane Group, 1998), accident rates have remained relatively stable since that time.
Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that further improvement in accident rates will require a 
new approach to accident reduction.
Given that the vast majority o f significant aviation incidents are attributable to 
flight crew failures, improving flight crew performance appears to be the best leverage 
point for improving accident rates. Elimination of 50% o f the hull loss errors attributable 
to flight crew factors o f the past decade would have prevented 52 of these accidents, or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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35% of all commercial hull loss incidents worldwide over that 10 year period. A 35% 
accident rate reduction would have saved 2445 lives and 75 aircraft this decade.
A great deal of intellectual and financial capital has been devoted to research aimed 
at improving aviation safety through aircrew training, and development of superior cockpit 
systems. However, as discussed above, human error remains a large factor in aviation 
mishaps; much o f this error can be characterized as deficiencies in SA.
The most famous example of lost SA by a flight crew in the SA literature is the 
tragic 1972 Eastern Airlines crash in the Florida Everglades. Here, the crew became 
preoccupied with an indicated nose landing gear malfunction and failed to notice that the 
autopilot had become disengaged. As with many tragic mishaps caused by poor SA, the 
Eastern Airlines crash of 1972 ended in controlled flight into terrain.
While SA has typically been addressed as important in an aviation context, it does 
have applications and implications beyond this. Anesthesiology and other medical systems 
(Gaba & Howard, 1995; Garland, Endsley, Andre, Hancock, Selcon, & Vidulich, 1996), 
nuclear power (Garland et al, 1996), air traffic control (Endsley, & Rogers, 1996; Hopkin, 
1994; Mogford, 1994; Rantanen, 1994), advanced manufacturing systems (Garland et al, 
1996), emergency services and emergency management (Companion, 1994; Schenk,
1994), battle fields (Garland et al, 1996), aircraft maintenance (Endsley, in press), and 
automobile driving (Garland et al, 1996; Gugerty & Tirre, 1996), have been identified as 
additional fields in which operators must have high levels of S A to perform safely and 
effectively. Each o f these contexts contains the major elements that comprise an 
environment in which SA is critical - high information load, high cognitive demand, 
complexity, time constraint and presence of risk. Thus, although the models and research
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have typically focused on a fairly narrow set of applications, SA is relevant beyond the 
cockpit.
Although most o f the statistics cited have been in reference to S A in an aviation 
context, this is largely due to the availability of data with regard to aviation accidents. 
Thorough investigations are conducted and the results published when aviation accidents 
occur. For obvious legal reasons, the same data are not available for medical incidents. 
However, this is not to suggest that SA is not relevant in these contexts or the others 
mentioned above.
Ejarly Work
Two decades ago, Bolman (1979) proposed the “theory of the situation” as an 
important factor in aviation accidents. Bolman’s theory o f the situation is “a set of beliefs 
about what was happening and what actions it was appropriate to take” (Bolman, 1979, p. 
34). Bolman further suggests that a theory o f the situation “is a short term theory used by 
an individual to analyze and make decisions about the immediate environment” (Bolman, 
1979, p. 35). Bolman proposed that aircrews test assumptions and look for differences 
between their espoused theories and their theories-in-use. Here, aircrews proactively seek 
out information to ensure that they are operating on the most correct information.
Bolman (1979) identified four factors that increase the probability that aircrews 
will be able to discover and correct faulty theories of the situation (or SA). The first is 
essentially the pilots’ training and experience, and the extent to which pilots rely on 
inquiry and testing in situations that are not optimal. Second, Bolman suggested that a 
crew’s ability to detect and correct faulty SA is determined by their ability “to combine 
skills in advocacy and inquiry” (Bolman, 1979, p. 32). Bolman’s third major predictive
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factor is the management skills and style o f the captain. Finally, Bolman’s fourth major 
factor is “the degree to which the role system in the cockpit is well understood, and 
procedures for role-modification are mutually shared” (Bolman, 1979, p. 32).
Perhaps the most interesting thing about Bolman’s seminal work on SA is the fact 
that it focused on SA as a team level phenomenon, and that the factors he identifies as 
important for maintaining high levels o f S A (or accurate theories of the situation) are 
social ones. It is curious that the SA literature has such emphasis on individual-level SA, 
and cognitive and technological approaches to increasing S A, given this jumping off point.
Levels o f SA
As discussed above, SA has three main components: awareness, integration and 
anticipation. Endsley (1988, 1995a) defined these as three levels which build upon each 
other. Level 1 SA is the awareness o f elements in the environment. Level 2 SA is the 
integration of those elements into a single coherent picture. Level 3 SA is the projection of 
that integration into the future, and planning to address this anticipated future.
Clearly, each o f the levels builds upon the preceding one in such a way that the 
preceding one is necessary but not sufficient for each next higher level S A. One cannot 
integrate elements o f  which one is not aware (transition between levels 1 and 2), nor can 
one formulate an effective plan based on a faulty comprehension of the overall situation 
(transition between levels 2 and 3).
Difficulties in the SA Literature
Perhaps one o f the reasons that the concept o f S A has not gained more currency in 
the scientific literature is the presence o f a few persistent problems in the S A literature. 
These difficulties generally fall into three major categories: methodological, conceptual
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and operational. Somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Billings (1994) mused, “situation awareness 
(S A) is a process -  or is it a product? Or is it both, or neither? It either is, or is not, critical 
to define S A precisely. It either can, or cannot, be quantified, but if it can be, the 
Heisenberg principle probably applies, and we alter it in the process of measuring it.” 
(Billings, 1994, p. 321). Clearly, challenges such as these can cast a pall over a line of 
scientific inquiry. Compounded, difficulties in all three of these domains (i.e., 
methodological, conceptual and operational) can render a topic “unresearchable.”
Methodological Difficulties 
Because o f the unique nature of S A and the specialized nature of tasks for which 
SA is most critical, researchers face some special methodological challenges. First, SA 
researchers are limited in their ability to assess operators’ SA in context; the element of 
risk and time constraint that characterize environments in which SA is critical are barriers 
to allowing a researcher to collect SA data while operators are performing their tasks. 
Thus, researchers are generally limited to using simulations or relying on post hoc or 
retrospective measures.
Second, because the individuals who perform these tasks are generally members of 
select groups (e.g., fighter pilots, air traffic controllers, anesthesiologists), SA researchers 
are frequently limited in their ability to collect data from large samples. Thus, one of the 
other limitations on much SA research is the small sample size usually associated with 
empirical studies o f SA (Carretta, Perry & Ree, 1994). In their review of the empirical SA 
literature, Carretta et al. (1994) found an average sample size o f 21.75. Sample sizes are 
generally limited in that researchers have drawn largely from expert operators (primarily 
pilots) in their research on S A. However, recently S A researchers have been using
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participants, although small sample sizes are still prevalent (e.g., 32 in Bolstad & Endsley, 
1999, 12 in Farley, Hansman, Endsley, & Amonlirdviman, 1999).
Conceptual Difficulties 
The conceptual difficulty in studying SA lies in the separation o f SA from the 
processes it is meant to influence (decision making and performance, principally). Indeed, 
aside from its ability to have an effect on these critical outcomes, SA is an esoteric 
concept, interesting only to theorists. Earlier in this paper, SA was discussed as both a 
state and a process by which that state is obtained. Other authors appear to include 
outcomes in their conceptualization of SA, such that adverse outcomes are suggestive of 
faulty SA. This dissertation has argued for defining SA as distinct from outcomes, such as 
decision making and performance, on theoretical grounds; there are practical grounds for 
this position as well.
Including outcomes in the conceptualization of S A introduces a considerable 
amount of error into the equation. For example, it includes situations that may be beyond 
the operators’ control. Yet, one can also argue that exclusion o f extenuating 
circumstances merely restricts the variability in S A. For example, if an aviation crew fails 
to complete its mission due to engine failure, the first perspective might only consider the 
crew’s SA prior and subsequent to the engine failure and their integration o f the engine 
failure into a plan to return safely. The second perspective might go further in including 
the crew’s performance in completing the flight safely in assessing SA, or even consider 
the engine failure itself as a mark against their S A (e.g., they were not able to predict and 
prevent the problem). As discussed earlier, the processes that lead to the state of SA and 
the outcomes o f decision making and performance are intimately intertwined. However,
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this dissertation maintains the position that SA is the state o f awareness (here, recognition 
o f engine failure and integration of that failure into a plan to meet objectives), and that 
decisions and ultimately performance are indicators o f SA, but are not SA themselves.
Operational Difficulties
Beyond these conceptual difficulties, there is another major category of difficulties 
in S A: problems related to the operationalization of S A. The central problem is that 
because S A is a cognitive process, it can only be inferred and never directly observed, 
although the inputs and outputs can be directly assessed. In addition, some argue that SA 
is too subjective for quantitative measurement (Flach, 1995; Gilson, 1995). Although 
many methods have been developed, there is no consensus in the SA literature with regard 
to the validity and applicability of the various techniques (Garland et al, 1996). However, 
moving the study o f SA beyond an amusing theoretical exercise requires that we be able to 
test our theories, and that requires reliable and valid measures of SA (Garland et al.,
1996).
Although Endsley’s (1995b) piece in the Human Factors special issue on SA is 
probably the most comprehensive treatment of SA measurement, several authors have 
examined and categorized the various attempts to empirically capture SA. These authors 
all propose substantially different taxonomies for SA measurement, thereby muddying the 
waters for the student of S A. Ultimately, two major approaches to S A measurement have 
emerged, proximal and distal, although a third approach, a middle-range or meso 
approach, has also been introduced in the SA literature.
Each o f these three approaches to S A measurement, proximal, distal and meso, 
asks a different question with regard to SA. Proximal approaches to SA measurement ask
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the question, does the operator have the basic building blocks necessary for good SA? 
Thus, proximal SA measures operate at Level 1 SA, perception of elements in the 
environment.
Distal measures, on the other hand, ask the question, when all is said and done, 
was the operator’s level of SA sufficient to do the job? In the earlier discussion as to 
whether or not to include decision making and performance as SA per se, the present 
author outlined several reasons why decision making and performance were not part o f 
SA itself, although they are important consequences o f SA. Distal measures, therefore, 
address the products o f S A, rather than S A itself; that is, distal S A measurement 
approaches actually capture outcomes of S A, rather than measurements o f S A itself.
Meso measures, or middle-range indicators, attempt to assess SA itself, rather than 
focusing on inputs, like proximal measures, or outputs, like distal measures. Extending this 
illustration, meso measurements focus on throughputs. However, the nature o f SA makes 
meso indicators inherently challenging to collect. It was stated earlier that one o f the major 
difficulties in SA measurement is that SA cannot be measured directly, yet this is precisely 
what meso indicators attempt to do.
Additionally, attempts to categorize SA measurement paradigms can be 
dichotomized as either objective or subjective. This is a basic operationalization decision 
that must be made in nearly all quantitative research. When researching SA, objective data 
may be such things as mission goals achieved or percent o f time at the prescribed altitude. 
Subjective measures of S A  on the other hand, typically involve observer ratings o f an 
operator’s SA.
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Any dichotomization of measurement approaches belies the complexity that has 
arisen around the issue o f S A measurement. A host o f measurement paradigms has 
emerged in the study o f S A. Indeed at times it appears that each author, frustrated with 
the inadequacies of existing SA measurement techniques, developed her or his own 
operational definition and measurement strategy.
Proximal Measures o f SA
A review of the definitions o f  S A revealed that one of the elements of S A upon 
which most authors and theorists agree is that of awareness of elements in the 
environment. Thus, this variety of immediate awareness seems a logical starting place for 
SA measurement. Level 1 SA, the level generally targeted by proximal measures, is a 
limiting factor on higher levels of SA, and ultimately, on performance. However, this is 
not a guarantee that high levels of level 1 SA will lead directly to high levels of overall SA 
and performance.
Objective approaches to proximal SA measurement. Perception research has long 
relied on physiological measures. Thus, it seems logical that, when searching for objective 
means by which to assess an operator’s perception of elements in the environment, 
physiological techniques should be explored. Physiological techniques, such as 
electroencephalography (EEG) and eye-tracking devices allow researchers to assess 
whether elements have been sensed (i.e., whether or not the subject’s eyes were pointing 
to a particular location), although sensation does not necessarily mean that the elements 
were attended to or understood. As Endsley (1995b) pointed out, physiological techniques 
provide no information with regard to the amount or accuracy of the information retained 
in the operator’s memory, or of what meaning the operators attach to the information that
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is perceived. Thus, Endsley (1995b) dismissed physiological measures as “not very 
promising” for SA measurement.
Another perceptual theory that has been considered in SA research is signal 
detection theory (e.g., Atkinson, 1963). At a very basic level, signal detection theory’s 
hits, misses, correct rejections and false alarms are very applicable to SA research. In some 
ways, this is the very essence o f level 1 S A. This has been discussed as an implicit 
approach to SA measurement (Brickman, Hettinger, Stautberg, Haas, Vidulich & Shaw, 
1999; Garland et al., 1996). Typically, these implicit measurement approaches apply signal 
detection theory to assess the operator’s perception of and reaction to prespecified critical 
events and cues. For example, if an operator uses any radar setting other than that which 
has been previously specified as correct during a mission segment, inadequate SA would 
be recorded for that item during that segment. Thus, correct actions are scored as 
indicating adequate SA and incorrect ones are scored as indicating inadequate SA during 
the preprogrammed mission segment.
Although signal detection theory provides an important analysis tool, in a panel 
discussion, Vidulich (Garland et al, 1996) questioned the scope o f SA that signal detection 
theory captures. In a later publication, Vidulich and his colleagues (Brickman et al., 1999) 
suggested that their Global Implicit Measurement technique has several advantages in that 
reactions to the prespecified events can be weighted to yield a more realistic assessment of 
SA.
Endsley (1995b) addressed the use of questionnaires in assessing SA. O f all the 
approaches to SA measurement discussed, Endsley suggested that this one held the most 
promise. Because the questionnaires that she discussed involve assessing objective
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information such as number o f enemies currently threatening, they are more likely to be 
valid. In addition, questionnaires are more able to tap directly into an operator’s SA, 
rather than simply inferring it.
Endsley (1995b) discussed three approaches to questionnaires: posttests, on-line 
assessment and the freeze technique. Posttests, administered directly after a trial, offer the 
advantage of permitting subjects to respond to long and involved questions. However, 
Endsley pointed out that posttests probably only assess S A at the very end of the trial, as 
events unfold and earlier misconceptions are addressed. On-line assessment techniques, 
which layer SA assessment questions on top of the operators’ tasks, offer the advantage of 
real-time assessment but they also draw needed attentional resources away from the task 
at hand and may actually shape SA by essentially giving the operators hints as to what 
information is important.
Finally, Endsley (1995b) discussed her preferred technique, the freeze technique. 
Here, the action is momentarily frozen, and the operators are probed for their S A with 
regard to a certain prespecified element in the environment. While this has the obvious 
drawback of being unavailable in “real” settings (one cannot simply freeze a dogfight and 
ask the respective pilots about their SA), it does allow the experimenter an opportunity to 
assess SA information in real time. Furthermore, Endsley’s (1995b) research showed that 
the technique did not appear to be intrusive on SA. Her technique, the Situation 
Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT), thus appears to offer some 
advantages in the study o f SA.
It must be recognized, however, that the freeze technique and SAGAT are distinct. 
The freeze technique is a methodology, and SAGAT applies that methodology with a
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particular type of question. Endsley’s research suggests that this content-methodology 
combination is effective. However, SAGAT can be challenging to deal with from a 
conventional measurement paradigm, in that the different items included within a SAGAT 
protocol, as Endsley uses them, tend to be fairly independent; “This means that trying to 
compile SA queries on different situational aspects into one combined SA variable is not 
supported” (Endsley, 1998, p. 85.).
There is nothing inherent in the freeze technique, or the proximal approach to SA 
measurement that categorically precludes the development o f fairly unitary scales, 
however. In fact, there are examples in the literature (e.g., Chaparro, Groff, Tabor, Sifrit,
& Gugerty, 1999) where a probe/recall technique has been employed using a composite 
score approach.
Both on-line assessment and Endsley’s freeze technique are representative of 
memory-probe approaches to SA measurement. Most authors who address the issue of 
SA measurement include probe techniques in their taxonomies (e.g., Garland et al., 1996). 
The primary concern with the probe technique is that it disrupts operator performance, 
offering respite from the time constraint o f the S A context and possibly breaking the 
operator’s concentration. Endsley’s (1995b) pair o f studies on the freeze technique 
suggested that for breaks o f up to 5 or 6 minutes, operators were able to use this 
technique without adverse affect on memory or performance.
On-line assessment requires much smaller “breaks” than the freeze technique. 
Therefore, given the finding that a break o f 5 to 6 minutes does not affect outcomes such 
as memory or performance, researchers should also feel confident that the shorter breaks 
used in on-line assessment will not impair memory or performance either. However, Sarter
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and Woods (1991) challenged this conclusion, suggesting instead that, despite the claim 
and aim that these techniques assess what a particular operator is aware o f at a given 
moment in time, these probe techniques are intrusive and in fact can only measure what 
the operator can recall once removed, even temporarily, from the context.
Subjective approaches to proximal SA measurement. Although most probe 
techniques, discussed by Sarter and Woods (1991) as intrusive techniques, collect 
objective data, this is not a requirement o f the technique. It is also possible to collect 
subjective data, such as ratings of performance, using this technique. For example, one 
way to circumvent the criticism that any measure taken post hoc is biased by outcome 
knowledge would be to take performance assessments or ratings using a probe technique. 
Similarly, it would be possible to collect meso-level data subjective data, such as 
assessment regarding most imminent threats, using a probe technique. Essentially, this 
simply means that subjective data of any type might be collected during brief breaks in the 
task, rather than after a simulation or task is completed.
Summary. Proximal measures such as queries are the most common measures of 
SA (Tenney, Adams, Pew, Huggins, & Rogers, 1992). However, the specific data 
requested in the probe vary in complexity from spatial location of a single aircraft (e.g., 
Fracker, 1989) to very complex recall tasks. The central difficulty with this technique is 
the fear that artificially stopping the simulation for operators to respond to the probe items 
is disruptive, and will affect the operator’s SA. It is possible that this could either 
artificially enhance operators’ S A by briefly relieving the time pressure and giving cues as 
to important elements, or that it could prove a detriment to SA by interrupting the 
operators’ concentration and train o f thought. However, as mentioned above, at least one
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study (Endsley, 1995b) tested this hypothesis and found that operators’ level o f SA was 
not altered by pausing the simulation and probing for SA. Although Endsley’s (1989) 
SAGAT has been discussed above, it is important to remember that SAGAT is but one of 
a number of measurement protocols based on the probe technique.
Distal Measures o f  SA
The other major approach appears to take the perspective that outcomes equal SA. 
This group uses distal indicators o f SA such as overall performance, e.g., goals achieved. 
Despite the earlier debate on whether SA included outcomes such as decision making and 
performance, this approach has an appealing logic to it. After all, we are interested in SA 
only to the extent that it contributes to performance. Therefore, variation in SA that is not 
related to performance is less compelling and perhaps no great loss is suffered if we fail to 
capture those data. However, this approach is ultimately tautological; performance is 
treated both as S A itself and as an outcome o f S A. That is, an operator has low 
performance because his or her SA (as measured by performance) is low. In addition, the 
number of intervening variables introduces a great deal of measurement error into this 
indicator. While some measurement error is unavoidable, excess amounts obscure the true 
score of the variable o f interest.
Objective approaches to distal SA measurement. The most obvious approach to 
objective distal SA measurement is to identify outcomes of interest and measure 
performance against them. For example, one might measure performance in terms of 
mission goals achieved in military applications, traffic incidents per thousand miles driven 
for automobile studies, or fatality and damage statistics for emergency management SA. 
However, this sort o f global assessment of performance is the most rife with difficulties.
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Clearly, as measures of S A, global measures of performance are subject to large amounts 
of contamination; innumerable factors, aside from the operators’ SA, can affect the overall 
performance level (Endsley, 1995b).
At least three approaches resolving this difficulty in performance measurement 
have been discussed in the literature. One method to overcome the difficulty o f excessive 
random error is to restrict the performance evaluation to one or a few key elements that 
contribute to overall performance. This technique, which Endsley (1995b) refers to as 
imbedded task measurement, evaluates performance against prespecified subtasks. For 
example, in an imbedded measurement paradigm, one might assess performance in terms 
of maintaining a particular altitude or stopping for red lights. This maintains the 
“naturalness” o f global performance measures, while eliminating some of the random 
measurement error. The primary problem with this technique is that SA information and 
tasks are highly interdependent, and in focusing on one, the experimenter may miss critical 
changes in SA on other elements.
The second approach to eliminating the random measurement error that plagues 
global performance assessment as an indicator of S A is to artificially manipulate the 
simulation and evaluate performance in terms of perception of and reaction to the 
manipulated events. This sort o f external performance measurement might take the form 
of a “disappearing” aircraft during a simulation. The operator’s perception of and reaction 
to this event would then be measured. Although this technique has the attractive element 
of control, Endsley (1995b) pointed out that such artificial manipulation o f the scenario 
may fundamentally change the operator’s SA as well as decision making.
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Tenney et al. (1992) proposed a third approach to SA measurement using 
performance. Although this technique also relies on artificial manipulation, there is a key 
difference from the approach discussed above: where the previously discussed approach 
relies on manipulations that essentially “trick” the operator, the manipulations proposed by 
Tenney and her colleagues are intended to test SA by requiring deeper processing to 
comprehend the important elements of the scenario or requiring the operator to shift 
attention or focus to perform successfully. By increasing the challenges to SA through 
manipulation, the theory is that the sensitivity o f the performance measure to differences in 
SA is increased.
In a panel discussion, Vidulich (Garland et al., 1996) addressed the difficulty of 
mitigating circumstances from another perspective. He simply categorized performance- 
based measures into measures of effectiveness and the more “data-dense” measures of 
performance. The fundamental difference between the two, as discussed by Vidulich, is 
that measures of performance take into account mitigating circumstances whereas 
measures of effectiveness do not. That is, in order to be a true measure of performance, 
mitigating circumstances must be included in measurement. While the increased precision 
that measures o f performance theoretically offer is an advantage, accurately 
operationalizing mitigating circumstances presents a significant challenge to the SA 
researcher. Thus, despite the fact that measures of performance theoretically have greater 
predictive efficacy, their operational challenges may exclude them from practical use. 
Measures of effectiveness, then, may actually be better than measures of performance as 
indicators of S A.
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Subjective approaches to distal SA measurement. Endsley (1995b) also discussed 
subjective measures. She divided her discussion between self and observer ratings. The 
primary difficulty with both methods is the same, however; in neither method does the 
rater have access to all the necessary information. Self-ratings may be inflated due to 
ignorance of the true reality. While observers may have the luxury o f knowing exactly 
what the “reality” o f the situation is, the observer does not have access to the operator’s 
cognitive experience o f it. She pointed out that self-ratings are probably contaminated by 
performance. Endsley suggested that the demonstrated relationship between self-ratings of 
SA and performance (Venturio et al., 1989) is more likely due to the fact that, when the 
operator’s gave their self-ratings of their SA, they knew the outcomes of their missions. 
Thus, they were able to evaluate their SA based on the outcome. From this perspective, it 
is little wonder that SA and performance have been found to correlate.
However, Endsley (1995b) did not address the fact that Venturio et al. (1989) 
found that observer ratings correlated more strongly with performance (r = .85) than did 
self-ratings (r = .60). Although the subjective SA ratings used in the experiment were 
supposed to be estimated independently of the final engagement outcome, due to the 
absence of other data, it is unclear whether the observers were biased by the outcomes of 
the trial, and thus basing their SA estimations on overall performance, or whether they 
were able to provide more objective estimations o f SA than operators themselves. 
Regardless, the disparity between observer and self-estimations o f SA is large enough to 
warrant further investigation into the foundations for the differences; indeed, the observer 
estimations o f S A accounted for approximately twice as much o f  the variance in 
performance as the self-estimations.
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Sarter and Woods (1991) took a simple approach to categorizing attempts at 
measuring SA. They dichotomized SA measurement into two types: intrusive assessment 
techniques and after-the-fact data collection. Intrusive techniques are those like Endsley’s 
SAGAT, and after-the-fact methods are those like pilot debriefings. Each has its own 
distinct flaws. As mentioned earlier, despite their intention to measure an operator’s “real 
time” SA, probe measures may only capture the information to which an operator has 
access when extracted from the situation. Similarly, after the fact measures rely on 
context-deprived recollections. Thus, although posttests offer the advantage of permitting 
subjects to respond to long and involved questions, as discussed earlier, posttests have a 
critical flaw in that they rely on assessments of SA from only one point in the trial. 
Furthermore, this single assessment is based on the very end of the trial, after the end 
results are often known.
Summary. Contrary to Endsley’s (1995b) assertion that performance-based 
measures reveal little about an individual’s SA, Tenney and her colleagues suggested that 
“much can be revealed about the situation awareness o f the crewmember through 
performance measures alone.” (Tenney et al., 1992, p. 13). However, Tenney et al. went 
on to clarify that this is the case only when the demands on attention can be manipulated. 
Meso-Measures o f  SA
Even given this varied menu o f measurement techniques, it seems that each leaves 
something to be desired. One additional avenue to pursue in measuring SA is to revisit the 
promixal/distal debate and attempt to find, quite literally, the middle ground. Middle range 
indicators (meso-indicators) of S A should be more appropriate and perhaps more precise
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as indicators o f S A than either proximal or distal measures. Meso-indicators should suffer 
neither the myopia of proximal measures nor the random error of distal measures.
Objective approaches to meso SA measurement. Objectively attempting to capture 
the whole of SA is a trickier proposition than simply attempting to objectively measure 
SA’s inputs or outputs. The most complex o f these is the model-based approach to SA 
measurement. Tenney et al. (1992) suggested the use of human performance models that 
operate in parallel to a crew o f human operators in a flight simulation. During a 
simulation, the parallel system collects complete data on the crew’s activities. From this 
record, a performance model is developed. In essence, the researchers suggested 
developing an artificial intelligence model based upon the crews’ actions and reactions to 
environmental events. Of course, since these data are collected in a simulation, the 
universe of external events are also recorded, and the datasets are integrated into the 
performance model. At the end of the development process, the experimenters would then 
have a complete model of each crewmember’s “consciousness” at every given point in 
time throughout the simulation. Although this is clearly a highly complicated and 
sophisticated technique, if achievable, the resultant model could yield volumes of S A 
information to researchers. More importantly, it would yield information not only about 
the inputs to the operators’ SA and the outcomes of it, but of the SA itself. The goal of 
this technique is to yield information on the moment-to-moment perceptions and processes 
during the simulation.
Clearly, there are some technical challenges in this model-based approach. In the 
air traffic control domain, one way to gain the richness of data offered by the model-based 
approach to SA research, without the technological challenges is through a method
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
proposed by Rodgers and Duke (1994): Situation Assessment Through Re-Creation O f 
Incidents (SATORI). Here, as the name suggests, real incidents are re-created for review 
and analysis. Specifically, the SATORI system records both radar and verbal air traffic 
control information. This information is then synchronized and played back, or re-created, 
at a later time. One key advantage is that these are natural data rather than simulation 
data, with all the richness that natural data provide. Because the method captures all o f the 
data available to the air traffic controller, in the sequence in which it was made available, 
as well as the communications from the air traffic controller, there is significant 
opportunity to capture SA data. While the method was developed specifically for use in air 
traffic control, it offers promise for use with other systems, particularly those that are 
largely computer based, such as nuclear power operations.
Despite the appeal of these model-based approaches to S A measurement, there are 
substantial barriers to their implementation. First, both operator and environment data 
must be reliably captured. Second, those data must be integrated into a coherent whole 
(not unlike the achievement of Level 3 SA). Finally, due to the highly specialized nature of 
the models that are created, the results of such studies may not be generalizable.
There are, however, several methods by which holistic meso assessments of SA 
can be made which do not require the technological sophistication o f the model-based 
approach or SATORI. There are at least three objective approaches to meso SA 
measurement that are not so technologically complex. Each o f these in some way taps 
higher-level SA (Level 2 or Level 3). First, the operator’s response time and accuracy in 
assessing situations can be measured. Second, there are some direct measures of 
information seeking that can be indicators of higher-order SA. Finally, display recall can
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be used as an indicator o f higher-order SA. Each of these are discussed in greater detail
below.
The first o f  these, speed and accuracy in assessing situations, gets at the core o f 
SA in many regards. The defining feature of Level 2 SA is integration o f  elements in the 
environment into a cohesive whole. Level 3 is the level o f judgements and planning for 
future events. Thus, an operator’s ability to correctly and swiftly assess the normalcy o f a 
given situation can be taken as an indicator o f higher order SA. Tenney et al. (1992) 
proposed using this technique as a direct measure of S A. The drawback here is that the 
technique is only applicable in controlled settings, where one outcome or situation 
assessment can be objectively defined as “correct,” and any other judgement can be 
objectively characterized as “incorrect.”
The second o f these less technologically advanced objective measures of S A at the 
meso level is information seeking. Tenney at al. (1992) suggested that information seeking 
is a viable SA metric. It is only through the processes o f information integration and 
planning for future events that operators can generate questions and test hypotheses. 
Although the perception of information is an element o f Level 1 SA, information seeking 
is driven by higher level SA. That is, the operator’s current understanding of a situation 
will drive her or his efforts to seek confirmatory or contradictory evidence. Thus, 
information seeking could be used as an indicator of higher-order SA.
Tenney et al. (1992) discussed two approaches to the measurement of information 
seeking as an indicator o f S A: making all information available only by request and 
recording eye-movements. Using the technique of making all information available only by 
request actually includes elements that are both subjective and objective. Here, the
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operator is effectively isolated; all data are provided only on request. Thus, the number 
and content o f the operator’s requests can provide good insight into her or his current 
model of the situation, as well as providing a perfect record o f exactly what information 
that model is based upon. It is also possible that this concept could be applied to an 
operator’s or team’s communication pattern, such that information seeking could be seen 
as an indicator o f team SA. However, the delays involved in actively requesting all 
information, as well as the lost opportunity for serendipity seriously challenge this as a 
useful method for quantifying S A. The “real-time” quality o f the SA context suggests that 
the timing delays inherent in such a system may compromise generalizibility.
Real-time measures of information seeking have been discussed, however. A more 
objective, but possibly less accurate meso-level SA metric is recording eye movements 
during a real-time simulation. Here, a device records exactly what the operator looks at, 
and for how long. However, this method is not without its flaws. While it provides very 
detailed data about what elements in the environment are receiving the operator’s visual 
attention, there is no information about whether the information actually received the 
operator’s attention. Furthermore, the metric does not clearly delineate among the levels 
of S A, thus rendering “muddled” data. With this technique, the researcher cannot 
distinguish whether attention paid to a given element is indicative o f mere perception of 
that element, suggesting Level 1 SA, or due to information seeking as a part o f Level 3 
SA. That is, it is not possible to establish comprehension or strategy on the basis o f eye 
movement data. Thus, this method does not seem particularly appropriate forjudging 
information seeking per se. However, if it is assumed that eye movement tracking captures
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only data related to perception, it may function as a good measure of proximal S A to the 
extent that environmental data are often visual in nature.
The third objective approach to meso-level SA measurement involves display 
recall. One o f the classic studies in cognition establishes the link between pattern recall and 
meaningfulness of the pattern (Chase & Simon, 1973). In essence, when patterns are 
meaningful, the pattern is the unit of recollection, rather than the individual element. 
Meaning is layered onto “raw” perceptual SA data at Level 2 SA. Thus, recall of displays 
should vary as a function o f meaningfulness, and thereby be a good indicator of Level 2 
SA (Tenney et al, 1992). Tenney et al. treat display recall as a category separate from the 
simple queries addressed in the earlier section on proximal measurement. Thus, of the 
objective approaches to meso-level SA measurement, this seems the most promising. 
However, the success o f this measure depends upon some reliable way to quantify display 
recall accurately. Operationalizing display recall poses significant challenges to the SA 
researcher.
Subjective approaches to meso SA measurement. Subjective measures are ideally 
suited for quantifying SA at the meso-level. The central difficulty in measurement o f S A 
itself, which led to the proximal and distal approaches in the first place, was that SA was 
difficult to observe directly. However, given the flaws inherent in proximal and distal 
measurement strategies, there is an appeal in attempting to capture SA itself, and 
subjective ratings of SA as a whole seem an attractive means by which to achieve this. 
Subjective ratings of SA are a promising measurement approach to the extent that the 
ratings are based on sound theory.
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Several authors have taken this general perspective and proposed subjective SA 
measurement instruments. Carretta et al. (1994) proposed an 8 dimension, 31-item rating 
scale for use in assessing SA (see Appendix A). The Situation Awareness Rating Scale 
(S ARS) is designed for use both as a supervisory rating scale and a self-rating scale, and 
assesses such things as “time-sharing ability,” “communication quality,” and “defensive 
reaction.” The SARS is scored relative to other F-15C pilots, from “acceptable” to 
“outstanding.” Unfortunately, Carretta and his colleagues have not published any data on 
the reliability, validity or predictive efficacy o f the measure that they propose. In addition, 
SARS is specifically written for combat pilots, thus limiting is applicability to other 
populations that require SA.
Five years earlier, Taylor (1989) developed an objective rating scale that is both 
more concise than Caretta et al.’s (1994) SARS and more broadly applicable (see Table 
1). Taylor’s 10-D Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) relies on 10 empirically 
derived items, such as “complexity of situation” and “concentration o f attention.” SART is 
scored from low to high on each of the items. Interestingly, Taylor’s scale captures both 
the level of challenges present in the environment and the operator’s ability to meet those 
challenges. Selcon and Taylor (1989) have shown preliminary evidence that SART is a 
valid measure o f SA. Endsley’s (1998) comparative study o f SAGAT and SART 
suggested that SART was highly correlated to a rudimentary measure o f SA, although no 
relationship was established between SAGAT and SART.
One meso-level measurement strategy is available that represents a fairly dramatic 
shift from the approaches discussed thus far, in terms of the content that is evaluated.
Some behaviors are indicative o f SA, and to the extent that they can be codified and
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captured, behavioral indicators hold promise for fruitful S A measurement. Situational 
Awareness Linked Indicators Adapted to Novel Tasks, or SALIENT (Muniz, Stout, 
Bowers & Salas, 1997), is a set of behaviorally based indicators of SA (see Table 2). 
SALIENT holds promise for quantitatively assessing SA as a meso-indicator.
Table 1
Situation Awareness Rating Technique (Taylor, 1989)
Dimension Item
Demands on attentional resources
Instability of situation: Likeliness to change suddenly 
Complexity of situation: degree of complication 
Variability of situation: number of variable/factors changing 
Supply of attentional resources
Arousal: degree of alertness: readiness for activity 
Concentration of attention: degree to which thought is brought to bear 
Division of attention: distribution/spread of focus of attention 
Spare mental capacity: mental ability available for new variables 
Understanding of situation
Information quantity: amount of knowledge received and understood 
Information quality: goodness or value of knowledge communicated 
Familiarity: degree of prior experience/knowledge
SALIENT (Muniz et al., 1997) is a list of behaviors proposed to be indicative of 
good SA (see Table 2). These behavioral indicators were drawn from the SA literature. In 
their paper outlining SALIENT, Muniz et al. utilized a five phase process to arrive at a 
final checklist or observation form based on SALIENT. They first identified behaviors that 
indicate high levels o f SA; their list of behaviors is displayed in Table 2. The second phase 
involved developing scenario events that would allow for the display o f SA-related 
behaviors. Third, Muniz and her colleagues identified specific behaviors that are based on 
the behavioral indicators identified in Phase 1. For example, in this phase, “reporting 
problems” was operationalized as “team member verbalized they have lost radio contact
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with AMC (air mission commander)” (Muniz et al., 1998, p. 11-5). In phase four, Muniz 
and her colleagues developed a script for experimenters to use in administering SALIENT. 
Finally, the fifth phase o f SALIENT development yielded an observation form for use in 
capturing SA data. Here, the specific behaviors that were believed to indicate high levels 
of S A in each segment were listed on a checklist. The checklist includes a column next to 
each specific behavior where the experimenter indicates the presence of each specific 
behavior.
One of the limitations outlined by Muniz and her colleagues (1997) addresses this 
behavioral specificity. They acknowledge that the identification o f the “best” responses 
during each scenario segment is a long and arduous process. Furthermore, they 
acknowledge that some of these specific examples o f the behavioral indicators “may not 
occur naturally” (p. 11-6), and that alternative responses are also possible. Thus, the level 
of specificity offers both advantages and disadvantages.
It is possible, therefore, that the benefits of their behavioral focus may be obtained 
through less constrictive means than the specific behaviors outlined in their full 
methodology. That is, it may be constructive to use their list o f behavioral indicators as a 
traditional behavioral checklist, keeping the general categories intact. The development 
process speaks to the content validity of these dimensions. Applying a more generalizable 
rating or checklist approach to that content may be one means by which to assess SA in a 
wider variety of contexts or experimental settings than might be possible with the full 
SALIENT instrument as described by Muniz and her colleagues.
In addition to the measurement strategies outlined above, however, it is possible to 
take middle-range subjective measures of SA in forms other than rating scales. Notably, it
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is possible to apply the probe technique, the most used in SA o f  all measurement 
techniques (Tenney et al., 1992), to meso-measurement. Tenney and her colleagues were
Table 2
Situational Awareness Linked Indicators Adapted to Novel Tasks (Muniz et al., 1997).
Dimension Item
Demonstrated Awareness of Surrounding Environment
Monitored environment for changes, trends, 
abnormal conditions
Demonstrated awareness of where he/she was
Recognized problems
Reported problems 
Located potential sources of problem 
Demonstrated knowledge of problem consequences 
Resolved discrepancies 
Noted deviations 
Anticipated need for action
Recognized a need for action 
Anticipated consequences of action and decisions 
Informed other of actions taken 
Monitored actions (self & others)
Demonstrated knowledge of tasks
Demonstrated knowledge of tasks
Exhibited skilled time sharing attention among
tasks
Monitored workload (self & others)
Shared workload within station 
Answered questions promptly 
Demonstrated awareness of information
Communicated important information 
Confirmed information when possible 
Challenged information when doubtful 
Re-checked old information 
Provided information in advance 
Obtained information of what is happening 
Demonstrated understanding of complex relationships 
Briefed status frequently
somewhat disparaging o f the type o f information collected in many applications o f the 
probe technique, such as one’s altitude at a given time. They suggested that, if data 
collected via this technique are to have more than face validity, researchers must focus on
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such elements as goals, diagnoses, and crew responsibilities and knowledge. Clearly, these 
data are indicative of higher order SA. Thus, utilizing a probe protocol with content in 
these areas would yield SA data at the meso level.
Summary. Meso indicators of S A are promising in that they avoid the major 
challenges faced by proximal and distal SA metrics. Specifically, they are not subject to 
the contamination that plagues distal measure o f SA, nor do they suffer from the 
restriction of proximal measures.
Other Approaches to SA Measurement
It has been suggested that generalized intelligence (g), psychomotor skills and 
conscientiousness may be useful as predictors o f SA (Caretta et al., 1994). Although these 
clearly represent a different approach to dealing quantitatively with S A than the techniques 
discussed above, there is merit in considering the potential efficacy o f these fairly universal 
predictors in SA research. Given that SA is a cognitive construct, separate from 
performance, it seems as if psychomotor skills might be less directly related to S A 
(although it is likely related to overall task performance). However, it is impossible to 
determine empirically the efficacy of any predictor of S A until adequate methods for 
quantifying SA itself can be established.
Finally, some qualitative methods of data gathering have been proposed for use in 
SA research. Baker, Stout, Salas, Fowlkes, and Cannon-Bowers (1998) proposed using 
structured interviews and guided verbal reports. Their research suggested that these two 
methods yielded reliable results that hold great potential utility. Unfortunately, due to the 
qualitative nature o f these data, it is not possible to assess the validity of the measures. 
Baker and his colleagues emphasize that, while these methods yield rich data that are
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consistent across techniques, it is important to recognize their limitations. Ultimately, as 
with qualitative techniques in general, these techniques are most useful for revealing 
knowledge, rather than establishing the amount or extent o f knowledge.
Summary
Despite the volumes o f attention paid to different approaches to capturing SA 
quantitatively, to date there is no authority greater than any one author’s opinion as to the 
most efficacious method of SA measurement. That is, most authors’ efforts seek to 
establish the legitimacy o f their own methods, rather than to demonstrate their merits 
relative to other available methodologies. Thus, one o f the goals of this work is to identify 
the efficacy o f a variety of indicators o f SA.
Teams
The team literature is substantially larger and better developed than the SA 
literature. In recent years, team research has evolved considerably. Given the nebulousness 
of the concept o f “team,” and some of the controversies in the team literature, it is 
important to first define teams, and explore some team taxonomies that are relevant to the 
proposed research. In addition, it is important to consider team processes, and to address 
the relevance o f these concepts to team S A. Finally, several models o f team SA are 
considered.
Definitions
Before we can begin a meaningful discourse on teams, it is useful define the term. 
One of the frequently cited definitions o f teams is “a distinguishable set o f individuals who 
interact interdependently and adaptively to achieve specified, shared and valued
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objectives” (Morgan, Glickman, Woodard, Blaiwes & Salas, 1986, p. 3). Although brief, 
there are some important elements in this definition.
First, a team consists o f a distinguishable set of multiple individuals. This 
essentially speaks to team composition. Thus, it must be possible to distinguish both who 
is, and who is not, a member of a given team. In the same vein, one must establish some 
parameters for team size. One of the controversies in the team literature is how many 
people are required to classify multiple individuals working together as a “team.” To those 
researchers whose primary interests are in certain social processes (e.g., coalition 
formation), three people are required for a group of individuals to be classified as a team. 
Other models suggest that two individuals are sufficient. Given that minority/majority 
influence and coalition formation are not included in the models discussed in this 
dissertation, two individuals will be considered a team for the purposes o f  this research.
Second, teams work interdependently. This second element addresses team 
processes. This interdependence means that there is an element of reliance and shared fate 
among team members. While multiple individuals can work “together” in time or space 
towards the same or similar goals, unless the element o f interdependence is present, those 
individuals would not be classified as a team.
However, this interdependence can come in several forms. It is possible for teams 
to be interdependent in either their processes or in their outcomes, or in both. Each has a 
different implication for the level of interaction required. Process interdependence requires 
more interaction on the part o f team members, as the very way in which they achieve their 
goals is intertwined. Outcome interdependence, on the other hand, requires only that each 
team member “carry their own load” and contribute their portion to the final team
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outcome. While these teams require fewer interactions among the team members, none 
can succeed while another fails.
The last element of this definition speaks to a cognitive aspect of the definition of 
teams. Here we recognize the importance of goals and goal-directed activity. Thus, 
interdependence is a necessary but not sufficient element of teams. Symbiotic organisms 
are interdependent, but are in pursuit o f differing goals and therefore could not be 
classified as a team.
Finally, it is important to address some o f  the social processes associated with 
teams and effective teamwork. The necessity o f  coordinating multiple individuals each of 
whom is likely to have unique information and task priorities can be challenging.
However, successful team performance requires coordination.
Types o f Teams
Clearly, the definition above leaves considerable room for variability. Meaningful 
discussion on teams requires more specificity with regard to the particular defining 
characteristics of the teams under consideration. Two taxonomies are presented that 
contribute clarity to the definition of teams. The first is noteworthy for its elegance and 
parsimony in making distinctions among types o f teams on the basis o f their central 
features, within a fixed universe of features. The second is presented for its critical analysis 
of the differences among decision making teams. Although we have discussed S A as a 
construct distinct from decision making, it is important to bear in mind that teams which 
require SA are also required to make decisions. Thus, discourse on decision making teams 
is relevant.
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Basic Types o f  Teams
While numerous taxonomies have been presented, one in particular clearly lays out 
the key elements that distinguish among major types o f teams. McGrath, Berdahl and 
Arrow (1995) suggested that work groups (teams) are distinguished by relative emphasis 
that is placed on one of three key elements , members, tasks or tools. Thus, a given work 
group is characterized most by the individuals who comprise it, the specific tasks the work 
group performs, or the tools and technologies it employs to attain its goals.
These three key elements are not distinct, but overlap. The elements at the 
intersections o f these primary elements are also interesting. At the intersection of members 
and tasks we find the division of labor as an important element. Job structure is at the 
intersection o f tasks and tools, and the intersection between tools and members is defined 
as the role network.
The model presented by McGrath et al. (1995; see Figure 1), addresses three 
different types o f mutually interdependent work groups with singularity o f purpose. The 
defining characteristic when distinguishing among these is the primacy of one of the three 
key elements o f members, tasks or tools. The remaining elements, then, are less central 
and less immutable.
The first type of work group outlined by McGrath et al. (1995) is a team.
According to their taxonomy, the primary component o f a team is the individuals involved. 
The secondary element o f a team is the technology that it uses, and the least central 
component is the particular task at hand. When primacy is put on the individuals involved, 
teams will evolve to accomplish different tasks and use different technologies as necessary.
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The focal element o f a team is a relatively stable population; the team members do not 
change drastically over time.
= Most central component 
= Second most central component o = Least central component
Divisiorf 
o f Labor TasksMembers
TEAM/  Job 
Structure
Tools
Division 
o f Labor Tasks TasksMembers Members
/ T  TASK
RolcVORCJr Job 
Network
CREW/  Job 
Structure
r  R o lc \  
NetworkStructure
Tools Tools
Figure I. Three types of work groups.
McGrath, J. E., Berdahl, J. L, & Arrow, H. (1995). Traits, expectations, culture and clout: 
The dynamics of diversity in work groups. In S. E. Jackson & M. N. Ruderman (Eds.), 
Diversity in work teams (pp. 17-46). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by 
permission.
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Following the hierarchy o f elemental importance in each type o f work group, the 
intersection elements discussed above also vary in importance in the different types of 
work groups. In a team, the role network and division o f labor are the most important 
elements. In a task force, the division of labor and the job structure are the most important 
elements. In a crew, the job structure and role network are the most important elements. 
Decision M aking Teams
In general, teams are formed with a purpose or goal in mind. Often, decision 
making is a significant component of teams’ activities. Many different types o f teams must 
make decisions in their daily function. McGrath et al. (1995) presented some key 
differences among major types of work groups. However, considerable room for 
refinement in the definition o f teams and the distinctions among them remains. Klimoski 
and Jones (1995) present five types of decision making teams. The types of teams 
presented by Klimoski and Jones (1995) are: command and control teams, production 
teams, customer-service teams, professional/technical decision making teams, and 
executive teams. Each is distinct from the others, and each faces unique challenges. Table 
3 outlines some o f the key differences among these five types o f teams.
Command and control teams are characterized by highly specialized and 
interdependent jobs. This means that team members cannot “pick up the slack” if one 
member fails to perform adequately. Command and control teams generally perform highly 
coordinated tasks in response to the environment. Generally, their decisions must be made 
in real time, and consequences for decisions are immediate.
Production teams, autonomous production teams in particular, are characterized 
by broad responsibilities and flexible interdependence. While broad responsibilities and
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skills allow flexibility in goal accomplishment, this flexible interdependence increases the 
complexity in team coordination. Unlike command and control teams, where task 
responsibilities are clearly laid out as a consequence o f specialization, these production 
teams must address the matter o f who will perform what functions, in a team where 
several may be able to perform each task.
Table 3
Types o f  Decision Making Teams (Klimoski & Jones, 1995).
Team Type Coordination Decisions Specialization Interdependenc
e
Command & 
Control
Highly coordinated Real time with 
immediate consequences
Highly
specialized
Highly
interdependent
Production Need to coordinate
cross-functional
interdependence
Real time, immediate or 
long-term consequences
Broad
responsibilities
Flexible
interdependenc
e
Customer
Service
High need for 
coordination
Complex, based on 
perception of client 
needs, feedback is not 
consistent in form or 
timing
Flexible, 
broadly skilled
High
interdependenc
e
Professional (varies) Varies widely, 
significant impact
Highly
specialized
(varies)
Executive (varies) Poorly defined problems, 
significantly delayed 
feedback
(varies) (varies)
Third, Klimoski and Jones (1995) addressed customer service teams. They 
discussed the “handoff ’ approach to customer service, where one individual acts as a 
initial point of contact, and then “hands off’ the situation to another employee or group of 
employees. This is a highly interdependent process and successful execution o f this
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process requires a great degree of coordination. Furthermore, the decision tasks faced by 
customer service teams are complex. The stimuli upon which decisions are based may be 
subtle or subjective. In addition, the feedback is not consistent, taking many forms and 
operating on a variable timeline from immediate to significantly delayed.
Professional and executive teams are more variable than the previous three types. 
Klimoski and Jones (1995) suggest that executive teams are a type of professional team. 
The primary defining characteristic o f both of these types o f teams are their decisions. 
Professional teams come in many permutations, and thus, their decision tasks vary 
considerably as well. However, one constant is that their decisions generally have 
significant impact. The situation is more complex for executive teams. They tend to be 
faced with poorly defined problems, and feedback on their decisions may be delayed by 
months or even years.
Teams that Require Situation Awareness 
The complexity and constraints presented by the SA context often preclude a 
single individual working alone from performing successfully. The demands are too high 
and the operations are too complex. Thus, teams are often required to successfully operate 
in the SA context. While multiple individuals working together increase the resources that 
the unit can devote to operations in the context at hand, this also presents new challenges 
of communication and coordination. The teamwork required o f teams in contexts that 
require is highly sophisticated.
Teams that operate in contexts where SA is critical must demonstrate exquisite 
coordination. The time-constraint and risk often associated these contexts leaves little 
room for error or confusion. While a good deal of this can be established in advance (as in
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a mission brief, or through extensive experience as a team), the complexity of these 
contexts means that unexpected turns of events are a distinct possibility.
Acquiring and maintaining good SA places some additional demands on those 
teams which need high levels o f SA to function maximally. Team SA, then, falls at the 
intersection between two complex topics. Although a few perspectives or theories on team 
SA have emerged, it is important to first discuss some o f the unique characteristics and 
demands that teams which must operate in the complex environments that require SA 
must face.
Several authors have presented taxonomies of teams, and it is clear that some 
types of teams are more likely than others to find themselves in contexts that require SA. 
These contexts are often very technically demanding. Operators must be expert at their 
respective jobs to the extent that they can detect and analyze even minor deviations from 
normalcy that might indicate a problem down the road.
Following McGrath et al.’s (1995) taxonomy, then, the SA context is most likely 
to be a factor for crews, as opposed to teams or task forces. This has interesting 
implications for SA research. According to McGrath et al.’s (1995) model, the technology 
or tools are the most important element in a crew, followed by the task at hand. The 
members of the crew are the least central component.
Let’s review a context that requires high levels o f SA against this prescription. 
Taking surgery as a prototype, we find that the technology at hand is the central or 
defining element o f  the group’s existence. Secondary to that, we find a particular task at 
hand, in this case a particular operation. The element of tertiary interest is most subject to 
change. Indeed, we find that several physicians may execute different elements o f the
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surgical procedure, with little disruption in the overall process. It is far more challenging 
to imagine the team o f surgeons shifting from one technology to the next (for example, 
collectively abandoning surgery to pursue commercial fishing), than it is to imagine 
replacing on member o f the surgical team with another.
This characterization of teams that require SA as crews under the McGrath et al. 
(1995) model, also has interesting implications arising from the intersection elements. In a 
crew, the job structure and the role network are the two most important intersection 
elements. This suggests that teams (or crews) facing an context that requires SA must 
address these fundamental issues for successful performance.
Following Klimoski and Jones’s (1995) taxonomy o f team types, different 
attributes become important for teams likely to find themselves in contexts that require 
SA. According to this taxonomy, command and control teams are the most likely to 
require SA in their operations. These teams were characterized by high levels of 
coordination, real time decisions with immediate consequences, high levels of 
specialization and high levels of interdependence. Thus, it can be inferred that these 
attributes would also be important for teams in the SA context.
Together, these perspectives paint a fairly clear picture of the characteristics of a 
team in a context that requires SA. The high level of specialization in command and 
control teams is a requirement o f the technological focus o f a crew. The time-constrained 
nature o f the S A context drives the requirement for real-time decisions with immediate 
consequences. The high levels of coordination and interdependence are means by which to 
meet the need for job structure and clarity in role networks.
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Team Processes
To this point, our discussion of teams has been primarily descriptive. If we wish to 
be prescriptive with regard to teams, for example, to improve team effectiveness, it is 
important that we be able to understand team processes. From understanding, we can 
move to prescribing mechanisms and techniques for improved performance. Two 
perspectives that hold promise for improving team performance via process prescriptions 
are discussed, team decision making and role theory. In addition, several behaviors that 
contribute to team effectiveness have been identified.
Team Decision Making
Having differentiated among several types of decision making teams, it is 
important to examine the important elements that contribute to good team decision 
making. It goes without saying that team decision making will be similar to and different 
from individual decision making in important ways. While several good individual decision 
making models exist, one team decision making model is particularly clear in the 
constructs it proposes, the linkages among those constructs, and the empirical evidence to 
support the validity of the model. This is Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major and 
Phillips’ (1995) hierarchical team decision making model.
Hollenbeck et al.’s (1995) team decision making theory was developed for one 
specific type o f team, although it may be applicable to other varieties as well. Specifically, 
their model addresses decision making in hierarchical teams with distributed expertise. 
These are command and control teams with two primary distinguishing factors: status 
differences among team members and differential expertise among team members.
Although one leader in these teams has the final decision authority, each team member
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brings unique expertise. Thus, the leader must gather, integrate and act upon information 
from each of these distinct information sources.
Hollenbeck et al. (1995) explicitly recognize the importance of distinct levels of 
the decision making process: decision level, individual level, dyadic level and team level. 
However, the bulk o f their work focuses on the core team level constructs o f team 
informity, staff validity and hierarchical sensitivity. Although, in general, these have 
analogues at the other levels (decision, individual and dyad), it is the team level constructs 
that are of interest for purposes of the present paper.
Team informity addresses the extent to which the team as a whole is aware of all 
relevant information. Staff validity, Hollenbeck et al.’s (1995) second construct, addresses 
the accuracy of team members’ judgements. Finally, hierarchical sensitivity assesses the 
team leader’s accuracy in weighting the inputs of the various team members in arriving at 
a single team decision. The central thesis in this theory is that these three core team level 
constructs are the most direct causes of accurate team decision making.
Although their effects were not directly tested in Hollenbeck et al.’s (1995) piece 
on the hierarchical team decision making model, the model also includes six non-core 
constructs, believed to influence decision making accuracy indirectly, through the core 
constructs. Each of these six non-core constructs influences one or two o f the core 
constructs. Specifically, Hollenbeck et al. suggest that roles influence both staff validity 
and hierarchical sensitivity. The social environment, a non-core construct, is hypothesized 
to affect hierarchical sensitivity. The behavior setting (physical proximity) affects both 
hierarchical sensitivity and team informity. The physical/technical environment is also 
proposed to affect team informity. Tasks are thought to affect both team informity and
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staff validity. It is suggested that factors within the person influence staff validity as well. 
These concepts and the relationships among them are displayed in Figure 2.
Empirical research by Hollenbeck and his colleagues (1995; Hollenbeck, Ugen, 
LePine, Colquitt, & Hedlund, 1998) supports the primary contention that the three core 
team level constructs (informity, validity and sensitivity) are the most direct causes of 
accurate team decision making. In the seminal piece on this theory, Hollenbeck et al.
(1995) report two studies. The first study by Hollenbeck et al. (1995) examines the 
contributions o f the core constructs over a series o f six task sessions, each of which was 
three hours in duration. The second study by Hollenbeck et al. (1995) relies on a more 
typical team research paradigm, examining the results o f  a greater number o f participants, 
each whom made a much smaller number o f decisions. Thus, each of the studies drew its 
statistical power from a different source. The first study by Hollenbeck et al. (1995) relied 
upon many data points for a relatively small number o f  individuals (within-subject 
variation), and the second study relied upon relatively few data points for a substantially 
larger participant group (between subject variation). Both studies relied upon university 
students who received training in a simulation task.
Study 1 by Hollenbeck et al. (1995) revealed that the core constructs accounted 
for nearly 50% of the variance in team performance. The lion’s share o f this variance came 
from team informity and the interaction between staff validity and hierarchical sensitivity, 
each o f which accounted for about 20% o f the variability in overall team performance. 
Furthermore, the constructs were related to task success in two other interesting ways. 
First, teams that were high on all three o f the core constructs outperformed those that 
were low on all three core constructs by about two standard deviations. Second, teams
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that were low on all three of the core constructs were five times more likely to experience 
a disaster than those that were high on all three.
ROLE
/ i / i /  \
/  $/J /  \
/  /  Accuracy \
Team Informity^ 
Decision Infonnity
PHYSICAL/TECHNICAL
ENVIRONMENT
Figure 2. Overview o f hierarchical team decision making theory 
Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R , Sego, D. J., Hedlund, J., Major, D. A., & Phillips, J. 
(1995). Multilevel theory of team decision making. Decision performance in teams 
incorporating distributed expertise. Journal o f  Applied Psychology, 80, 292-316. 
Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.
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In Hollenbeck et al.’s second (1995) study, this finding was even more 
pronounced; none o f the 14 teams that were high on all three characteristics experienced a 
disaster, whereas the teams that were low on all three core constructs experienced a 3% 
disaster rate. This second study also revealed the importance o f team cohesiveness in 
contributing to team success; team cohesiveness was the only non-core variable to 
significantly predict all three of the core constructs, as well as overall team decision 
accuracy.
More recently, Hollenbeck et al. (1998) have shown that, together, these core 
constructs account for 63% of the variance in team decision accuracy. In terms of unique 
variance, the lion’s share was contributed by team informity (32%) and staff validity
(23%).
There are several lessons to be taken from these findings. First, the ability to 
collect and distribute information is important for accurate decision making. Second, it is 
important for teams to have members who can integrate raw data into meaningful and 
accurate judgements. This was seen as especially important, given the distributed expertise 
within the teams; substantial benefit was gained from team members processing and 
integrating information prior to passing it along to another team member who may not 
have been expert in the topic at hand. Third, it is important for accurate decision making 
that information from various sources be weighted accurately. Furthermore, within-team 
variance on these constructs can be substantial, particularly for informity.
Finally, these studies yielded some important observations in the area of 
communication. Although communication data were not collected as a central variable, the 
nature of the task used by Hollenbeck et al. (1995) permitted them to collect extensive
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communication data. While the objective quantity of communication did not differ 
between high and low performing teams, Hollenbeck et al. made two interesting 
observations regarding the nature o f those communications.
First, Hollenbeck et al. (1995) noted that high and low performing teams differed 
in the extent to which they were proactive or reactive in their communications. High 
performing teams in their studies were much more proactive, sending unsolicited relevant 
pieces o f communication to their teammates. Low performing teams, on the other hand, 
were reactive in their communication patterns; rather than proactively sending out 
information, these teams devoted much o f their communication effort to asking one 
another questions. Furthermore, in the low performing teams, many o f the questions went 
unanswered. Thus, fewer of the low performing teams’ communications actually yielded 
information.
The second interesting observation made by Hollenbeck et al. (1995) was that high 
and low performing teams differed in the extent to which they processed and added 
meaning to information prior to communicating it. Where low performing teams tended to 
pass along information in a raw data form, high performing teams processed the data prior 
to communicating it. Then, the individuals in high performing teams tended to pass along 
the processed information in a form that was meaningful to the recipient of the 
communication.
Decision M aking and Team Situation Awareness
The high demands placed on teams by the contexts that require high levels o f S A 
require very effective decision making strategies. Those decisions that can be planned in 
advance (programmed decisions, Simon, 1960) offer a reasonable expectation for success,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
given their developed structure, clarity o f criteria and viable alternatives. However, the 
advance planning that characterizes programmed decisions is not always available. 
Nonprogrammed decisions are those that must be made in the moment, without the benefit 
of advance planning. In the face o f nonprogrammed decisions, often necessary in 
situations that are novel and/or ill-defined, the likelihood of success is an unknown 
quantity. Critical cues may be missed, and time and resources may be insufficient to 
thoroughly explore alternative courses o f action.
This state of affairs leads to a bounded rationality with regard to decision making. 
When unusual situations arise in the SA context, teams must select a course o f action and 
initiate it very quickly. Thus, the team must use effective communication, and rely on a 
common understanding of the situation and each team member’s part in the solution.
Thus, team processes must be adequate to perceive, process, plan and perform smoothly 
in a very short time span, with limited information and resources.
The fact that many decisions within an SA context will be made using bounded 
rationality makes high levels of SA all the more important. When crises strike, teams do 
not have the luxury of reviewing all the possibly important information categories, 
initiating a search o f the environment, and synthesizing information from the environment 
search prior to reaching a decision. Rather, they must make their plans on the basis of the 
information that is available at the time. It follows, then, that the better the quality of that 
information, the better the decisions that will come out of the situation.
This argument returns us to the importance o f SA at levels 1, 2 and 3, and the core 
constructs in Hollenbeck et al.’s (1995) hierarchical team decision making model. 
Hollenbeck and his colleagues have demonstrated the contribution that informity makes to
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accurate team decisions. Although we have established that decisions are not a component 
of SA, decision accuracy is a consequence of SA. Major and Fink (1998) have argued that 
informity and Level 1 SA are analogous constructs. If level 1 SA and team informity are 
analogous constructs, and team informity has been empirically demonstrated to predict 
team decision accuracy, then it follows that Level I SA has a significant contribution to 
team performance. This rebuffs the arguments that probe measures of SA that assess 
operator’s knowledge of elements in the environment (e.g., altitude) are high in face 
validity but impoverished as measures of SA. To the extent that informity and Level 1 S A 
overlap, Level 1 SA is indeed an important contributor to decision accuracy, a 
consequence o f S A. It is difficult to conceive of a means by which an element o f S A could 
contribute to a consequence o f S A without influencing overall SA levels.
Role Theory
One o f the challenges in effective teamwork is distributing the tasks such that each 
is done most efficiently, none are omitted, and the level o f redundancy is appropriate. An 
equally important, but often overlooked, challenge is establishing not only who will attend 
to the explicit task elements, but also who will attend to the implicit or emergent elements 
of the team’s work. Role theory addresses these challenges.
Defining ‘‘role. ” As with many terms that are used both in the scientific literature 
and common parlance, it is important to define the term precisely prior to engaging in any 
discussion on the topic. A “role” as it is discussed in role theory is a pattern or set of 
behaviors that are expected o f a particular individual (Biddle, 1979). Ilgen and Hollenbeck 
(1991) further clarify that roles are cognitions, and therefore exist only in the minds of 
people.
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It is important to make the distinction between “job” and “role.” The essential 
difference is that roles are more fluid than jobs. Where a job will consist o f established task 
elements that exist independent of the incumbent, a role is comprised of emergent task 
elements that are “subjective, personal, dynamic and specified by a variety o f social 
sources” (Ugen & Hollenbeck, 1991, p. 174). On the other hand, Ilgen and Hollenbeck 
(1991) define jobs as objective, bureaucratic, static and specified by a prime beneficiary. 
Where roles are subjective and exist in the minds o f people, jobs are objective and can be 
documented in formal job analyses and job descriptions. Jobs are also bureaucratic, where 
roles are personal. This means that jobs are independent of any given incumbent; a “job” 
exists as a set o f defined task elements even when there is no one performing those task 
elements. Further, although the role may change as incumbents change, the job remains 
relatively static. Finally, where roles are developed on the basis o f social information from 
many sources, jobs are created by an individual or entity in a position of authority who will 
benefit by the performance o f the job.
The “space” between the defined and static job and the demands placed by a 
dynamic environment is filled by roles. Because this space is defined by a set o f changing 
circumstances, roles themselves are fluid and subject to a great deal of change. Thus, 
emergent task elements are added to jobs, and the entire set is referred to as a role.
Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) discuss several different job-role combinations, 
varying from the highly prescribed bureaucratic prototype, where the conceptual space is 
almost entirely comprised o f fixed established task elements (the job) and very little space 
is devoted to emergent task elements (the role), to the “loose cannon” prototype, where 
nearly the entire job-role space is comprised of emergent (role) elements, surrounding a
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very minimal core o f established (job) task elements. In addition, they discuss the fact that 
a fixed set o f established task elements (a job) will have a different set o f emergent (role) 
task elements associated with it, depending upon who fills the role. That is, the 
environment may make different demands on different job incumbents. Figure 3 displays 
Ilgen and Hollenbeck’s examples o f job-role combinations.
Developing roles. Understanding the content o f roles is of little instructional value 
for the team researcher without companion knowledge regarding how roles develop and 
change. The classic model of role development (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek & Rosenthal, 
1964; Katz & Kahn, 1978) describes a process by which an individual’s superiors, peers 
and subordinates, collectively referred to as the role set, communicate expectations to the 
focal individual. The focal individual’s behavior in response to these expectations 
influences the role set’s expectations. The cycle o f send -  respond -  alter expectations is 
then repeated. This non-recursive process is known as a role episode.
The alternative perspective, presented by Graen and his colleagues (Dansereau, 
Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen, 1976; Graen & Scandura, 1987) argues for a more active 
role for the focal individual. Graen and his colleagues argued that the focal individual 
negotiates with the role set to develop a role that meets the needs of both the focal 
individual and the role set, rather than passively receiving role information from the role 
set.
Particular attention has been paid to the influence o f supervisors on subordinates, 
and role theory is no exception. In their Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory, Graen
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Bureaucratic Prototype
Established Elements 
(Job)
Emergent Elements 
(Role)
Loose Cannon Prototype
Established Elements 
(Job)
Emergent Elements 
(Role)
Job Similarity - Role Difference Prototype
Established Elements 
(Job)
Emergent Elements, 
(Role)
Figure 3. Examples o f job-role combinations (Ilgen & Hollebeck, 1991) 
Reproduced by special permission o f the publisher, Consulting Psychologists 
Press, Inc., Palo Alto, CA 94303 from Handbook O f Industrial & Organizational 
Psychology by Daniel R. Ilgen and John R. Hollenbeck. Copyright 1991 by Consulting 
Psychologists Press, Inc. All rights reserved. Further reproduction is prohibited without 
the publisher’s consent.
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and Scandura (1987) describe a process o f role development from an incumbent’s first 
encounter with her or his supervisor until role behavior stabilizes. This state of role 
routinization is achieved when the incumbent and supervisor have reached a shared 
understanding with regard to the incumbent’s role that is agreeable to both parties.
In addition to the attention paid to the crucial role that supervisors play in the 
development of roles, Seers (1989) explicitly addresses the importance o f team members 
in the development of roles. Although peers lack the formal authority and control over 
organizational resources that are vested in superiors, peers may exert a greater level of 
pressure on focal individuals through their more frequent presence and sheer numbers.
That is, the constant influence o f several less powerful peers may sum to a greater impact 
on role development than the distal, but more powerful, influence of the supervisor. Seers 
(1989) demonstrated the importance o f team member exchange quality for job attitudes 
and performance. Thus, Seers argued that peers have a systematic and measurable effect 
on role outcomes.
All of these role development processes are bounded by a finite set o f relevant task 
elements. That is, the universe of possible elements that could be incorporated into a role 
is limited to those that are germane to the job that forms the core of the role. In addition, 
roles are based on jobs, the task elements o f which are non-negotiable (Ilgen &
Hollenbeck, 1991). Thus, the role negotiation process, whether viewed as one of passive 
role taking or active role making, is always limited to that conceptual space between the 
demands o f the environment and the static job upon which the role is built.
Role conflict and ambiguity. Unfortunately, the demands of multiple role senders 
in the role set and a continually changing environment contribute to difficulties in the role
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development process. Generally, the role theory literature has discussed these failures as 
one o f two varieties: either a lack of clarity in the roles or incompatibility among the roles.
A lack o f clarity in the expectations that comprise a role is referred to as role 
ambiguity. This ambiguity may arise from either a lack of clarity with regard to the 
behavioral expectations associated with a given role; alternatively, the ambiguity may 
result from confusion around the consequences of particular behaviors (Cook, Hepworth, 
Wall & Warr, 1981). Thus, either expectations or consequence may result in ambiguity.
Role conflict, on the other hand, arises from mutually exclusive or otherwise 
incompatible demands placed on the focal individual. These conflicting demands often 
originate from different expectations held by different members o f a single role set (intra- 
role conflict), or the incompatible expectations may be held by member o f differing role 
sets (inter-role conflict). Alternatively, it is conceivable that these conflicts emerge as a 
function of the dynamic nature o f other elements in the environment. That is, as the space 
between a job and its environment changes, conflicting demands may emerge.
Although the concepts of role ambiguity and role conflict are interesting 
theoretically because they offer researchers insight into the processes by which roles 
develop and change, they also have practical implications. Jackson and Schuler’s (1985) 
meta-analysis o f role ambiguity and role conflict revealed significant negative relationships 
between the role constructs and many work related variables (See Table 4). For example, 
Jackson and Schuler (1985) found that role conflict and role ambiguity were significantly 
negatively related to every type o f job satisfaction analyzed. In addition, both concepts 
were negatively related to feedback and leadership behavior (consideration and initiating 
structure) as well as to commitment and involvement. Conversely, role conflict and role
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ambiguity were significantly positively related to tension and anxiety and propensity to 
leave. Thus, the organizational impact o f poorly developed roles can be substantial.
Rizzo, House and Lirtzman’s (1970) measure o f role conflict and ambiguity is by 
far the most frequently used (Van Sell, Brief & Schuler, 1981). Despite considerable 
scrutiny and questioning of the validity of the measure (e.g., Breaugh & Colihan, 1994; 
Schuler, Aldag & Brief, 1977; Tracy & Johnson, 1981), the Rizzo et al. (1970) ambiguity 
and conflict measure is still considered to be a satisfactory measure o f role ambiguity and 
role conflict (Jackson & Schuler, 1985).
Table 4
Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict “True r ” Estimates (Jackson & Schuler, 1985)
Correlate Ambiguity “True r” Conflict ‘True r”
Feedback from others -.58 -.31
Feedback from task -.41 -.25
Leader initiating structure -.43 -.27
Leader consideration -.44 -.42
Participation -.55 -.37
Job satisfaction: general -.46 -.48
Job satisfaction: supervision -.53 -.53
Job satisfaction: work itself -.52 -.49
Job satisfaction: co-workers -.37 -.42
Job satisfaction: pay -.26 -.31
Job satisfaction: advancement -.40 -.38
Tension/anxiety .47 .43
Commitment -.41 -.36
Involvement -.44 -.26
Propensity to leave .29 .34
In response to the criticisms surrounding the Rizzo et al. (1970) measure, Ilgen 
and Hollenbeck (1991) suggested supplementing this classic measure with other metrics. 
Specifically, they suggested asking incumbents to indicate what elements comprise their 
role. By permitting incumbents to respond in a likert-type fashion (i.e., a rating scale
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anchored at one end by a statement like “certain that it is” and at the other by “certain that 
it is not”), the researcher may be able to make several interesting calculations regarding 
the focal individual’s role.
Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) suggested that role ambiguity could be assessed 
through such an instrument by assessing the number o f elements to which the focal 
individual responds that he or she is uncertain as to whether it is included in his or her 
role. That is, responses near the midpoint on such an instrument are an indication o f role 
ambiguity.
Further, Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) suggested that role conflict could be 
assessed by comparing the responses of the role set to the focal individual’s responses. To 
the extent that these descriptions of the focal individual’s role differ, role conflict exists. In 
the case where multiple role senders are available, another dimension o f role conflict could 
be assessed by comparing role descriptions between or among the role senders as well. 
Role Theory and Team Situation Awareness
As discussed in the previous section, the contexts in which high SA is typically 
required presents several challenges to teams, beyond those faced in less demanding 
contexts. In addition, following the model presented by McGrath et al. (1995), the role 
network within a team is one of the most central elements in a team. Klimoski and Jones 
(1995) suggested that high levels of coordination and interdependence indicate that each 
team member knows what is expected o f him or her and what he or she can expect from 
each o f his or her teammates. Role theory, then, is applicable to teams that must operate in 
these contexts at a very basic level (Fink & Major, 1999; Major, Fink, & Stout,
1998/1999).
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Role theory explicates the means by which the roles in a team are developed.
Thus, role theory provides not an end, but rather a means to an end. As discussed earlier, 
role theory also indicates that roles will be fluid, and responsive to changing 
circumstances. Clearly, the circumstances in an SA context are highly subject to change. 
Thus, effective expectations for appropriate roles under different conditions, as well as 
protocols for efficiently shifting from one set of roles to another, are important in this 
context. Role theory provides the outline for how such processes may be utilized.
The perspective brought by role theory may have even greater importance for 
novice operators. Where expert operators are likely to already have well-established 
mental models with regard to team interactions as well as technical aspects o f the task at 
hand, novice operators are likely to present more of a tabula rasa. Therefore, a structured 
process by which to gain shared understanding can spare such a team a great deal of trial- 
and-error learning. Additionally, those that may be technical novices no doubt still have 
some level o f expertise or knowledge about social processes and interactions, making the 
content brought to light by role theory somewhat more within a “masterable” domain. 
Essential Teamwork Behaviors
Ultimately, teamwork is a behavioral construct; it is a composite of behaviors that 
team members display to perform their own tasks and support their teammates in their 
tasks (i.e., work together) to achieve a common goal. However, much o f the discussion 
thus far with regard to teams has not focused on behavioral dimensions o f teamwork.
While the two previously explored models o f team process do much to illuminate 
segments o f underlying team processes, there are still several elements o f teams, teamwork
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and team processes that remain mired in confusion. Thus, it is important to review those 
teamwork behaviors that have been demonstrated to be essential to effective teamwork.
McIntyre and Salas (1995) helped to elucidate some o f these essential teamwork 
behaviors. They examined command-and-control teams and outlined a series o f behaviors 
and conditions that contribute to effective teamwork. Specifically, they identified four 
behaviors that are important for teamwork: monitoring, feedback, communication and 
back-up behaviors.
First, McIntyre and Salas (1995) suggested that monitoring one another’s 
performance is central to teamwork. Their research suggested that, in effective teams, 
team members keep track o f their teammate’s work as well as performing their own. 
However, it is important that this monitoring is built on trust, with a goal o f improving 
overall team performance, rather than an orientation toward catching another individual 
doing something wrong. McIntyre and Salas’s research suggested that monitoring is 
actually built into the psychological contract among team members.
In addition, McIntyre and Salas (1995) contended that the giving and receiving of 
feedback is an essential teamwork behavior. They suggested that feedback is a natural 
extension o f the monitoring discussed above. However, feedback is only effective to the 
extent that it can be given and received freely. Unfortunately, a free flow of feedback is 
sometimes hampered by such elements as status, rank and tenure or experience. McIntyre 
and Salas’s research suggested that high performing teams have a climate such that these 
characteristics do not obstruct the flow o f feedback among team members. Furthermore, 
they suggested that it is particularly important for team leaders to model an ability to
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accept constructive criticism. In this way, leaders can establish that such constructive 
criticism is appropriate within the team.
Communication is highlighted by McIntyre and Salas (1995) as central fixture in 
good teamwork. In particular, they cited closed-loop communication as important in 
situations where information must be communicated rapidly. They discussed closed-loop 
communication as a 3-step process. In the first step, the sender initiates the 
communication. Then, the receiver accepts the communication and provides feedback as a 
mechanism to indicate that the communication arrived successfully. Finally, the sender 
confirms that the correct or intended communication was in fact received by the receiver. 
McIntyre and Salas (1995) suggested that the importance o f closed-loop communication is 
attested to by the fact that many military communications are based on proceduralized 
closed-loop communications.
Finally, they suggested that effective teamwork cannot occur without the 
“willingness, preparedness and proclivity to back up fellow members during operations” 
(McIntyre & Salas, 1995, p. 26). They suggested that this element “is perhaps at the very 
heart o f teamwork, for it makes the team truly operate as more than the sum of its parts” 
(McIntyre & Salas, 1995, p. 26). Teams that exhibit back up behavior are populated by 
members that ably lend and receive help when needed. This is only possible, however, 
when team members are skilled not only in their own technical niche but are also 
competent at the tasks o f  their fellow team members.
McIntyre and Salas (1995) also outlined two conditions that enable the teamwork 
behaviors discussed above. First, they regarded it as essential that team members view 
themselves collectively, and that they consider their success to be contingent upon their
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interactions. Second, building upon the first condition, McIntyre and Salas suggested that 
within-team interdependence enables teamwork. To a certain extent this latter proposition 
goes without saying; interdependence is one of the central elements in the definition of 
teamwork.
Models of Team Situation Awareness
Despite the social bent to the inaugural paper on the topic of SA (Bolman, 1979), 
the majority of the SA literature is not written from a social perspective, but rather a 
cognitive or perceptual one. This perspective has influenced the manner in which models 
of S A at the team level have evolved. Consequently, sophisticated social processes do not 
appear in most models o f team S A. Each o f the models discussed below suggests different 
things about some aspects of S A measurement. However, other aspects of measurement 
will remain the same across models. For example, team SA is conceptualized as a second 
order variable in each o f the models.
In their review o f team SA models, Major, Fink and Stout (1998/1999) discussed 
three general models o f team S A: team member contributions (summation), 
communication, and shared understanding. This paper will build on the foundation laid by 
Major and her colleagues in outlining different approaches to team SA in the literature.
Summation
The first model outlined by Major and her colleagues (1998/1999) addresses team 
member contributions to SA. Here, we are calling this the summation approach to team 
S A. This is the simplest approach to team S A. Here, team S A is considered to be the sum 
total of SA at the individual level. Endsley (1995a) exemplifies this approach. She states 
that team SA is “the degree to which every team member possesses the SA required for
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his or her responsibilities” (Endsley, 1995a, p. 39). Endsley explicitly stated that a lack in 
one team member’s SA is detrimental to overall team SA. As seen in Figure 4, the 
summation model makes a direct leap from individual SA to team SA. This model 
translates into the following bivariate hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Individual SA is positively correlated with performance
This summation model is intuitively appealing both for its parsimony and its 
rationality. Here, the team level o f the variable is simply the sum o f the individual parts. 
This perspective is often applied when studying group phenomena. For example, if one is 
interested in a group’s collective opinion on an issue, one might collect data on each 
group member’s opinions and then take the sum or the mean o f all the individual level data 
to get the group level data.
SA however, is a complex phenomenon, and when examined at the team level, we 
may expect it to be even more complex. While individual SA may be a limiting factor, 
much as is Level 1 S A (necessary but not sufficient), it is unlikely that it accounts for the 
entirety of S A at the team level. Indeed, if each individual has a very high level o f SA for 
her or his area o f expertise or responsibility, but is oblivious to all other information, it 
may be difficult for a coherent picture of the entire situation to be developed at the team 
level.
In presenting her summation model o f  team SA, Endsley (1995a) discussed the 
issue of redundancy, noting that some pieces o f  information may be necessary components 
o f more than one team member’s SA. However, she did not address the issue o f judicious
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use o f resources in terms of establishing an appropriate level of redundancy for team 
functions. She failed to outline processes by which the redundant information is gained. 
That is, she failed to consider that one team member might have primary responsibility for
Individual SA
Team SA
Individual SA
Team > 
Performance
Figure 4: Summation model
monitoring a certain element o f raw data in the environment, and then passing along 
processed information (Level 2 SA information) with regard to that element to an 
individual who must integrate that information with other environmental information 
(Level 2 and Level 3 S A responsibility). Thus, we are left with several team members 
independently developing their own SA and acting accordingly, perhaps with little 
knowledge o f their teammates’ actions. Furthermore, we are presented with a situation 
where the only guarantee against counterproductive actions is redundancy, an approach 
that leaves much to be desired, particularly in the resource-thin situation in which many 
teams find themselves.
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Communication
Major and her colleagues (1998/1999) also discuss the communication perspective 
on team S A. Here, communication is taken as either a cause or an effect (or both) of good 
team SA. Applying Endsley’s three levels of SA to the team level, addressing issues of 
communication is much like the integration and synthesis level of individual S A, Level 2.
However, the communication model of SA is conceptually imprecise. 
Communication is implicitly treated as both cause and effect, rendering any model difficult 
to test in a linear, empirical fashion. To the extent that communication is both sent and 
received, this is a natural result; communication may mean one thing for the sender and 
another to the receiver. Given that communication is not a strictly linear process, this 
cause/effect debate may be, to a certain degree, unavoidable.
Some authors address communication as an important concept in the study of S A, 
but avoid the cause-effect problem entirely. Shrestha et al. (1995) avoided the cause-effect 
debate by proposing that communication acts as a moderator for SA. Given the central 
role that communication plays in developing team SA (Shrestha et al., 1995), however, it 
seems unwise to relegate it to moderator status.
It is logically possible for communication to be both a cause and an effect of good 
team SA. Communication can function as a precursor to team level SA: the individual data 
points are communicated from individuals to the team at large, thus enhancing team level 
S A. However, it is equally logically attractive for communication to be a result of good 
SA; teams which have a coherent and unified understanding of a given situation should 
communicate more efficiently and effectively than those that are confused and 
uncoordinated.
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The following solution to this tautology is proposed: communication is a cause of 
S A for the receiver of a communication and an indicator of SA for the sender o f a 
communication. Thus, communication affects each individual’s SA, rather than directly 
affecting team SA itself. Rather, the influence o f communication on team SA is indirect, 
through its influence on individual SA. This non-recursive relationship can be seen in 
Figure 5, and translated into the following bivariate hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Individual SA is positively correlated with communication
Hypothesis 3: Communication is positively correlated with performance
Individual SA
Team ^  
PerformanceTeam SACommunication
Individual SA
Figure 5. Non-recursive communication model
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While such processes pose difficulties for those trained in cause-and-effect, linear 
models of science, cybernetics relies upon such feedback loops (see Richardson, 1990). 
Therefore, they are not without precedent in the social sciences.
Some authors have suggested that specific types of communication are indicative 
of team SA. Schreiber, Lee, Raspotnik, and Hubbard (1996) found that high SA pilots 
showed more overall communication, were more directive in their communication, made 
more requests, and were more specific in directing their communications at a particular 
individual. Several o f the same researchers (Schreiber, Bell & Raspotnik, 1998) identified 
a similar pattern, finding that pilots high in SA provided more information, were more 
directive and requested more information.
Hollenbeck and et al. (1995) performed post hoc analyses on the communication 
patterns of high-performing v. low-performing teams. Contrary to Schreiber and his 
colleagues’ (1996) findings that pilots high in SA showed more overall communication, 
Hollenbeck and his colleagues (1995) found that the amount of communication did not 
differ significantly between the high and low performing teams; rather, the nature of the 
communication differed. Specifically, low performing teams sent significantly more 
requests for information (lowA/= 5.3 v. high M  = 0.6) and high performing teams sent 
significantly more facts about the situation (high M  = 15.9 v. low M  — 9.6). Furthermore, 
high performing teams were more likely to send communications that had already been 
processed and evaluated; that is, they were more likely to share Level 2 SA information.
Hollenbeck et al.’s (1995) finding that low performing teams made more requests 
for information appears to be in contrast to Schreiber et al.’s (1996) finding that pilots 
high in SA made more requests, and Artman’s (1999) finding that greater performance
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was actually related to fewer communications. However, Schreiber et al. (1996) did not 
specify what type o f requests their high performing pilots made. That is, it is possible that 
the pilots were making requests for action rather than requests for information, thus 
eliminating the contradiction.
Hollenbeck et al. (1995) went so far as to suggest that this difference in 
communication patterns may be the primary factor that distinguishes high performing from 
low performing teams. Similar to the overall cause-effect debate about communication, 
sending information rather than requests represents both a cause o f higher performance 
(time is spent efficiently) and an effect of good team processes or high S A (team members 
are able to anticipate the needs o f their team members).
Individual SA
Team SACommunication
Individual SA
Team > 
Performance
Figure 6. Communication model
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The communication perspective suggests something different about the 
development o f team level SA than the summation perspective does. Where team level SA 
is a direct result o f individual level SA in the summation perspective, communication is the 
only route by which team SA can be achieved under the communication perspective (see 
Figure 6).
The central difficulty with the communication perspective on team SA is its 
reliance on overt communication. Major and her colleagues (1998/1999) pointed out that 
high team SA may actually decrease a team’s need to communicate. In fact, it seems 
reasonable that one of the key distinguishing characteristics o f teams with high levels of 
SA may be the seamless fashion in which they “change gears;” where a team with low SA 
may suffer through a period o f confusion when conditions change, teams with high SA 
may have a much smoother transition. Wellens (1993) suggested that the quantity of 
communication within the team decreases due to the high demand that is characteristic of 
the SA context. Thus, Major et al. (1998/1999) concluded that communication is 
insufficient to explain or describe the phenomenon of team SA, although they 
acknowledged that communication is essential to team SA.
Shared Understanding
The shared understanding approach is fundamentally a mental models approach to 
S A at the team level. Shared understanding is built upon “mental maps” that are shared 
among team members. These mental maps may develop either through explicit attention to 
their formation or through more implict means, such as experience with a given team 
and/or situation. Recent research (Bolstad & Endsley, 1999; Farley, Handsman, Endsley & 
Amonlirdviman, 1999) has shown that shared information, specifically shared displays, has
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a beneficial impact on SA and on performance, lending some support to the theory that 
shared understanding should increase team SA. Major et al. (1998/1999) suggested that 
the processes by which these cognitive constructs are formed and shared can also be social 
and behavioral.
In proposing the shared understanding approach to team SA, Stout, Cannon- 
Bowers and Salas (1996/1997) suggested that there is more than one route to high levels 
o f team SA. Essentially, there are only two major elements in this model: individual SA 
and shared understanding. Stout et al. suggested that high levels of team SA can be 
achieved either through high levels o f individual SA or through high levels o f shared 
understanding (see Figure 7). This suggests the following bivariate hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Individual SA is positively correlated with shared understanding
Hypothesis S: Shared understanding is positively correlated with performance
According to Stout et al., the same level of team SA may be achieved by either of 
these routes to team SA, and different situations will determine the extent to which each 
route is central to the formation and maintenance of team level SA. This is in direct 
contradiction to the summation perspective, where high individual levels of SA were 
proposed as the sole means to high levels of team S A.
The mental models, or shared understanding, approach to team SA does a fine job 
of identifying some of the specific types o f information that must be shared in order for a 
team to operate effectively in the SA context. Thus, this cognitive perspective provides a 
great deal of guidance on the content of shared understanding. Role theory, however,
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focuses more on the processes by which mental models come to be shared among team 
members (Major et al., 1998/1999). While the social perspective brought by role theory 
adds another wrinkle to the content piece of shared understanding, a large part of its 
contribution is the process complement to the content component provided by a focus on 
mental models. Thus, role theory is an integral part o f  the shared understanding approach 
to team SA. In addition to illuminating the process by which shared understanding comes 
to be shared, role theory also provides content for shared understanding, in that roles are a 
major component o f shared understanding.
Individual SA
Team > 
Performance
Shared
Understanding n  Team SA
Individual SA
Figure 7. Shared understanding model
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Integrated Model
It is often the case that several theories have something of substance to offer the 
scholar of a particular topic. The models presented above are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, although certain elements among them are contradictory. However, to account 
for a maximum amount of the variance in team SA, it seems advantageous to draw upon 
each of the previously outlined models of team SA to develop one integrated model of S A 
at the team level. Thus, we find ourselves with a model that contains elements from the 
summation, communication and shared understanding models (see Figure 8), which 
suggests this final bivariate hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Communication is positively correlated with shared understanding.
The summation model (Figure 4) suggested that a direct link must exist between 
individual SA and SA at the team level. We reviewed two different approaches to 
incorporating communication into a model o f SA at the team level. One considered 
communication to be a non-recursive process, where communication acted as both a cause 
and an effect of SA (Figure 5). The second suggested that communication exerts a direct 
influence on levels o f team SA (Figure 6). Elements of both o f these approaches to 
incorporating communication into a model o f overall team S A are included in the 
integrated model. Communication is shown both resulting from individual SA and 
contributing towards individual SA, and it is shown influencing team SA, albeit indirectly.
This non-recursive representation o f communication adds to the shared 
understanding model, in that shared understanding is explicitly influenced both by
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individual SA as well as communication. Stout et al.’s (1996/1997) contention that team 
level SA is a function of either high levels of individual SA or high levels of shared 
understanding is represented in this model as well; team level S A is directly influenced by 
both individual SA and shared understanding in the integrated model. Thus, we see in the 
integrated model the central elements o f all three of the models o f team SA previously 
reviewed.
Individual SA
Team > 
Performance
^  Shared 
Understanding Team SACommunication
Individual SA
Figure 8. Integrated model
Statement of the Problem 
This research had a twofold goal. The first goal was to evaluate the relative 
efficacy of several S A measurement methods established in the literature. Second, the 
three models o f team S A proposed in the literature were tested, as was as the integrated 
model proposed above. In addition, this discourse was intended to add some clarity to the 
SA literature as a whole and the team SA literature in particular.
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Evaluating SA Measures 
As outlined in the section on S A measurement, a wide variety of measures of SA 
have been proposed. The present paper utilized several o f these measures. Further, we 
conducted analyses to determine which among them provided the greatest predictive 
efficacy. Despite the variety in SA measures and approaches to measurement, no rigorous 
study comparing the various methods has been conducted previously. Without data 
comparing the techniques, it is difficult to generalize between and among studies to speak 
authoritatively on the matter of SA.
Furthermore, this research was intended to make a contribution to the SA 
literature by analyzing SA measurement techniques according to their type. That is, we 
analyzed proximal, meso and distal measures o f S A. Given the nature of these different 
approaches to SA measurement, we treated proximal and meso measurements as 
predictors o f S A and distal measures as outcomes of SA. Thus, we were able to establish 
predictive models.
Evaluating Models o f  Team Situation Awareness 
This paper outlined several models o f team S A that have been proposed in the 
literature. To date, however, none of these have been subjected to rigorous empirical 
investigation. By developing an integrated model, as well as testing the models which are 
currently present in the literature on team SA, we had two routes by which to establish the 
relative validity o f the various models. O f course, testing each model independently 
yielded fit statistics that indicated the correctness of each model. In addition, the 
integrated model offered an opportunity to establish which elements account for the 
greatest amount of variance in the variable o f interest, team level S A. It was expected that
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the integrated model, drawing on several theoretically based models of S A at the team 
level, would yield the best fit to the data.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants (N  = 272) were drawn from a large southeastern university. Mean age 
of participants was 21.4 (SD  = 6.2), although participants ranged in age from 18 -7 4 , and 
42 (15%) did not report their age. One hundred eighty (66.2%) participants were female, 
80 (29.4%) were male and 12 (4.4%) did not indicate their sex. Participant self- 
identification o f  racioethnic identity was 48.9% (133) Caucasian, 27.9% (76) African- 
American, 9.9% (27) Asian, 5.1% (14) Hispanic, and 5.1% (14) Native American/Pacific 
Islander. Eight participants (2.9%) declined to report their racioethnic background.
Participants were volunteers from the student body at a large, urban, southeastern 
university. The university review process approved the use o f human subjects for this 
research. Participants received their choice of experimental credits in eligible courses, $10 
or an entry into a lottery for $100 as an incentive for their participation. In addition, 
because this study used a commercially available flight simulator game, it was observed 
that the participants derived intrinsic enjoyment from participation.
Participants had the option to sign up to participate individually or in pairs. As a 
means to control variance with no relationship to the theoretical model, same sex pairs 
were used. Participants who signed up to participate as individuals were randomly paired 
with another same-sex individual to complete the experimental trials. Participants who 
signed up in pairs were permitted to complete the trials as intact pairs. One o f the models 
of team SA, the shared understanding model, predicts that one means by which shared 
understanding may be achieved is through experience with team members. Thus, it was
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necessary that there be some variability in team members’ familiarity with one another to 
adequately test this proposition.
Measures and Materials 
Materials
The simulation used in this study was a commercially produced helicopter flight 
simulation game, Werewolf v. Comanche (NovaLogic, 1995). Jentsch, Barnett, Bowers, 
Hicks, and Sierra (1997) evaluated commercially available flight simulation software for 
appropriateness in team SA research and determined that Werewolf v. Comanche was the 
best package for this purpose. Due to the fact that SA is generally o f  greatest interest in 
contexts that are risky and time-constrained, most SA research is conducted using 
simulators, rather than in the actual task environment. Gugerty and Tirre (1996) compared 
SA in a PC-based simulator and found that it correlated significantly with performance in a 
higher-fidelity simulator and actual task performance. Thus, PC-based simulators have 
been shown not to distort SA.
Jentsch et al. (1997) evaluated 55 commercially available aviation simulations in a 
multi-phase procedure. First, they identified those simulations that met 8 criteria: 1) 
elicitation of team SA behaviors/processes, 2) allow experimental manipulation, 3) allow 
data collection, 4) allow control o f extraneous variables, 5) simulate military aviation 
context, 6) easy to learn and operate, 7) minimum o f hardware and peripherals, and 8) 
inexpensive. Simulations that met these criteria were evaluated by subject matter experts 
(experienced aviators) for ease o f use my aviation-naive participants. Werewolf v. 
Comanche was identified as the best platform for team SA research in the final phase,
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which evaluated simulations for their controllability, scenario complexity, realism and 
multiplayer capability.
Jentsch et al. (1997) determined that Werewolf v. Comanche was the easiest 
simulation to control, stating that “this simplicity and intuitiveness o f use, together with 
the multiplayer capabilities and the graphics which appealed to participants were the final 
reasons that Werewolf v. Comanche was ranked highest” (p. 24). Jentsch et al. (1997) 
reported that, after a brief factual introduction to the simulation, “most participants were 
able to successfully complete most tasks in their first attempt” (p. 31). All participants in 
Jentsch et al. (1997) were able to perform critical tasks such as takeoff, hover, forward 
flight, turns, selecting weapons, and firing gun and destroying target on their first attempt, 
without any practice. Those tasks for which one or more participants required a second 
attempt or a hint were o f a more sophisticated nature, such as “selecting one specific gas 
tank in a refinery” (p. 32). Similar ease o f use was observed for participants in this 
research.
When networked together, players can “see” one another in the simulation, and are 
two players in a single simulation. Therefore, if one player destroys a target, the target is 
destroyed for both players. Networked players may either play “with” each other or 
“against” each other. Jentsch et al. (1997) revealed that the simulation performed reliably 
in the multiplayer mode.
The simulation offered several missions for each o f  several levels o f difficulty. The 
summary o f each mission is displayed on the screen after it is selected. The mission 
summary must be acknowledged by the participants before the simulation begins; that is, 
the players must click a button indicating that they accept the mission before the
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simulation will begin. The simulation includes both stationary and moving targets in the 
form of mission goals (stationary) and enemies (moving). Additionally, the simulation 
tracks each team member’s performance in terms of mission goals destroyed and enemies 
killed.
Measures
Several criteria were applied in the selection of measures for this study. First, only 
measures or measurement approaches that had been previously described in the literature 
were used. Second, only measures that had either some established theoretical basis or
Table 5
Measures Included in the Research
Latent Trait Measure Rater
Individual SA
Proximal SA Questionnaire Self
SART Self, Partner, Experimenter
SALIENT Self, Partner, Experimenter
Communication
Communication estimates Experimenter
Communication behavioral observation Experimenter
Shared
Understanding
Role checklist Self, Partner
Role conflict and ambiguity scale Self
Task/partner experience Self
Performance
Objective performance (simulation recording)
Subjective performance Self, Partner
previously established empirical validity were used. Third, only measures that were 
applicable to, or could be adapted for, the simulation task in this research were used. 
Fourth, only measures that fit within the models discussed were collected. Measures were
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selected to ensure a balance between objective and subjective measures, and to ensure 
representation o f proximal, meso and distal indicators.
The set o f measures that satisfied these criteria is shown in Table 5. Furthermore, 
as the majority o f these measures had not been subjected to rigorous previous validation 
efforts, preliminary analyses were conducted on each of the measures to establish the 
relative merits o f each. Only those measures that displayed evidence o f good measurement 
characteristics and preliminary evidence o f validity were included in model testing.
It is important to note that no direct measures for team SA were included in the proposed 
research. Rather, team SA was a second order variable, built from other latent variables in 
the various models.
Individual SA Measures
Both proximal and meso level SA were included in the individual SA measures. 
Proximal S A was assessed using brief questionnaires in a probe or freeze technique. 
Endsley (1995b) suggested that this was the most promising technique by which to assess 
SA. Furthermore, Endsley (1995b) has demonstrated that briefly pausing a simulation, as 
this technique requires, does not adversely affect SA. Hollenbeck et al.’s (1995) construct 
of informity has been shown to significantly contribute to team decision performance.
Thus, questions for this measure were derived from task-relevant information present in 
the simulation. The experimenter collected data on each of these items for each participant 
as well. Items are presented in Table 6.
One o f the criticisms o f probe measures of S A is that simply by asking a particular 
question, we have changed the operator’s SA. In effect, this criticism addresses a cueing 
effect; that by asking a question about something, we convey to the operator that is it
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important, and thereby cue the operator to attend to that piece o f information in the 
future. As a test o f this, one item was repeated across breaks in the proximal S A measure.
Table 6
Proximal £4 Questionnaire
Break Items
Break One (at 5 minutes)
How many enemies are currently threatening?
What is your current weapons setting?
How many mission goals (targets) are currently within range?
Break Two (at 15 minutes)
What is your current speed?
What is your current heading (direction)?
How many enemies are currently threatening?
Proximal SA items were calculated as a difference score between the participant’s 
recall of the item during the break and the experimenter’s recording o f the true state of 
affairs. This difference scoring approach is similar to that taken by Chaparro et al. (1999). 
Weapons setting was coded as true/false; either the participants were aware of their 
weapons setting or they were not. The score for mission goals and for enemies within 
range was the difference between the participants’ reports and the experimenter’s record 
of actual targets in range. The score for current speed was calculated by taking the 
absolute value o f the difference between the participants’ report o f their speed and their 
actual speed at the time o f the break, and dividing this number by 5. Finally, current 
heading (direction) was based on an 8 point heading system, using 8 basic directional 
points as anchors: North, Northeast, East, Southeast, South, Southwest, West and 
Northwest. In this scheme, East is 2 points away from North, as is West, with a maximum 
difference o f 4 (i.e, South is 4 directional points away from North -  NE, E, SE, S).
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Because o f the difference scoring, low scores are indicative of accuracy and are therefore
desirable.
Meso level SA measurements were also used to indicate individual level SA. These 
measurements were calculated using items from two o f the three scales discussed in the 
introduction: Taylor’s (1989) Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART, Table 1) 
and Muniz et al.’s (1997) Situational Awareness Linked Indicators Adapted to Novel 
Tasks (SALIENT, Table 2). Both of these measures are grounded in SA theory and were 
developed with the assistance of subject matter experts. Additionally, SART has been 
subjected to extensive factor analyses, although no reliability data are available. These 
measures were completed by the experimenter and participants as a rating o f self S A and 
as a rating of partner SA. The exact items used can be found in Appendices B and C.
Taylor (1989) specified that the SART was scored on a 7-point rating scale, where 
1 indicated “low” and 7 indicated “high.” Therefore, this scoring scheme was preserved 
for the purposes o f this study. Participants rated themselves and their partners.
Additionally, the experimenter rated each participant using this scale.
SALIENT is a behavioral approach to SA measurement. The original SALIENT 
methodology was devised for a very circumscribed simulation for use with skilled pilots. 
During the simulation, the crew experiences a series o f events. For each o f these events, 
they have the opportunity to display their S A behaviorally in a 5 x 25 matrix of categories. 
In theory, then, there are 125 opportunities to demonstrate SA at each juncture. In the 
original proposition o f the SALIENT methodology, subject matter experts and team task 
analysis were used to identify a “correct” behavior in each of the categories for each
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segment o f the simulation. During the simulation, an experimenter notes the number of 
times the participants’ actions correspond to the behavior identified a priori as “correct.” 
Two factors make SALIENT, as originally designed, inappropriate for our use. 
First, the novice status of the participants means that, for example, it may be unreasonable 
to expect participants to demonstrate the “correct” behavior during the simulation.
Second, the simulation used in this research allows for variability in the simulation. That is, 
while each scenario progresses according to a predetermined pattern, participants were 
not given a precise flight plan, as the participants envisioned by Muniz et al. (1997) would 
be given. Thus, it was impossible to predict, for example, from which direction enemies 
would appear in this study, as participants may have chosen a circuitous route. This 
presented a challenge to the researcher in developing a clear sequence o f  events for the 
purposes o f creating an observation form of the type described by Muniz et al. (1997).
Therefore, the SALIENT instrument was adapted for the purposes of the study.
The content was preserved, but rather than used in an observation format, the dimensions 
were used as stems for a rating scale. Participants rated themselves and their partners on 
each of the items, using a 1 to 9, Iikert-type rating scale, where 9 indicates “consistently 
did this” and 1 indicates “never did this.” Thus, the adaptation of SALIENT used in this 
research essentially captures the extent to which a particular behavior was characteristic of 
a participant, rather than whether precise actions or reactions indicative o f one of the 
SALIENT dimensions were taken at a particular point in the simulation. The experimenter 
rated participants using this scale as well.
For model testing and statistical analyses, the meso level constructs theoretically 
load onto the latent variable “individual SA.” For both measures (SART and SALIENT),
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the participant’s self ratings, her or his partner’s ratings o f  the participant, and the 
experimenter’s ratings of the participant were used as observed variables, in a 2 (test) x 3 
(rater) matrix: “self rating -  SART,” “partner rating -  SALIENT’ etc. Thus, three of 
these observed variables (self, partner, experimenter) are variations of SART and another 
three are variations of SALIENT, and the six observed variables in turn indicate the latent 
variable “individual SA.” However, prior to being used in model testing, these measures 
were subjected to preliminary analyses, evaluating their measurement characteristics, such 
as factor structure and reliability, as well as preliminary indications of their validity. 
Communication Measures
Communication was operationalized both objectively and subjectively, through 
experimenter ratings (subjective) and a communication sample collected by the 
experimenter. Communication was the only measure in the proposed research that was 
collected solely by the experimenter. The subjective communication estimates focused on 
issues relevant to building shared understanding as well as assessing overall 
communication levels. Although research on SA using communication as a variable has 
addressed communication in terms of frequency (e.g., Schreiber et al., 1996), the special 
characteristics of SA, team SA, and propositions of role theory suggest specific data 
collection categories. Therefore, in addition to rating the overall frequency o f 
communication for each participant, a rating scale was developed that included ratings for 
five additional dimensions of communication.
The first additional communication dimension was on-task communication of a 
mundane nature, such as current conditions (speed, altitude, weapons). These items 
indicated the same underlying construct as the proximal SA measure. The second
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additional dimension also addressed on-task communication, but it captured 
communication related to emergencies, such as attacks. Third, a dimension was added to 
reflect the participants’ extent of role-related communication. Roles and role theory were 
hypothesized to provide content that contributes to shared understanding, and it seemed 
reasonable to assess communication that reflected continued role negotiation or references 
to established roles. Similarly, shared understanding was also hypothesized to be 
influenced by the relationship between team members. Thus, the fourth additional 
dimension addressed communication that was team related, such as rapport-building 
communication and support statements. Finally, McIntyre and Salas (1995) suggested that 
closed-loop communication was an essential teamwork behavior, particularly in time- 
constrained situations. Thus, the fifth additional communication dimension addressed the 
participants’ use of closed-loop communication. Given that good role-related 
communication, for example, can also be closed-loop, it was possible that a single 
communication could be included in multiple categories.
All of the communication estimates were made by the experimenter, at the 
completion o f the trial. The experimenter made communication estimates for each 
participant individually. The estimates were made on a percentage basis, using a base of 
10 . An end point of zero was included to indicate that the participant never exhibited a 
particular communication type. That is, the experimenter rated the percentage of time that 
each participant engaged in each type o f communication. If  a participant spent 60% of her 
or his time engaged in role related communication, then he or she would have received a 
communication estimation rating of 6 for that dimension.
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Despite the fact that this communication measure was grounded in S A theory, it 
was unvaiidated. Thus, these data were subjected to preliminary analyses to determine the 
measurement characteristics and efficacy o f the measure. Factor analyses and reliability 
analyses were run on this measure.
In addition to the communication estimates, the experimenter collected a 10 
minute communication observation sample between the two breaks. That is, from minute 5 
of the simulation to minute IS of the simulation, the experimenter tallied each 
communication and categorized it. Additionally, the trial segment between probe breaks 
was tape recorded as a back-up for communication observation.
Following Hollenbeck et al. (1995), the communication sample was based on the 
frequency o f particular types of communication. Hollenbeck et al.’s post hoc observations 
suggest that particular types of communication that appear to contribute to team success. 
Thus, the communication sample collected communication data in three content 
categories: information requests, raw data about situation facts and processed (qualitative) 
data about situation facts. These data were collected as frequency data. That is, a score of 
0 in one o f the categories meant that, during the 10 minute sample period, the participant 
exhibited no communication of that type.
Communication items and data collection formats can be found in Appendices D 
and E. As shown in the communication models, the team level latent variable of 
communication also predicts and is predicted by individual level SA. Further, given that 
communication is the primary means by which shared understanding is achieved, 
communication also predicts the latent variable “shared understanding” in team level
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analyses of the integrated model. Finally, communication indicates the latent variable 
"‘team SA” in the communication models.
Shared Understanding Measures
Shared understanding is contributed to by roles and also, according to Stout et al. 
(1996/1997), experience with team members or the task at hand. As the integrated model 
discussed in the introduction displayed, communication was also hypothesized to 
contribute to shared understanding.
Roles were assessed in two ways. First, a role checklist (Table 7) was used. Ilgen 
and Hollenbeck (1991) recommended a procedure in which focal individuals indicate how 
sure they are that a particular task element is included in their role. Additionally, they 
recommend that another individual from the focal individual’s role set do the same for the 
focal individual’s role. Thus, a list of role elements was constructed for the purposes of 
the proposed research. Participants indicated how confident they were that each item was 
included in their role, and they also indicated how confident they were that the items were 
included in their partner’s role. Ratings were made on a 9 point, likert-type scale, where 1 
indicated “completely confident that this is not part of the role,” and 9 indicated 
“completely confident that this is a part o f the role.”
Following Ilgen and Hollenbeck’s (1991) recommendations, role ambiguity was 
operationalized as a neutral response to the question of how confident a participant was 
that a given element was part o f a particular role. For ease of understanding, it is 
preferable that role conflict and ambiguity be negatively related to shared understanding, 
given that they are inversely related. Thus, low role conflict and ambiguity scores would 
correlate with high shared understanding scores, due to the fact that those with high levels
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of shared understanding should agree on their roles, and therefore have low levels of role 
ambiguity and role conflict.
Table 7
Role Checklist
Role or Responsibility
Leader
Back-up person
Responsible for locating and identifying mission goals or targets
Responsible for attacking mission goals or targets
Responsible for locating and identifying enemies
Responsible for disabling enemies
Responsible for setting strategy
Devil’s advocate
Moral support
Navigate - decide where to go 
Weapons expert • decide which weapons to use 
Responsible for making task assignments 
Responsible for monitoring partner’s activities 
Responsible for keeping perspective 
Responsible for keeping task fun 
Trainer -  teach partner
To calculate role ambiguity, role checklist items were recoded into “confidence” 
scores for the purposes of calculating role ambiguity. That is, items were turned from a 1 
to 9 scale that ranged from “Completely confident that this is NO T  a part of role” to 
“Completely confident that this IS  a part o f role” into a 1 to 5 scale that ranged from great 
confidence (1) to no confidence (5). Items that were scored originally 1 to 5 maintained 
their original scoring, but 6 to 9 were recoded in descending order, such that the greatest 
confidence in either direction is coded as a 1. Thus, scores were transformed into a 1 to 5 
scale, where 1 was very confident (positively or negatively), and 5 was no confidence as to 
whether the item is included in the role. In this way, a high score indicated high levels of
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role ambiguity, and a low score indicated low levels of role ambiguity (or high levels of 
role clarity).
Role conflict was calculated using difference scores between self and partner 
ratings, using the original ratings. Thus, if the self rating for a role element was 7 and the 
partner rating for the same element was 9, there was a difference score o f 2. The smaller 
the difference between self and partner ratings on a given role element, the greater the 
degree of agreement between team members and the lower the level o f role conflict. Thus, 
low scores in role conflict indicated low role conflict, and high difference scores indicated 
high levels of role conflict. It is important to bear in mind, however, that this methodology 
only captured role conflict in terms of disagreement between the focal individual and the 
role set; it did not capture intra-role conflict.
Second, roles were assessed by several items from Rizzo et al.’s (1970) role 
conflict and ambiguity scale. These items are presented as Table 8. Only those items which 
were applicable to the task used for the proposed research were included. As a result, the 
abbreviated scale includes 5 items assessing role ambiguity and 3 items that assess role 
conflict.
Despite the challenges to this measure, it was indisputably the most commonly 
used measure of role ambiguity and conflict. At a minimum, the implementation of both 
methods for role assessment allowed the opportunity to quantitatively compare them. The 
items on the Rizzo et al. (1970) measure were scored on a 1 to 5 Likert-type agreement 
scale, where 1 indicates strongly disagree and 5 indicates strongly agree. Thus, the Rizzo 
et al. measure was scored in the same direction as the role checklist; 1 indicated low role 
conflict or ambiguity, and 5 indicated high role conflict or ambiguity.
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Table 8
Items from Role Conflict and Ambiguity Scale (Rizzo et al., 1970)
Dimension hem
Role Ambiguity
I feel certain about how much authority I have.
I have clear, planned goals and objectives for my job.
I know what my responsibilities are.
I know exactly what is expected of me.
I have to work under vague directives or orders.
Role Conflict
I work on unnecessary things.
I receive a assignment without the ability to complete it
I work under incompatible guidelines.
For the purposes of model testing and statistical analyses, the role measures 
theoretically indicate (albeit negatively) shared understanding. Preliminary analyses were 
used to determine the measurement characteristics of each measure. Those measures that 
were determined to have satisfactory measurement characteristics were included in model 
testing. When scored for role ambiguity, the role checklist was an observed variable “role 
ambiguity.” When scored for role conflict, the role checklist was the observed variable 
“role conflict.” Role conflict and role ambiguity indicated shared understanding, and were 
expected to have a negative relationship with shared understanding. The Rizzo et al. 
(1970) scale was also an observed variable that indicated shared understanding, and was 
also expected to be negatively related to shared understanding.
One of the models o f S A suggests that shared understanding can be gained 
through either task experience or experience with team members. Therefore, task 
experience and experience with one’s partner were also assessed. These items are shown
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in Table 9. Experience items were scaled from 1 to 5 in a Likert-type format, where the 
anchor for 1 was “not at all” and the anchor for 5 was “very/a lot.”
For the purposes o f  model testing and statistical analyses, the first three items were 
treated as observed variables that indicated the latent variable “task experience.” The 
observed variable “partner experience” and the latent variable “task experience” together 
indicated the latent variable “experience.” The latent variable “experience” indicated the 
team level latent variable “shared understanding.” As with the other measures included in 
the study, the experience measures were first submitted to preliminary analyses to 
determine their measurement characteristics.
Table 9
Experience Items
Dimension Item
Task Experience 
Social Experience
How would you describe your skill level at computer games like flight simulators? 
How much experience do you have with this particular flight simulator (Werewolf 
v. Comanche)?
How much experience have you had using a joystick?
How much experience have you had working in teams?
Please rate how well you know the person you will be participating with:
Performance Measures
Performance was assessed both via subjective means and via objective means. 
Objective performance data were collected from the mission statistics (enemies killed and 
mission goals achieved) reported by the simulation used in the study. Absolute numbers of 
mission goals achieved (targets destroyed) and enemies killed were collected and summed
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as “hits.” Thus, an individual who achieved 15 mission goals and lolled 7 enemies during 
the course o f the simulation would be coded as having achieved 22 hits. These are true 
ratio level data.
Table 10
Performance Scale - Self (adaptedfrom Wayne & Li den, 1995)
Item
Overall, to what extent did you feel that you were performing your job the way you would like it to be 
performed?
To what extent did your performance meet your own expectations?
Overall, to what extent do you feel you effectively fulfilled your roles and responsibilities?
Rate the overall level of performance that you observed for yourself:
What is your personal view of yourself in terms of your overall effectiveness?
If you had it to do over again, to what extent would you change the manner in which you did your job?
Table 11
Performance Scale - Partner (adapted from Wayne & Liden, 1995)
Item
Overall, to what extent did you feel that your partner was performing his or her job the way you would 
like it to be performed?
To what extent did your partner’s performance meet your own expectations?
Overall, to what extent do you feel your partner effectively fulfilled his or her roles and responsibilities? 
Rate the overall level of performance that you observed for your partner:
What is your personal view of your partner in terms of his or her overall effectiveness?
If you entirely had your way, to what extent would you change the manner in which your partner did his 
or herjob?
Subjective performance measures were collected via questionnaires or rating 
scales. Both self and partner performance ratings were collected from participants. 
Performance scales were taken from Wayne and Liden (1995). The self version of the 
performance scale is found in Table 10 and the partner version of the performance scale is 
found in Table 11. Both instruments were scaled from 1 to 5, where 1 means “not at all”
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and 5 means “to a great extent.” Thus, a higher score indicated higher performance or 
distal SA, and a lower score indicated lower performance or distal SA.
All three performance measures, the objective measures and both self and partner 
subjective measures, were included in the analyses as observed variables indicating the 
latent trait performance for team level analyses.
Finally, limited demographic data, in the form o f age, sex and race were collected 
for sample reporting purposes. These data were not included in statistical analyses or 
model testing, but were reported only in summarized form for the purposes o f describing 
the sample used in the study. The last section o f the questionnaire booklet contained items 
asking participants for this information.
Procedure
Participants completed the trial in teams o f two. Participants arrived at the testing 
site, were introduced to the study and given 10 minutes of training on the simulation. The 
training involved a brief introduction to the simulation and an opportunity to practice 
“flying” the simulation. The training materials discussed the mechanics o f controlling the 
simulation, including information on weapons options. The training materials can be found 
in Appendix F. As discussed earlier, research by Jentsch et al. (1997) demonstrated that 
this simulation is very easy to learn; in Jentsch et al. (1997), all participants were able to 
perform a core of operations on the first attempt without practice.
The training materials introduced participants to the idea that they would be 
operating together in the same virtual environment. Participants were instructed to work 
as a team to complete their mission, although they were not given specific instructions 
with regard to their teamwork, such as how they should divide their tasks or roles. The
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experimenter brought the mission assignments up on the screen, and participants were told 
to click the “accept” button on the computer screen when they were ready to begin. In this 
way, participants were given the opportunity to strategize or otherwise prepare prior to 
initiating the simulation. However, they were given no instructions to prepare in any 
particular way; they were simply instructed to “click the ‘accept’ button when you are 
ready to begin.”
As a means to control variability, all participants completed the same scenarios or 
“missions,” with the same goals, weather conditions, terrain and enemy threats. However, 
they were able to freely maneuver within the simulation; they were not required to 
maintain a predetermined flight path. All participants were networked together as 
“friendlies;” that is, participants both flew the same type of aircraft on the same mission, 
and competed against the computer’s pre-programmed responses, rather than being 
networked together as opposing forces.
The scenarios were selected in a predetermined order. The task was divided into 
three segments by the data collection breaks. A new scenario was started for each 
segment. If a team completed a scenario during a segment, a new scenario was started for 
the remaining time in the segment. Thus, each team had 20 minutes of game play, and an 
opportunity to play at least 3 scenarios.
Due to the fact that the primary aim o f the research was model testing, no 
experimental manipulations were conducted. All participants received the same training, 
operated the simulation for the same duration and were subjected to the same 
measurement protocol. The aim of the research was to capture and analyze natural 
variations, rather than manipulated ones. The level of difficulty was manipulated by the
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scenario selection; each scenario progressed in a predetermined order, with identical goals 
and threats each time a mission was played. Thus, teams operated in a standardized 
environment. Teams were faced with progressively more difficult scenarios until their 20 
minute trial period was up.
After training, participants played the simulation with their partner for a period of 
20 minutes, during which period two brief probe measures o f S A were collected. The 
probe breaks were scheduled at 5 and 15 minutes into the simulation, at which time the 
simulation was paused. Endsley (1995b) empirically demonstrated that pausing a 
simulation and probing for SA information does not adversely affect operator’s levels of 
SA. The break periods did not count toward the 20 minute trial period. During the 10- 
minute period between probe breaks, the experimenter collected the communication 
sample. Tape recordings o f  experimental sessions were made to ensure the reliability of 
experimenter coding. Timekeeping resumed when the simulation was resumed after each 
break.
After the simulation period, participants were asked to complete a  series o f paper 
and pencil measures: partner performance, self performance, selected items from SART 
and SALIENT, the role checklist, role conflict and ambiguity scale and the task and 
partner experience items. Upon completion o f  the measures, participants were thanked, 
offered their choice of incentives and dismissed. While participants were completing their 
paper and pencil measures, the experimenter completed the SART, SALIENT and the 
communication rating scale for both participants. Results were submitted to  statistical 
analyses.
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RESULTS 
Measure Validation 
Statistical Analyses
Several sets of statistical analyses were conducted. Measures were validated using 
exploratory principle components analysis with varimax rotation, unless otherwise noted. 
Eigenvalues greater than I were used as the criterion for identifying significant factors in 
the principle components analysis. Items were placed in the factor for which they had the 
highest rating; these placements are indicated in bold in the tables. Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1983) suggest that a factor loading o f greater than .30 is considered acceptable. Comrey 
(1973) suggests that factor loadings o f .30 are considered to be poor, but that a factor 
loading greater than .45 can be considered fair. Therefore, a factor loading cutoff of .45 
was used; no item was included in a factor if it had less than a .45 factor loading.
Reliability was assessed using Chronbach’s coefficient alpha internal consistency 
reliability estimate. Although no firm minimum acceptable value o f the internal consistency 
reliability estimate has been established, most test designers agree that .70 is acceptable 
(Golden, Sawicki & Franzen, 1990), and lower values are often used, even in top-tier 
journals (e.g., internal consistency reliability estimate of .62 in Earley & Mosakowski,
2000 and internal consistency reliability estimate o f .61 in Garoznick, Brockner & Seigel, 
2000). Thus, an internal consistency reliability estimate cutoff of .65 was used.
Analyses at this phase were conducted at the individual level of analysis; that is, 
each o f the 272 participants was treated as an individual unit o f analysis. In the interest of 
space and brevity, where multiple principle components analyses were conducted on 
different versions of the same measure (such as a participant, partner and experiment
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rating o f using the same items), results of all principle components analyses are reported in 
a single table. The correlation between the refined scales and objective performance (hits) 
was reported as a preliminary indicator of measure validity. Descriptive statistics for all 
measures included in the study can be found in Appendix G.
Proximal SA
Although Endsley’s (1989) SAGAT was dichotomously scored and was never 
intended to be a unitary measurement, there is no reason that scales devised using the 
probe methodology in general should not be unitary. The scoring scheme used for the 
proximal S A measure in this research was essentially an index of accuracy (how accurate 
was the participant’s proximal SA). It is reasonable to expect accuracy to be fairly 
consistent across items. Thus, the proximal SA measure used in the present study was 
submitted to principle components analysis. This measure yielded mixed results, and was 
disappointing in terms of psychometric characteristics. Principle components analysis 
showed that the measure did not capture a single component; three significant factors 
emerged. Table 12 displays the factor loadings for all items on this scale.
A criticism of measures which interrupt the situation with probe questions is the 
possibility of a cueing effect. As a test of this hypothesis, one item was repeated across 
breaks. A t-test revealed that participants were significantly more accurate, t (230) = 2.10, 
p  < .05 ( i f  = .08) the second time they were asked about the number of enemies currently 
threatening. During the first break, the mean difference between participants’ estimates 
and experimenter’s observations was 3.62 (SD = 5.66), whereas the mean difference was 
2.78 (SD = 4.41) during the second break; thus, participants were significantly more 
accurate in their estimations during the second break, suggesting that they had been more
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closely attending to the information asked in that item. It is noteworthy that the repeated 
item loaded identically in the principle components analysis both the first and second time 
it appeared (factor loading o f .70). Removing this cued item from the scale yields the 
factor structure shown in Table 13.
Table 12
Principle Components Analysis fo r Proximal £4 Measure
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Break 1, enemies threatening 0.70 -0.11 0.10
Break 1, current weapons 0.12 0.20 0.71
Break I, targets in range 0.62 0.43 0.15
Break 2. current speed -0.10 0.90 -0.03
Break 2, current heading (direction) -0.13 -0.21 0.71
Break 2, enemies threatening 0.70 -0.08 -0.27
Eigenvalue 1.44 1.14 1.04
Percent variance 23.92% 18.97% 17.36%
Note. Highest factor loading for each item is shown in bold.
Table 13
Principle Components Analysis fo r  Proximal SA Measure, Without Cued Item
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Break 1, enemies threatening 0.83 -0.22 -0.08
Break 1, current weapons 0.25 0.14 0.66
Break 1. targets in range 0.65 0.38 0.15
Break 2, current speed -0.03 0.92 -0.03
Break 2. current heading (direction) -0.20 -0.15 0.79
Eigenvalue 1.27 1.07 1.03
Percent variance 25.46% 21.36% 20.55%
Note. Highest factor loading for each item is shown in bold.
These analyses lend little clarity as to which item or items are best representative 
of the variable o f interest, SA. O f these three factors, only one shows a significant 
correlation with objective performance (hits). The item that loaded highest on factor 2 
correlated with performance, r = -. 17, p  < .05. Recall that the ratings on the proximal SA
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measure are difference scores and that smaller numbers are indicative of greater 
agreement. Thus, this result is in the expected direction. However, it seems inadvisable to 
use this measure in model testing.
SART
SART was measured by each participant, her or his partner and the experimenter. 
Principle components analyses supported separating those SART items that evaluated the 
game from those that evaluated the individual. Principle components analyses showed 
each of these to be unitary scales; thus, the values reported in Tables 14 and 15 represent 
unrotated factor solutions. In the interest of space, results from more than one analysis are 
reported in each table. Table 14 displays the unitary factor solution for the self ratings of 
the game items and the unitary factor solution for the experimenter ratings o f the game 
items. Similarly, Table 15 displays the results o f three separate principle components 
analyses; one analysis based on self ratings, one based on partner ratings and one based on 
experimenter ratings. Because the different scales represent different raters rather than 
different dimensions, it is appropriate and in fact desirable for items to have high factor 
loadings on multiple measures. That is, the high factor loadings were obtained for the 
same item on both the self rating and the experimenter rating were evidence o f convergent 
validity, rather than of cross-loading.
Internal consistency reliability estimates were satisfactory for all subscales except 
self rating of the game. As a preliminary test o f predictive validity, each of these subscales 
was also correlated with objective performance (hits). Internal consistency reliability 
estimates and the correlation with objective performance for each of the subscales are 
shown in Table 16.
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Table 1+
Principle Components Analysis for Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART): Game Ratings
Item Self rating Experimenter Rating
Instability of situation .76 .94
Complexity of situation .68 .96
Variability of situation .79 .94
Eigenvalue 1.67 2.69
Percent variance 55.60% 89.70%
Table 15
Principle Components Analyses for Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART): Individual Ratings
Item Self rating Partner Rating Experimenter Rating
Arousal .85 .79 .89
Concentration of attention .81 .81 .93
Division of attention .83 .77 .95
Spare mental capacity .73 .76 .85
Eigenvalue 2.61 2.45 3.27
Percent variance 65.13% 61.12% 81.77%
Table 16
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimate and Correlation with Performance fo r Situation Awareness 
Rating Technique (SART) Subscales
Subscale of SART Internal Consistency 
Reliability Estimate
Correlation with Performance 
(hits)
Game: Self Rating .60 -.18*
Game: Experimenter Rating .94 .52*
Individual: Self Rating .82 .32*
Individual: Partner Rating .79 .18*
Individual: Experimenter Rating .93 .59*
Note. *p < .05
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SALIENT
Analysis of the adapted form of SALIENT used in this research yielded very 
positive results. Like SART, ratings on SALIENT were gathered from each participant, 
his or her partner and the experimenter. Despite the length o f the measure, the unrotated 
factor matrix for each rating method yielded factor loadings that were all above .50. 
Results from the three principle components analyses o f the scale (one from each rating 
source) are reported together in Table 17. Similar to the results reported for SART, due to
Table 17
Principle Components Analyses for Situational Awareness Linked Indicators Adapted to Novel Tasks
(SALIENT)
Item Self Rating Partner Rating Experimenter Rating
Monitored environment .61 .50 .81
Demonstrated spatial awareness .69 .52 .76
Reported problems .70 .68 .75
Location problem source .71 .74 .90
Knowledge of consequences .79 .79 .90
Resolved discrepancies .80 .71 .88
Noted deviations .77 .74 .83
Recognized a need for action .66 .64 .79
Anticipated consequences .72 .68 .88
Informed other of actions taken .73 .72 .85
Monitored actions .78 .74 .87
Demonstrated knowledge of tasks .71 .62 .76
Shared attention among tasks .75 .72 .83
Monitored workload .80 .78 .80
Shared workload .75 .69 .74
Answered questions promptly .64 .55 .67
Communicated important .79 .74 .85
Confirmed information .76 .68 .79
Challenged information .71 .66 .60
Re-checked old information .68 .67 .57
Provided information in advance .75 .79 .83
Obtained information .77 .72 .83
Complex relationships .80 .74 .85
Briefed status frequently .74 .72 .69
Eigenvalue 12.95 11.54 15.24
Percent variance 53.97% 48.06% 63.48%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
the fact that the different columns in Table 17 represent different raters rather than 
different constructs, it is appropriate and desirable for the items to have high factor 
loadings on multiple scales. Table 18 displays the correlations between the SALIENT 
scales and objective performance, and the internal consistency reliability estimates for 
SALIENT.
Table 18
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimate and Correlation with Performance for Situational Awareness 
Linked Indicators Adapted to Novel Tasks (SALIENT) Subscales
Subscale of SALIENT Internal Consistency 
Reliability Estimate
Correlation with Performance (hits)
SALIENT: Self Rating .96 .30*
SALIENT: Partner Rating .95 .14*
SALIENT: Experimenter Rating .97 .48*
Note. *p < .05
The high factor loadings, high internal consistency reliability estimates and 
significant correlations with objective performance are strong evidence that SALIENT is 
reasonably consistent across raters, that it is a unitary measurement, and that it possesses 
good reliability. Additionally, preliminary evidence suggests that it has good predictive 
validity for objective performance. Given that the statistics for SALIENT are more 
favorable than those for SART, it seems advisable to use SALIENT as the metric for SA 
in model testing analyses.
Communication
Analysis of the measures of communication were less encouraging. Although there 
did not appear to be a method effect (estimation versus observation), communication was 
not a unitary measure. Where the SART and SALIENT measures used a single set of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
items collected multiple times from three different raters, the communication measure was 
comprised o f a single set o f items, each of with was collected only once, although two 
different methods were used. Thus, the values reported in Table 19 are the results of one 
principle components analysis that included all items.
Table 19
Principle Components Analysis fo r  Communication Measures
Measure Factor 1 Factor 2
Communication frequency (estimation) 0.82 0.52
Communication mundane (estimate) 0.69 0.55
Communication emergency (estimate) 0.59 0.57
Communication role (estimate) 0.16 0.82
Communication team (estimate) 0.78 0.26
Communication closed loop (estimate) 0.33 0.76
Communication info request (observation) 0.59 0.48
Communication raw data (observation) 0.82 0.06
Communication processed (observation) 0.24 0.86
Communication other (observation) 0.72 0.28
Eigenvalue 6.05 1.07
Percent variance 60.52% 10.66%
Note. Highest factor loading for each item is shown in bold.
Table 20
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimate and Correlation with Performance fo r  Communication 
Measures
Measure Internal Consistency Correlation with
Reliability Estimate Performance (hits)
Communication: Factor 1 .73 .05
Communication: Clarifying .70 .18*
Communication: Processed .24*
Note. *p < .05
Several items that loaded primarily on Factor 1 of the communication measure 
were cross-loaded; that is, they had fairly high factor loadings on both factors. This was
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less the case for Factor 2; items that loaded primarily on Factor 2 had much smaller factor 
loadings on Factor 1. This suggests that Factor 2 is a “cleaner” factor.
Internal consistency reliability estimates were calculated and predictive validity was 
also tested. The internal consistency reliability estimate for the items that comprised Factor 
1 was acceptable, but the internal consistency reliability estimate for the three items 
comprising Factor 2 was only .27. Removing the communication measure for processed 
information resulted in a much higher internal consistency reliability estimate for the 
remaining two items in Factor 2. Therefore, communication was broken out into three 
components: Factor 1, Factor 2 (without processed) and processed communication. 
Internal consistency reliability estimates and correlations with objective performance are 
presented in Table 20. Given that the communication Factor 1 was not significantly related 
to performance and that it had problems with cross-loading, it seems best to include only 
communication Factor 2 and the processed communication item in model testing.
Examination of the content of each item supports this decision also -  those items 
that comprise Factor 1 have been shown in previous research to be unrelated to SA, while 
those items that remain (Factor 2 and processed communication) do have a theoretical 
relationship to SA, as outlined in the introduction. The two items that comprise 
communication Factor 2 can be characterized as “clarifying communication” in that they 
demonstrated an effort on the part of the participant to address role issues and to ensure 
that communication was accurately understood by both parties (closed-loop 
communication).
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Role Checklist
The role checklist was used to calculate role conflict and ambiguity, using the 
methodology suggested by Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991). This methodology used the same 
set o f items but two different calculation methods to arrive at the role ambiguity and role 
conflict scores. Role ambiguity was measured by the degree of certainty about whether or 
not a particular item was part of the participant’s role. Role conflict was calculated as a 
difference score between the participants’ rating of her or his role, and the partner’s rating 
of the participant’s role.
Although the two scales are fundamentally different metrics from the perspective 
that one takes into account the ratings o f the partner, one of the goals was to identify 
those items which contributed positively to both methods of calculations. That is, the 
intention was to create one role checklist that could be used for calculating both role 
ambiguity and role conflict, rather than a separate checklist for each purpose. Therefore, 
those items that loaded only on one scale or the other when submitted to principle 
components analysis were eliminated, leaving only those items that formed a unitary scale 
for both methods of calculation. Eight items were identified that comprised unitary 
measures o f both role conflict and role ambiguity. Only those items were included for the 
remaining analyses.
The difference between the two scales using this method is in the calculation rather 
than in the items themselves. Values reported in Table 21 reflect the factor solutions for 
both methods o f calculation independently. That is, Table 21 reports the principle 
components analysis for the eight items calculated to reflect role ambiguity and the 
principle components analysis of the same items calculated to reflect role conflict.
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Therefore, it is appropriate for the factor loadings for a single item to be high on both 
dimensions. Table 22 displays the internal consistency reliability estimates and 
relationships with performance for both of these calculation approaches. As role conflict is 
not significantly correlated with performance, role ambiguity will be used in model testing.
Table 21
Principle Components Analysis fo r  Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict
Item Role Ambiguity Role Conflict
Leader .57 .51
Responsible for setting strategy .75 .57
Moral support .62 .47
Navigate -  decide where to go .70 .62
Weapons expert -  decide which weapons to use .71 .68
Responsible for making task assignments .82 .72
Responsible for monitoring partner’s activities .71 .62
Responsible for keeping perspective .73 .63
Eigenvalue 3.98 2.92
Percent variance 49.73% 36.55%
Table 22
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimate and Correlation with Performance for Role Ambiguity and Role 
Conflict
Scale Internal Consistency CorrelaUon with Performance (hits)
Reliability Estimate
Role Ambiguity .85 .14*
Role Conflict .75 -.05
Note. *p < .05
Role Conflict and Ambiguity Measures 
Factor analysis o f role conflict and ambiguity using the Rizzo, House, and 
Lirtzman (1970) classic measures did not fall out as cleanly as expected. While the items 
assessing role conflict did emerge as a unitary scale, the items for role ambiguity did not.
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Further analysis revealed that one item, “I have to work under vague directives or orders” 
fit better with the role conflict items than with the role ambiguity items. The internal 
consistency reliability estimate of the role ambiguity scale was also improved by deleting
Table 23
Principle Components Analysis fo r Rizzo et al. (1970) Measure o f  Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict
Item Role Ambiguity Role Conflict
I feel certain about how much authority I have. 0.69 0.05
I have clear, planned goals and objectives for my job. 0.75 0.14
I know what my responsibilities are. 0.86 0.08
I know exactly what is expected of me. 0.79 0.16
I work on unnecessary things. 0.06 0.68
I receive a assignment without the ability to complete it. 0.21 0.76
I work under incompatible guidelines. 0.07 0.84
Eigenvalue 2.45 1.79
Percent variance 61.16% 59.69%
Note. Hjghcst factor loading for each item is shown in bold.
Table 24
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimate and Correlation with Performance for Rizzo et al.(I970) 
Measures o f  Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict
Scale Internal Consistency Correlation with Performance (hits)
Reliability Estimate
Role Ambiguity .78 .14*
Role Conflict .65 .12
Note. *p < .05
this item. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, analyses were conducted with only the 
first 4 items of the role ambiguity measure. The three role conflict items were left as an 
intact scale. Principle components analyses for these scales are shown in Table 23, and 
Table 24 displays the internal consistency reliability estimates and the correlations to 
performance. Similar to the results for the Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) approach to
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measuring role conflict and role ambiguity, only role ambiguity was significantly correlated 
to performance. Unlike the Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) approach, the difference between 
the two measures here lies in the item content rather than the calculation.
Task/Social Experience 
Analysis of task and partner experience revealed that items fell out nicely into two 
factors, corresponding to the dimensions of task and social experience. Factor loadings for 
these measures are listed in Table 25. Table 26 displays the internal consistency reliability 
estimates and correlations with performance.
Table 25
Principle Components Analysis for Experience Items
Item Task Experience Social Experience
Computer game skill 0.78 0.22
Comanche experience 0.72 -0.27
Joystick experience 0.79 0.25
Team experience -0.04 0.83
Familiarity with partner 0.15 0.56
Eigenvalue 1.85 1.12
Percent variance 37.06% 22.33%
Task experience relates significantly to performance, although social experience 
does not. An examination of social experience at the item level revealed that although the 
extent to which the team members knew each other correlated modestly with objective 
performance ( r = . 12, p  < .05), prior experience working with in a team was not 
correlated to performance ( r  = .03, n.s.). In addition, the social experience items have an 
unacceptably low internal consistency reliability estimate; thus, it is inappropriate to 
include this measure in model testing.
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Table 26
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimate and Correlation with Performance fo r  Experience Measures
Scale Internal Consistency Correlation with Performance (hits)
Reliability Estimate
Task Experience .65 .46*
Social Experience .21 .11
Note. *p < .05
Performance
The performance measures included both objective components (i.e., the number 
of mission goals achieved and enemies destroyed, collectively called “hits”) and subjective 
components (i.e., rating scales). Both self and partner ratings on the subjective measure o f 
performance were included in the study. Although the performance rating scale included 
six items, both principle components analysis and reliability were improved by deleting the 
sixth item. The factor loadings for the performance measures are displayed in Table 27. 
Table 28 displays the internal consistency reliability estimate and correlation with objective 
performance for subjective performance measures. As with several other measures 
included in this study, the different scales reflect different raters rather than different 
constructs, and thus it is appropriate and desirable for items to have high factor loadings 
on both scales.
Having established the factor structures, internal consistency reliability estimates 
and rudimentary predictive validity for the measures included in the study, it was 
important to identify those that displayed the best measurement characteristics for 
incorporation in the model testing phase of the analysis. Clearly, it was important to 
include only those measures which possessed unitary factor structures and adequate
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Table 27
Principle Components Analyses for Subjective Performance, Without Item 6
Item Self Rating Partner Rating
Perform job as preferred .89 .85
Performance met expectations .80 .83
Role and responsibility effectiveness .91 .87
Overall performance rating .89 .85
Personal view of effectiveness .86 .80
Eigenvalue 3.81 3.52
Percent variance 76.12% 70.42%
Table 28
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimate and Correlation with Objective Performance for Subjective 
Performance Measures
Scale Internal Consistency 
Reliability Estimate
Correlation with Performance (hits)
Performance: Self Rating .92 .50*
Performance: Partner Rating .89 .23*
Note. *p < .05
reliability. In addition, it was preferable to include measures that have some relationship 
with the ultimate variable of interest, performance. These criteria left us with the following 
measures for inclusion in the model testing phase of analysis: SALIENT (self, partner and 
experimenter ratings) for Individual SA, clarifying communication and the processed 
communication item for communication, role ambiguity (both role checklist and Rizzo et 
al. (1970) measures) and task experience for shared understanding, and all three 
performance measures (objective, and self and partner ratings) for performance.
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Bivariate Hypotheses 
Bivariate hypotheses were proposed in the introduction. These hypotheses 
described the expected relationships between latent traits addressed in this research. The 
correlations displayed in Table 29 provide an opportunity to evaluate these bivariate 
hypotheses, by examining the correlations between the measures that comprise each latent 
trait included in the bivariate hypotheses. Appendix G displays the descriptive statistics 
and correlation table for all measures described above; Table 29 displays the correlation 
table for the subset o f scales that were included in model testing.
Table 29
Correlation Table for Measures Included in Model Testing
Measure N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 272 4.27 1.73
2 272 4.26 1.58 .39*
3 272 3.12 1.67 .51* .47*
4 268 0.37 0.67 .40* .43* .68*
5 272 4.80 9.45 .38* .37* .54* .73*
6 272 2.86 1.02 .30* .18* .19* .15* .15*
7 271 3.74 0.86 .10 .00 .02 .02 -.05 -.08
8 271 2.13 0.87 .36* .25* .38* .18* .16* .09 .16*
9 270 41.19 26.81 .30* .14* .48* .18* .24* .14* .12* .46*
10 271 3.18 1.01 .50* .22* .35* .17* .20* .20* .30* .49* .50*
11 271 3.93 0.74 .20* .36* .20* .14* .14* .19* .08 .13* .23* .23*
Note. *p < .05. Measures are listed below.
1. SALIENT: Self Rating
2. SALIENT: Partner Rating
3. SALIENT: Experimenter Rating
4. Communication: Clarifying
5. Communication: Processed
6. Role Ambiguity
7. Rizzo et al.: Role Ambiguity
8. Task Experience
9. Objective Performance
10. Subjective Performance: Self
11. Subjective Performance: Partner
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In the interest of eliminating as much random error as possible, only those 
measures which were determined to be sound enough for use in model testing were used 
in evaluating the bivariate hypotheses. Due to the fact that these correlations and the 
evaluation of the bivariate hypotheses are primarily for descriptive purposes, no correction 
for Type I error was made.
All nine (100%) of the bivariate relationships that comprise Hypothesis 1, 
individual SA is positively correlated with performance, were statistically significant. All 
six (100%) of the correlations comprising Hypothesis 2, individual SA is positively 
correlated with communication, were statistically significant. Hypothesis 3, 
communication is positively correlated with performance, was also supported by all six 
(100%) of the bivariate relationships involved.
Hypothesis 4, individual SA is positively correlated with shared understanding, 
was comprised o f nine bivariate relationships and, although six were statistically 
significant, only three (33%) were in the expected direction. Role ambiguity is inversely 
related to shared understanding; that is, low role ambiguity is indicative o f high shared 
understanding. Thus, the positive relationships between individual SA and the role 
ambiguity measures are in the opposite direction from the hypothesis. Similar to the 
findings for Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 5 was only partially supported. Three significant 
correlations (33%) emerged supporting Hypothesis 5, although eight o f nine relationships 
comprising Hypothesis 5, shared understanding is positively correlated with performance, 
achieved significance. That is, five o f  the eight positive relationships were actually in the 
opposite direction; role ambiguity was positively correlated with performance.
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Finally, of the six bivariate relationships included in Hypothesis 6, communication 
is positively correlated with shared understanding, only two (33%) significant correlations 
emerged supporting the hypothesis. Like Hypotheses 4 and 5, however, two more 
significant correlations emerged in the opposite direction (communication positively 
correlated with role ambiguity). Thus, Hypotheses 1-3 received strong support, and 
Hypotheses 4-6 received mixed support.
Model Testing 
Statistical Analyses
Scale scores with the best measurement characteristics identified above were 
included as the observed variables in testing each of the five models identified in the 
introduction. Models were tested using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). SEM is a 
general statistical modeling technique, which allows examination of the relationships 
among multiple variables, which can be observed or unobserved, at the same time. One 
advantage of SEM is that it explicitly models measurement error associated with observed 
variables to arrive at unbiased estimates of unobserved variables (Ullman, 1996). In 
addition, SEM permits reciprocal causation, that is, non-recursive models (Bentler & 
Raykov, 2000).
SEM is a confirmatory technique; thus, analyses with SEM begin with an a priori 
model, which is evaluated against the covariance structures o f the data to determine the fit 
of the model to the data (Ullman, 1996). The more closely the a priori model fits the data, 
the more plausible it is that the model is an accurate explanation for the relations among 
the measures. SEM yields both standardized and unstandardized regression estimates
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(path coefficients). For ease o f understanding, standardized regression estimates are 
displayed on the figures. Significant paths are noted with an asterisk.
Model testing analyses were performed using the Analysis of Moment Structures 
(AMOS) structural equation modeling program (SmallWaters Corporation, 1999). 
Goodness o f fit o f the models was evaluated using several o f the more widely-used 
indicators. The most commonly used indicator o f closeness o f model fit is chi-square (e.g., 
Kline, 1998), thus, chi-square was calculated for each o f the models. Due to the fact that 
the goal in model testing is to have a model that fits the data, that is, a model which is not 
significantly different from the data, a nonsignificant chi-square is desired. That is, it is 
desirable to accept the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the data and the 
model (Ullman, 1996).
Since chi-square is affected by sample size, four other commonly used fit statistics 
were also included. Each of these take a comparative approach to estimating fit. That is, 
they compare the fit of the data to some theoretical baseline model, either completely 
uncorrelated (the independence model) or perfectly correlated (the saturated model; 
Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). The Normed Fit Index (NFI; Bentler & Bonett, 1980) and 
Non-Normed Fit Index (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) are both commonly used indices, 
although they tend to underestimate fit in models with smaller samples, and the NNFI 
sometimes yields values outside the 0 -  1 range (Ullman, 1996). The Incremental Fit Index 
(IFI; Bollen, 1989) is another variation of the NFI and NNFI, and addresses the variability 
issues of the NNFI (Ullman, 1996). The last fit index used, the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI; Bentler, 1990), uses a slightly different statistical approach than the NFI, NNFI and 
IFI, but it yields accurate estimations of fit, independent of sample size. For all four of
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these fit indices, values close to 1 (e.g., greater than .9) indicate a good fit (Arbuckle & 
Wothke, 1999).
Models were compared to determine which best fit the data using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1987). The AIC is a composite measure, formed by a 
weighted sum of badness-of-fit and model complexity, where a constant k  is applied to 
complexity as a relative penalty for badness-of-fit and complexity (Arbuckle, 1997). Thus, 
complex, poorly fitting models yield high AICs, and simple, well-fitted models yield low 
AICs. Although values close to zero are desirable, no agreed-upon cutoff has been 
established (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996). The statistic is inappropriate as a general 
evaluation o f an individual model; rather it is designed to allow comparisons among 
models (Arbuckle, 1997). The statistic explicitly favors more parsimonious models.
This test is an appropriate method by which to compare the models presented here, 
in that it works with both hierarchical (i.e., nested) and non-hierarchical models (Kline, 
1998). Although the test is imperfect, it is considered to be the best method to compare 
both hierarchical and non-hierarchical models for goodness o f fit (Schumacker & Lomax, 
1996).
Summation Model
Figure 9 displays the summation model with standardized regression coefficients 
for the paths. The summation model included only two latent traits, team S A and team 
performance, each o f which was comprised of three observed variables. This model had 
excellent goodness-of-fit indicators, which are displayed in Table 30.
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^  Team >  
Performance
.65*Team SA
.86*.96*
.48*.90*
i r
.54*.63*
SALIENT :Experimenter Objective Performance
Performance: Self
SALIENT: Partner
SALIENT:Self
Performance: Partner
* p  < .05
Figure 9. Standardized regression estimates for summation model
Table 30
Goodness o f  Fit Indices fo r  Summation Model
Index Value
(8, N = 126) = 44.05, p  < .05
Normed Fit Index .98
Incremental Fit Index .98
Non-Normed Fit Index .96
Comparative Fit Index .98
Akaike Information Criterion 82.05
Non-Recursive Communication M odel 
Figure 10 displays the non-recursive communication model with standardized 
regression coefficients for the paths. The non-recursive communication model included 
three latent traits: communication, team SA and team performance. Communication was 
comprised of two observed variables, and had a non-recursive (i.e., two-way) relationship
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with team SA. This model had good goodness-of-fit indicators, which are displayed in
Table 31.
Communication
.83*
.54* 14*
.66*
Team SA
,85*
.49*.91*
.55*
Team ^  
Performance
.90*
.93*;
Objective PerformanceSALIENT Experimenter
SALIENT rPartner Performance: Partner
Performance: SelfSALIENT:Self
Communication: Clarifying
Communication: Processed
* p  < .05
Figure 10. Standardized regression estimates for non-recursive communication model
Table 31
Goodness o f  Fit Indices fo r  Non-Recursive Communication Model
Index Value
'C (18, N = 126)= 115.76, p  < .05
Normed Fit Index .95
Incremental Fit Index .96
Non-Normed Fit Index .92
Comparative Fit Index .96
Akaike Information Criterion 167.76
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Communication M odel
.90*
Conun uni cation
.63*
Team > 
Performance
.66*
Team SA
.85*.93*
.49*.91*
.67* .55*
SALIENT: Partner Performance: Partner
SALIENT :Experimenter
SALIENT:Self
Objective Performance
Performance: Self
Communication: Processed
Communication: Clarifying
* p  < .05
Figure 11. Standardized regression estimates for communication model
Table 32
Goodness o f  Fit Indices for Communication Model
Index Value
7.: (18, N = 126)= 115.76, p  < .05
Normed Fit Index .95
Incremental Fit Index .96
Non-Normed Fit Index .92
Comparative Fit Index .96
Akaike Information Criterion 167.76
Figure 11 displays the communication model with the standardized regression 
coefficients for the paths. The communication model was identical to the non-recursive
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communication model, except that the communication model included a unidirectional 
path between communication and team SA, as opposed to the bi-directional relationship 
between those two variables in the non-recursive communication model. This model had 
good goodness-of-fit indicators, which are displayed in Table 32.
Shared Understanding M odel
.96 *r
SALEENT:Self .89*
r
SALIENT :Partner
* p  < .05
Role Ambiguity
  .295
Shared 
Understanding ) Rizzo Role Ambiguity
Task Experience
.67* x Team
v PerformanceTeam SA
Performance: Self
Performance: Partner
Objective PerformanceSALIENT :Experimenter
Figure 12. Standardized regression estimates for shared understanding model
Figure 12 displays the shared understanding model with standardized regression 
coefficients for the paths. The shared understanding model included three latent variables, 
team SA, team performance and shared understanding. Each of these was comprised of
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three observed variables. This model had excellent goodness-of-fit indicators, which are 
displayed in Table 33.
Table 33
Goodness o f  Fit Indices for Shared Understanding Model
Index Value
'/: (25, N =  126) = 95.33.p < .05
Normed Fit Index .97
Incremental Fit Index .98
Non-Normed Fit Index .96
Comparative Fit Index .98
Akaike Information Criterion 153.33
Integrated Model
Figure 13 displays the integrated model with standardized regression coefficients 
for the paths. The integrated model includes all four of the latent traits from the previous 
models. The integrated model includes the unidirectional relationship between 
communication and team SA from the communication model, rather than the bidirectional 
relationship between these two variables tested in the non-recursive communication 
model. The integrated model had good goodness-of-fit indicators, which are displayed in 
Table 34.
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Communication: Clarifying
(.Communication
Communication: Processed
.28*
.51* S ' Shared \  .40* 
Understandin
Role Ambiguity
Rizzo Role Ambiguity
Task Experience
.05 1.13* /
SALIENT: Self •^94* /  86V* Performance: Self
SALIENT: Partner
^ o V
Team SA
N  .68*/^ '^ >C49*
)——m. Performance ) > Performance: Partner
SALIENT: Experimenter
^ 6 7 * ,55*\* Objective Performance
* p  < .05
Figure 13. Standardized regression estimates for integrated model
Table 34
Goodness o f Fit Indices for Integrated Model
Index Value
7.
Normed Fit Index 
Incremental Fit Index 
Non-Normed Fit Index 
Comparative Fit Index 
Akaike Information Criterion
(40, N = 126) = 176.25, p  < .05 
.95 
.96 
.94 
.96 
250.25
M odel Comparisons 
Although the chi-square value for each of the models tested was significant, the 
other fit indices revealed that the each of the models fit the data well. Table 35 displays the 
fit indices for all the models. The AIC for the summation model is smallest; thus, it 
represents the best fit of the data.
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Table 35
Fit Indices for Models
Models Compared Chi-square NFI IFI NNFI CFI AIC
Summation (8, N = 126) = 44.05, p  < .05 .98 .98 .96 .98 82.05
Non-recursive (18, N = 126) = 115.76, p  < .05 .95 .96 .92 .96 167.76
Communication
Communication (18, N = 126) = 115.76, p  < .05 .95 .96 .92 .96 167.76
Shared Understanding (25, N = 126) = 95.33, p  < .05 .97 .98 .96 .98 153.33
Integrated (40, N = 126) = 176.25, p  < .05 .95 .96 .94 .96 250.25
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Two primary goals were identified for the present research. The first goal was 
validation o f metrics for use in SA research. The primary goal, identification of a model of 
team SA, was dependent upon the first. Results o f this research were very encouraging in 
terms of both of these goals. Implications for future research are discussed throughout this 
section.
Measurement Validation 
Measures o f SA
Three approaches to measuring S A were identified in the introduction: proximal 
meso or middle and distal. All three o f these were operationalized and tested. A measure 
was constructed to assess proximal SA, two previously described measures, SART and 
SALIENT were included to test meso SA  and performance measures were included to 
quantify distal SA  although distal SA measures are more inferential than direct measures 
o f SA. The proximal SA measures, SART and SALIENT are discussed below.
Proximal SA Measure
A probe-type measure of proximal S A was developed. Although this approach to 
measuring SA was the most common one found in the literature, upon statistical analysis, 
it proved disappointing. It was not unitary, and only one factor, comprised of a single 
item, correlated significantly with performance. Although there are examples in the 
literature o f proximal S A techniques being effectively used with a composite measure 
(e.g., Chaparro et al.,1999), Endsley herself has demonstrated that the technique as she 
practices it is not a unitary measure (e.g., Endsley, 1998). Despite the fact that previous 
research has suggested that use of a freeze or probe technique does not intrude on S A
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(Endsley, 1995b), a t-test revealed a significant cueing effect for the one item that was 
included in the probe question on the first and second breaks.
There are several possible explanations for the disappointing results for the 
proximal SA measure. First, it is possible that the items included in the breaks were not 
central enough to the task to be good indicators of S A. Second, it is possible that the 
participants were attending to more the naturalistic, context-rich environmental cues 
rather than attending to the simulated aircraft’s displays. That is, it is possible that the 
participants were more focused on how many targets they could see out their windshield 
as opposed to attending to their cockpit display of mission goals within range. Given the 
good visual conditions of the simulation, it was possible for participants to fly using visual 
flight rules rather than attending to instrumentation. Participants’ novice status may have 
contributed to a tendency to attend to naturalistic cues rather than the instrumentation. 
Much SA research (e.g., Bolstad & Endsley, 1999) uses impoverished displays such as a 
single simulated radar screen, rather than the full-graphics display provided in the 
Werewolf vs. Comanche simulation.
Third, it is possible that the novice participants were not attending to the cues in 
any structured way, or that they simply had poor SA. It is also possible that the 
dimensions captured on the measure are truly independent, and that it was inappropriate to 
attempt to create a composite measure from them. However, item level analyses reveal 
that only one o f the items included in this measure achieved a statistically significant 
correlation with objective performance (“what is your current speed”, r = -. 17, p f .05), 
although this correlation was in the expected direction.
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These criticisms could be overcome through the use of a different simulation or 
different items. It may be that probe-type measures of proximal SA are indeed useful 
indicators of S A when the data that they capture are most salient to the participants. If 
participants have only the radar to indicate the location o f targets, it is possible that their 
SA for target location will be more accurate than if they can also “see” targets out of their 
windshields. That is, the additional visual information may be acting as a distractor. Thus, 
although the proximal SA measure was disappointing in this research, the approach may 
still be useful in other research.
The disappointing results related to proximal SA may have had less to do with the 
items comprising measure and more to do with the approach to measuring proximal SA. 
That is, the items themselves may not have been problematic; rather, the probe technique 
may be the culprit. Durso, Hackworth, Truitt, Crutchfield, Nikolic and Manning (1998; 
cited in Durso & Gronlund, 1999) suggested that retaining information about the situation, 
such as speed or current weapons setting, in memory may actually be indicative of poor 
resource use. That is, if the information is available in the environment, it may be 
indicative of good S A to know where to find relevant information, rather than attempting 
to maintain the information in working memory. Thus, different methods for assessing 
proximal SA should be tested in future research.
SART
SART yielded acceptable validation statistics. The measure is unique in that it 
assesses both the complexity of the game and the individual’s SA. The two distinct 
sections o f the scale were both unitary, all versions of the scale correlated significantly 
with performance, and the internal consistency reliability estimates for the versions of the
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scale were generally acceptable, although the internal consistency reliability estimate for 
the self rating o f game complexity was borderline at .60.
Although in general SALIENT appears to be a superior method to SART for the 
assessment o f SA, SART still holds promise as a means to answer research questions that 
SALIENT cannot address. For example, research investigating the interactions among 
situation complexity, S A and performance could be quite interesting. The brevity o f the 
measure is also an advantage.
SALIENT
The adaptation of Muniz and her colleagues’ (1997) SALIENT yielded the best 
validation statistics. Although Muniz et al. designed SALIENT as a sophisticated 
behavioral observation measure for use with expert pilots, the content performed well 
using a rating scale approach to assess each content dimension. This adaptation both 
simplified the use of the measure and made it more appropriate for novice participants. 
Research comparing the results of the two approaches (behavioral observation checklist 
and rating scale) to the measure is required to determine the relative merits o f each.
Principle components analysis revealed that the 27-item scale was unitary using 
each of the three (self, partner and experimenter) rating techniques. Furthermore, all three 
rating methods yielded high internal consistency reliability estimates, and were significantly 
correlated with objective performance. This represents a significant advancement in that 
these results were achieved with the easily-generalizable adaptation o f SALIENT that was 
developed for this study.
It must be explicitly acknowledged, however, that it is possible that some o f the 
strength of SALIENT may be inflated due to the fact that it is a retrospective measure.
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During the simulation, participants received feedback on their performance in the form of 
a counter that showed the number of mission goals remaining for the team in each 
scenario, and the visual cue o f seeing when targets were destroyed. Therefore, participants 
had some performance data when they completed the SALIENT measure. Although the 
measure focuses on behavior rather than general impressions, it is possible that the 
measure was somewhat biased by this. Future research should validate this measure in a 
simulation where participants are blind to their performance.
In addition, it is somewhat disconcerting that the five proposed dimensions that 
comprise SALIENT did not fall out as distinct factors in principle components analysis. 
This suggests one of two things. Either the scale is actually unitary and the dimensions are 
highly correlated with each other, or the participants (and experimenter) in the study 
lacked the sophistication to recognize the subtle variations that would create the various 
factors. This again begs future research.
Other Measures
Other measures were also investigated as a part of this research. Specifically, 
measures o f communication, shared understanding and performance were included. 
Validation o f these measures yielded mixed results.
Communication
One model of team SA focuses on communication, but it was unclear which 
specific aspects of communication were most central to team S A. Thus, two measurement 
approaches and several categories o f communication were included in the study. A 10- 
minute communication sample was observed between the two breaks for the probe 
measures o f proximal SA. In addition, after the experimental task ended the experimenter
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made estimations about the relative frequency of different communication types across the 
entire 20-minute task.
Two factors emerged from principle components analysis, although many of the 
items that primarily loaded on the first factor cross-loaded onto the second factor. The 
items included in factor 2, clarifying communication, were less subject to this cross­
loading, and were also notable for their content: they were precisely the types of 
communication that might be expected to differentiate “good” teams from average or poor 
ones. The three types of communication that comprised this second factor were role- 
related communication, closed-loop communication and processed communication. The 
internal consistency reliability estimate was improved by separating the processed 
communication item from the first two. Thus, it should not be a surprise that these items 
were significantly related to performance, whereas the more generic communication items 
comprising Factor 1 were not.
This result confirmed Hollenbeck et al.’s (1995) post hoc finding that high 
performing teams processed information prior to communicating it more than low 
performing teams did. This result also confirmed McIntyre and Salas’s (1995) contention 
that closed loop communication is particularly critical to good team performance, 
especially in high-complexity, time constrained settings. The inclusion of role-related 
communication speaks to the importance of developing shared understanding.
On the other hand, the literature has mixed findings on the relationship of general 
communication and SA. Major et al. (1998/1999) suggested that high levels of team SA 
should decrease the amount of communication required among team members. Artman 
(1999) found that fewer communications were related to better performance (presumably
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
due to greater SA), but Schreiber et al. (1996) found the opposite, that those with greater 
overall communications had higher SA. It is possible that these discrepant results are an 
artifact of the different studies’ operationalizations o f communication.
Item-level analysis o f the relationship between overall communication frequency 
and performance in this study revealed a nonsignificant correlation. At first blush, it seems 
possible that overall frequency may be more strongly related to familiarity between 
partners than to performance. However, even when the extent to which partners knew 
each other was controlled, the relationship between communication frequency and 
performance remained nonsignificant. This suggests that the mere frequency of 
communication is not a contributing factor to performance.
Shared Understanding
Shared understanding was assessed in two broad categories in this research: shared 
understanding regarding roles, and shared understanding developed through experience. 
Both types of shared understanding are discussed below.
Role conflict atid role ambiguity. Of particular interest is the role conflict and 
ambiguity assessment made using the methodolgy recommended by Ilgen and Hollenbeck 
(1991). Although not as simple to calculate as a likert-type scaling approach, the 
methodology was shown to have merit. O f the 16 items included on the role checklist, 8 
were identified that yielded unitary scales for both the role ambiguity calculation and the 
role conflict calculation. Although both calculation techniques yielded acceptable internal 
consistency reliability estimates, only role ambiguity was significantly related to 
performance. It is interesting to note that this same pattern emerged with the Rizzo et al.
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(1970) measure of role conflict and ambiguity, offering some evidence of convergent 
validity between these two measures.
It is possible that the failure of role conflict to achieve a significant relationship 
with performance was due to the task used in this study; it was possible for team members 
to act fairly independently and still perform the task adequately. Thus, role conflict may 
not have been as great as impediment in this task than in other, more highly interdependent 
tasks, or those that require distributed expertise. Research further validating the use of this 
methodology should be welcomed in the field.
Experience. Shared understanding was also assessed through measures o f social 
experience and task experience in this study. Stout, Cannon-Bowers and Salas 
(1996/1997) suggested that one route to high levels of team SA was through high levels of 
shared understanding. Two types of shared understanding were assessed: social and task. 
Although principle components analyses were promising for these measures, only task 
experience had acceptable internal consistency reliability estimates. Furthermore, only task 
experience correlated significantly with performance.
However, it is worth noting that several significant correlations with social 
experience did emerge. First, social experience was significantly positive related to self 
ratings on both SART and SALIENT, suggesting that individuals with more social 
experience on teams and/or with their partner were more confident in their SA. Second, 
social experience was significantly positively correlated to the communication measures. 
Interestingly, when the social experience is broken down to its component parts, 
experience with teams and partners’ familiarity with one another, familiarity is significantly
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positively correlated to all three types of communication, but team experience is only 
positively correlated to processed communication (r = .13, p  < .05).
Given that mixed results were achieved for this variable, it is probably premature 
to dismiss it as unimportant. Rather, further research should endeavor to clarify this 
relationship. It is possible that the items used to measure this variable were simply 
inadequate to capture the complexity of social experience; only two items were used, and 
these assessed fairly rudimentary social experience, which may not have been sufficient. 
Alternatively, it may be that the task was not sufficiently interdependent for a difference 
based on social experience to emerge. That is, due to the fact that it was possible for 
participants to play the game with some success without depending on their partners, 
social experience may not have been an important variable.
The experimenter’s casual observations revealed that partners who appeared to 
know each other well generally performed either very well or very poorly, and often those 
who had outstanding performance at the task brought along a good friend to participate 
with them. Examination of the item level correlations supported this; the correlation 
between familiarity with partner and task experience was (r = . 14, p  < .05), and between 
familiarity with partner and objective performance was (r = . 12, p  < .05). However, this 
pattern was not repeated for more general team experience.
It may be that there was an interaction between task experience and how well 
participants knew each other. Participants who knew each other often appeared to share 
an enjoyment o f tasks like the one used in the simulation or to share an unfamiliarity with 
them; thus both their task experience and social experience were high, as was their 
performance, or their social experience was high, and both their task experience and
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performance were low. Participants who participated with a stranger did not follow such a 
pattern; their task experience varied more randomly, and thus their aggregated task 
experience tended to regress toward the mean. This is another area that warrants further 
investigation. However, there is a possibility, however unlikely, that social experience is 
simply unimportant to team SA.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the two items included in the social 
experience measure were conceptually distinct. Reviewing item-level results for this 
measure yielded a pattern of results similar, but not identical, to those found at the scale 
level. Specifically, both team experience and familiarity with the experimental partner 
correlated significantly with self ratings on SART, SALIENT, processed communication, 
and self-rating of performance, as did the social experience measure. However, several 
other measures that correlated significantly with social experience were related to only 
experience with partner (and not team experience): experimenter rating on SALIENT, 
communication Factor 1, clarifying communication, task experience, objective 
performance and partner rating of performance. Interestingly, role conflict (using the Ilgen 
and Hollenbeck, 1991, methodology) was related to team experience only at the item 
level. That is, the more experience team mates had with working in teams, the less they 
agreed about their respective roles. Scales that specifically assess social experience should 
be developed in future research.
Performance
Subjective and objective measures of performance were included in this research. 
Subjective measures o f performance were significantly positively correlated to objective 
measures o f performance, which is evidence of convergent validity between the measures.
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Both self and partner ratings of subjective performance were unitary scales, and had high 
levels o f internal consistency reliability. Thus, either approach could probably be used in 
future research. This represents an advantage in that performance in SA contexts is not 
always easily quantifiable. For example, it may be difficult to quantify individual 
“performance” in fire fighting or disaster relief efforts. However, this research has 
demonstrated convergence between subjective performance ratings and objective 
measures of performance, thus clearing the way for subjective measures to be used when 
objective measures may be impractical.
Bivariate Hypotheses 
Bivariate hypotheses were generally supported. Hypotheses 1-3, which address the 
relationship between individual SA and performance, between individual SA and 
communication and between communication and performance were all universally 
supported by the correlations. Hypotheses 4-6, which address individual SA and shared 
understanding, shared understanding and performance, and communication and shared 
understanding all had mixed support.
Further examination reveals that the mixed results for Hypotheses 4-6 were due to 
measures of role ambiguity. Specifically, where these measures should have been 
negatively related to the outcome measures and other study measures, in every instance 
the correlations were either positive or nonsignificant. However, it would be premature to 
take these results as evidence that roles are not important to effective team performance.
There are several possible reasons why the relationships between role ambiguity, as 
measured using the Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) methodology, and the other study 
measures were positive rather than negative. First, it is possible that teams who devoted
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effort to role negotiation had less time to devote to the task, thereby lowering their 
performance. This would yield a pattern o f high role ambiguity (little effort spent on role 
negotiation) and high performance (more time to devote to the task). However, this 
possibility does not account for the positive relationship between role ambiguity and 
communication; if this were the causal mechanism, then high levels of role-related 
communication in particular should be related to low levels o f role ambiguity, which was 
not the case. Instead, it is possible that this positive relationship between role ambiguity 
and role-related communication is due to the efforts of participants to resolve their role 
ambiguity. That is, participants may have been unclear about their roles and may have 
engaged in role-related communication in an effort to clarify.
A second possibility is that there is an overconfidence effect. That is, those 
individuals who were least competent at the task were nonetheless quite confident about 
their competence (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). If  this were the case, then these individuals 
who had higher levels of role ambiguity would also have higher actual levels of 
performance, and those with very low levels o f role ambiguity (those who felt very clear 
about their roles and very competent at the task, yet were actually incompetent) would 
have had lower objective performance, yielding the positive correlation that was observed. 
However, if this were the causal mechanism, then self ratings o f performance would have 
been inflated for those individuals with poor performance and low role ambiguity, and this 
effect did not emerge.
The third possibility is that the novice participants in this simulation who were 
more flexible in their roles were more successful. Where members of mature teams 
presumably are fairly clear with regards to who will play what role under what
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circumstances, the participants in this study had only 20 minutes o f working together on 
the task. It is likely that each participant in the more effective teams played several 
different roles at different times during the simulation, trying various role configurations to 
determine which were most effective. Since the roles that they played were not consistent 
across the entire period of game play, it was not accurate for them to express confidence 
that particular roles were highly descriptive o f them. Less effective teams, on the other 
hand, may have been more clear with regards to their roles, to the detriment of their 
performance. That is, they may have become too focused on a particular role and missed 
opportunities to enhance overall team performance. This would account for the 
constellation o f findings associated with this variable.
Bolstad and Endsley (1999) showed that teams that started in a condition designed 
to facilitate shared understanding initially had performance that was poorer than teams 
without the shared understanding information, but later outperformed teams in other 
conditions. The present study did not include an explicit element o f time, but the findings 
with regards to role ambiguity are consonant with the findings of Bolstad and Endsley 
(1999). Future research should include the element of time in investigations of the 
relationship between roles, shared understanding, SA and performance.
Lending further support to this hypothesis about the curious positive relationship 
found between role ambiguity and performance is the positive relationship between 
communication (notably the role-related communication component) and role ambiguity. 
This suggests that teams who were actively negotiating roles (and therefore may still have 
some level of role ambiguity) were more effective.
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The fourth possibility is that this is not an anomalous finding at all, but entirely 
appropriate. That is, to the extent that roles actually are “subjective, personal, dynamic 
and specified by a variety o f social sources” (Ilgen & Hollenbeck, 1991, p. 174), it may be 
that a certain level of role ambiguity is reflective of good “role work” in a team, rather 
than a failure on the part o f the team. Recall that, in contrast to jobs, which are static, 
roles are naturally and by definition fluid. Empirical investigation may be able to determine 
whether there is an “optimal” level of role ambiguity, and whether that level changes with 
time. Additionally, it may be possible to determine empirically if there is an optimal 
balance between jobs and roles (somewhere between Ilgen and Hollenbeck’s 1991 “loose 
cannon” and bureaucratic job-role combinations; see Figure 3) for teams that must operate 
in contexts that require SA. Clearly, this is an area for future investigation.
All but one of the nonsignificant relationships within the proposed bivariate 
hypotheses involving shared understanding included the Rizzo et al. (1970) measure of 
role ambiguity. O f the 10 bivariate relationships between this measure and the other 
measures included in this analysis, only 3 were statistically significant. Notably, the three 
that did achieve significance were positive; that is, higher role ambiguity was related to 
higher performance. As these few significant findings were in the same direction as those 
including the Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) approach, this suggests that the failure to 
achieve significance may be due more to the measure than to the nature of the 
relationships between the variables. That is, this measure may simply be less sensitive than 
the measure using the Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) methodology. Alternatively, it may be 
that this measure is less subject to the overconfidence effect that may be causing the Ilgen
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and Hollenbeck (1991) measure to positively correlate. Again, further research using both 
methods for assessing role conflict and ambiguity is required.
Model Testing
The primary goal o f this research was to identify a model of team S A. Several 
models have been described, directly or indirectly, in the literature. Specifically, a 
summation model, both recursive and non-recursive communication models, a shared 
understanding model and an integrated model were tested. Each of these yielded excellent 
fit statistics. In fact, the greatest difference between the best-fitting and worst-fitting 
model was only .04. Thus, although the AIC suggested that the summation model, the 
most parsimonious model tested, fit the data best, it is impossible to emphasize enough 
that these models all essentially fit the data about equally well.
It seems reasonable to suggest that the similar results found for the models is due 
to the fact that each model tested is built upon the basic summation model. Additional 
variables were added into the models to examine their relationship with team SA, but the 
foundational model remained intact in all models tested. It is interesting to note that the 
standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between team S A and 
performance (the two latent variables in the summation model) were relatively stable 
across models; the estimates ranged from .65 to .68.
Despite the fact that the AIC favors the summation model, it would be a mistake 
to dismiss the other models put forth as unimportant. The fit indices for all models were 
very high, and all models yielded similar patterns in the indices. In addition, it needs to be 
highlighted that this research was conducted with novice participants, who worked at a
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novel simulation task for relatively brief time periods. Thus, it is possible that, given 
different research parameters, very different results could emerge.
Summation Model
Several noteworthy results emerged from model testing. As mentioned above, the 
summation model was determined to be the best fit to the data by the AIC. This model 
also had the smallest chi-squared statistic. This makes clear the centrality o f individual 
level SA, at least for novice operators and novel tasks.
It must be acknowldeged that the summation model had somewhat o f an unfair 
advantage over the other models as far as the AIC is concerned. This statistic explicitly 
punishes complexity. Therefore, it is possible that the summation model nosed out the 
other models simply by virtue o f its parsimony, as opposed to the closeness of its fit to the 
data. However, it should also be acknowledged that the summation model also had the 
smallest chi-squared statistic, and its other fit indices were in every case equal to or higher 
than the next highest model’s indices (although, as mentioned above, these differences 
were negligible).
It is interesting to note that the summation model seems to suggest that teams 
requiring SA are most like McGrath et al.’s (1995) task forces, rather than crews or 
teams. That is, the summation model suggests that aggregated individual SA is the most 
important predictor for team performance. McGrath et al.’s task forces are characterized 
by the primacy o f tasks, followed by members, with tools being the least central (although 
still important) element. Furthermore, in a task force, according to McGrath et al., the two 
most critical intersections are division of labor and job structure, with role network being 
the least important of the intersection element. If in fact the summation model is supported
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in future research as most important, this theory suggests that role networks are less 
important to team (task force) performance than are the division of labor and job 
structure. This may account for the disappointing findings around role conflict and role 
ambiguity.
Communication Models 
Both communication models received support. Examination of the non-recursive 
communication model reveals that the reciprocal relationship between communication and 
team SA is considerably stronger from communication to team SA than the other way 
around. Removing the feedback loop from team SA back to communication did not have 
any effect on the fit statistics, but it did increase the strength of the regression coefficient 
between communication and team SA to .63 from .54. Although communication was 
demonstrated to be important to team SA, no support was found for Shrestha et al.’s 
(1995) hypothesis that communication acts as a moderating variable. Instead, as was 
demonstrated by the integrated model, the relationship between communication and team 
SA is mediated by shared understanding.
Shared Understanding Model 
Examination of the results from the shared understanding model revealed a strong 
regression coefficient between shared understanding and team SA. Again, results 
supported the validity o f this model. It should be duly noted, however, that shared 
understanding in this model was operationalized as task experience and the two measures 
of role ambiguity. Thus, the results regarding shared understanding should be replicated 
before any substantive claims about the centrality o f shared understanding to team SA are 
made.
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The central premise put forth by Stout et al. (1996/1997) was that multiple routes 
were available by which high levels o f team S A could be achieved. Specifically, team S A 
could be achieved either through high levels o f shared understanding or through high 
levels o f individual SA. Our team level analysis confirmed that team SA was indeed built 
from both shared understanding and individual SA. Stout and her colleagues (1996/1997) 
in essence suggested that the two components could compensate for one another. It may 
be that some minimum level of one or both are required for adequate team SA. Future 
research should examine the extent to which these two factors are complementary.
The relatively brief duration o f  the simulation (20 minutes o f data collection during 
game play) also posed a disadvantage as far as shared understanding. The very nature of 
shared understanding suggests that it must evolve over time. Participants in this research 
had little opportunity for shared understanding between them to evolve. Recent research 
by Bolstad and Endsley (1999) suggests that the beneficial effects o f shared understanding 
become more pronounced over time. The present study did not include an element o f time 
in the analyses. This represents another clear need for future research.
Integrated Model
The strong relationship between shared understanding and team SA was stable 
when communication was added in the integrated model. However, the significant 
regression coefficient between communication and team SA seen in the two 
communication models evaporated when the integrated model was tested. Instead, a .51 
regression coefficient emerged between communication and shared understanding, and the 
relationship between shared understanding and team SA remained strong. The relationship 
between communication and team SA dropped to ncnsignificance.
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Thus, although the complexity o f the integrated model is a disadvantage for it 
statistically, interesting relationships that would not otherwise have emerged were 
revealed through testing this model. Most interesting was the relationship between 
communication and shared understanding, which had a higher regression coefficient than 
any o f the direct indicators of shared understanding, and the fact that the relationship 
between communication and team SA appears to be mediated by shared understanding. 
This suggests that it is important to re-think the role of communication in SA, as well as 
the importance o f shared understanding.
It seems intuitively reasonable that the primary importance of communication for 
SA is in developing and maintaining shared understanding. Certainly the regression 
coefficients for the integrated model support this. However, as mentioned above, shared 
understanding as it related to team SA in this research was a product of task experience 
and two measures o f role ambiguity. This is clearly an improvished measurement of shared 
understanding. Future research should take a rigorous mental models or situation models 
approach and test the relationships among shared understanding, communication and team 
SA.
This relationship between communication and shared understanding may also have 
been inflated by the content of the communication measure. This latent variable was 
comprised of two observed variables. Only three items contributed to this latent variable, 
and one of those three was role-related communication. Thus, it is possible that shared 
understanding (comprised largely of role ambiguity) was strongly predicted by 
communication because communication was built, to some extent, out of role-related 
communication. This is clearly an area for future research to investigate and clarify.
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It is possible that the relationship between communication, shared understanding 
and team S A was an artifact o f the impromptu teams and novel task used in this research. 
That is, participants did not arrive with shared understanding of their roles and the task at 
hand, but rather had to build their understanding during the simulation period. It is 
possible that experience or training could substantially alter this constellation of 
relationships. Research examining the roles of communication and shared understanding in 
developing team S A in experienced operators may yield different results.
Even given the possibility that the intriguing findings in the integrated model are an 
artifact of the novice participant population, the results are important. The central role of 
shared understanding, and the substantial contribution o f communication to that shared 
understanding, suggest that training for team S A should attend carefully to the shared 
understanding being developed by trainees. A significant component o f this attention 
should be communication monitoring.
Summary
This research made several important contributions to the body o f team S A 
research. First, it empirically identified the strengths and weaknesses o f measures of S A. 
SALIENT, the best measure identified here, has good measurement characteristics, 
whether used for self rating, rating by a partner or experimenter rating. It is unitary, has 
high levels of coefficient alpha reliability and correlates nicely with performance. Thus, this 
research found that measuring SA at the meso level was most appropriate.
Second, the research validated the methodology proposed by Ilgen and Hollenbeck 
(1991) for assessing role conflict and role ambiguity. Eight items were identified that were 
unitary across calculation methods, and had acceptable levels of alpha reliability. Although
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only role ambiguity was related to performance in this research, it is premature to 
conclude that this method is not a good one for calculating role conflict. The failure of the 
standard measure of role conflict (Rizzo, House & Lirtzman, 1970) to achieve a 
significant relationship with performance may suggest that role conflict was simply not an 
important element in this task, rather than suggesting that there is something inherently 
wrong with the measure. Alternatively, it is possible that the time period was simply to 
short to establish clear role sets.
Third, this research confirmed that each of several models o f team SA has merit. 
While the summation model yielded the best fit to the data, the difference in fit statistics is 
essentially negligible. It is premature, therefore, to dismiss the contributions made by the 
other models. O f particular interest is the mediating role that shared understanding plays 
between communication and team SA.
Study Limitations 
Novice Participants
This study had a few major limitations. First, its use of novice participants, while 
appropriate for the goals o f the study, significantly limits generalizability. First, novices are 
typically not put in settings where high levels o f S A are required. Typically, firefighters, 
aircraft pilots and anesthesiologists are extremely knowledgeable and have had 
tremendous amounts of skill practice prior to being expected to perform “for real.” It is 
possible that novice behavior and performance in any SA simulation or task is 
categorically different from expert behavior or performance in that simulation or task. To 
the extent that this is true, any research that utilizes novices lacks external validity.
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There is evidence that experts process information differently than novices. For 
example, experts often have the benefit o f automatic processing o f information (e.g., 
Schneider & Shiffirin, 1977). Experts also have been shown to recognize cues more 
completely and more quickly than novices (Means, Salas, Crandall & Jacobs, 1993). 
Finally, has been well known for a long time that experts are able to “chunk” related 
information in working memory far better and more accurately than novices (e.g., Chase 
& Simon, 1973; Miller, 1956) Durso and Gronlund (1999) suggested that experts may be 
able to utilize long-term working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) to efficiently 
retrieve information from long term memory, thereby lessening the load on working 
memory. Novices’ inexperience makes them unable to take advantage of this mechanism. 
From an S A perspective, all o f this suggests that perhaps expert operators can leap from 
Level 1 SA to Level 2 SA far more easily than can a novice.
This in itself is not sufficient reason to discount the research, however. First, it 
should be acknowledged that all experts were once novices themselves, and studying 
novices may offer clues to means by which to accelerate the learning process. Second, it 
should be acknowledged that, while the high-risk, high-complexity contexts that are 
typically studied in SA research are generally the domain o f  expert operators, SA is 
important, although possibly less critical, in dozens of more mundane tasks that people 
engage in every day; walking across campus, supervising children, playing basketball, and 
even mowing the lawn all require SA.
Proximal SA Measure
The use of only one proximal S A measure was a limitation o f this research. The 
disappointing results of this measure precluded any testing o f  the relative importance of
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proximal S A as a predictive mechanism or a limiting factor on overall levels o f SA. Given 
that proximal SA is, at least in theory, an essential foundation for SA at levels 2 and 3, 
exploration o f level 1 (proximal) SA seems a necessary component to understanding the 
mechanisms by which SA is built and maintained.
Parsing out the importance of different levels of S A on ultimate performance may 
be more than a theoretical exercise. Durso and Gronlund (1999) suggested that the levels 
of S A may be inextricably intertwined. It has been long established (e.g., Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971) that recognition of a pattern automatically activates other related 
components that were not perceived. That is, the pattern recognition literature suggests 
that the leap from Level 1 SA to Level 2 SA to Level 3 SA may be more automatic and 
less distinct than SA researchers have suggested.
The naturalistic decision making literature suggests a similar linkage between 
perception (Level 1 S A) and the other 2 levels o f S A, at least for expert operators. 
According to Klein (1989), recognition (Level 1 SA) and deciding what to do about it 
(planning -  Level 3 SA) are actually inseparable parts of the same process, at least for 
experts. Research comparing experts and novices in other domains (e.g., Wright, Pleasants 
& Gomez-Meza, 1990) suggests that experts are able to anticipate future events very 
accurately on the basis of advance cues currently available. Therefore, rather than arriving 
at a decision as a result o f a laborious process o f perception, integration, evaluation and 
planning, experts may recognize the future and the appropriate course of action as they are 
perceiving the present. These recognition-primed decisions are based on experience with a 
variety of situations, and retrieval o f the appropriate course o f  action, according to this 
theory, follows fairly automatically from recognition of the situation itself. Empirical
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evidence in the naturalistic decision making literature supports this: Kaempf, Lkein, 
Thordsen and Wolf (1996) studied expert command-and-control officers, and determined 
that 87% of decisions conformed to this pattern.
Given the extent to which the three levels o f S A play a foundational role in S A 
theory, empirical testing to determine the extent to which these levels of SA are actually 
distinct components is sorely needed.
Operationalization o f Social Experience
The operationalization of social experience was the weakest operationalization in 
the study. Specifically, social experience was operationalized as two items, team 
experience and familiarity with partner, that, while both forms o f social experience, one 
general the other specific, are not necessarily related to each other in a meaningful or 
reliable way. Indeed, the correlation between the two items barely achieved statistical 
significance (r = . 12, p  < .05). Although similar correlations emerged for the two items 
with a variety o f measures included in this research, notably self ratings of performance,
S ART, and SALIENT, and for processed communication, the patterns were by no means 
identical. Interestingly, and contrary to expectation, generic team experience was 
positively correlated to role conflict (calculated using the Ilgen and Hollenbeck, 1991, 
methodology) but specific team experience was not (generic, r = .20, p  < .05; specific, r = 
-.06, n.s.).
Future research, however, should carefully operationalize social experience, 
attending both to general social experience (such as experience in teams) and specific 
social experience (such as familiarity with team members). A solid scientific understanding
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of the influence of both o f  these factors on team SA could inform decisions about training 
for team SA as well as about team composition.
If generic social experience is found to be important to maintaining team S A, then 
mechanisms by which to provide trainees with the requisite social experience should be 
added to curricula. Such experience could come in a variety of forms. However, if generic 
social experience is found to be inconsequential to team SA, then perhaps training efforts 
should focus more toward the technical aspects of the task at hand. This research found a 
significant correlation between generic social experience and processed communication. 
Research identifying what generic team skills can be learned and applied in a team SA 
setting may also contribute to improved team SA performance.
Findings related to specific social experience may also assist in improving team 
performance. If  it is determined that specific social experience is important to team S A and 
ultimately to success, then perhaps teams should be viewed less as an assembly of 
interchangable components and more as an intact whole. Additionally, perhaps it would be 
wise to provide additional opportunities for specific social experience where feasible. 
Clearly, in a combat setting, it will not always be possible to send a team of whatever 
operators one can scrape together off for a week at a ropes course to “get to know one 
another,” but it may be possible to foresee likely team constellations, and provide the 
future team members with opportunities to work together in advance o f their actual need 
to do so.
If one accepts the premise that specific social experience is important because the 
team members know what to expect of one another, one is essentially acknowledging the 
importance o f roles. Thus, it can be said that specific social experience is built on a set of
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role episodes among the team members. Fink and Major (1999) suggested that team SA 
can be improved by addressing roles. Specifically, they suggest that role negotiations 
should take place before entering the SA context, and that a climate of openness and trust 
be fostered within the team, to facilitate on-the-fly role negotiations as necessary. It may 
be possible to train operators to engage in more efficient, explicit role negotiations, 
thereby accelerating the familiarization process.
Data Recycling
The fact that this research used the same dataset for measure validation and for 
model testing is mildly problematic, in that any idiosyncrasies o f the dataset would have 
affected both sets o f analyses. Research designed to replicate and cross-validate these 
findings is necessary and would be welcomed.
Team Task
The primary limitation o f this research, however, was the team task. Although the 
task has been shown as appropriate for team SA research (Jentsch et al., 1997) the task 
itself did not require high levels o f interdependence to function, and it was not necessary 
for team members to view themselves collectively. McIntyre and Salas (1995) suggest that 
an identity as a team and levels of interdependence are both important to enabling good 
teamwork behaviors. This research did not systematically ensure that either o f those 
conditions existed. Although this research suggested that command and control teams 
(Klimoski & Jones, 1995) were most likely to require SA, the marginal interdependence 
meant that this task did not simulate a command and control team particularly well.
Partners in this research had only outcome interdependence, rather than process 
interdependence. Partners were able to work together to achieve very high performance,
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but it was also possible for them to work fairly independently. It would have been possible 
for one partner to have continued to play and enjoy whatever level of success she or he 
was capable of, even if her or his partner was asleep at the controls. Clearly, this is not the 
case in most team SA applications.
It is quite possible that the results o f the model comparisons would be quite 
different in a more highly interdependent task. This is not to suggest that Werewolf v. 
Comanche should be abandoned as a testing platform, but rather to suggest that future 
researchers exercise more creativity in carefully structuring interdependent tasks.
Werewolf v. Comanche includes a variety of display settings, and interdependence could 
be fostered by giving team members different displays, such that none had all the display 
information necessary to successfully play the game. That is, it may be possible to 
configure the game such that team members have both process and outcome 
interdependence. Such configurations should be tested in future SA research using this 
platform.
Conclusions
Originally, this research set out to identify the extent to which team S A was an 
important factor in performance, and the mechanisms by which team S A was built. 
Secondary to that goal, the research also set out to identify the best available measure of 
SA.
Both o f the goals o f this research have been achieved. Team SA has been shown to 
be an important predictor for team performance, even with novice participants and a novel 
task. Both of the contributing factors hypothesized to be important to team S A, 
communication and shared understanding, were shown to be significantly related to team
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S A. Furthermore, testing of the integrated model demonstrated an interrelationship 
between these two elements; shared understanding was shown to mediate the relationship 
between communication and team SA.
The secondary goal o f this research, to identify the best available measure o f SA, 
was also achieved. The modified version of SALIENT used in this research was shown to 
be reliable and valid. In addition, the measure is behaviorally-based, which lends it face 
validity, and it is simple to use. As part o f the research process, however, another popular 
measure o f SA, SART was also shown to be an acceptable method by which to capture 
S A, and a new methodology for assessing role conflict and ambiguity was tested. SART is 
also simple to use and face valid, although it lacks the behavioral focus that makes 
SALIENT so appealing. The Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) approach to capturing role 
ambiguity and role conflict was demonstrated to be feasible and reliable, and preliminary 
evidence of validity was established.
Thus, this research accomplished the goals originally set for it. Although 
considerable research is still required in this field, this research has established a model of 
team SA and a method by which to investigate it.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
REFERENCES
Adams, M. J., Tenney, Y. J., & Pew, R. A. (1995). Situation awareness and the 
cognitive management o f complex systems. Human Factors, 37, 85-104.
Akaike, H. (1987). Factor analysis and AIC. Psychometrika, 52, 317-322.
Arbuckle, J. L. (1997). AM OS User's Guide Version 3.6. Chicago: SmallWaters 
Corporation.
Arbuckle, J. L, & Wothke, W. (1999). AMOS 4.0 User’s Guide. Chicago: 
SmallWaters Corporation.
Artman, H. (1999). Situation awareness and co-operation within and between 
hierarchical units in dynamic decision making. Ergonomics, 42, 1404-1417.
Atkinson, R. C. (1963). A variable sensitivity theory of signal detection. 
Psychological Review, 70, 62-77.
Baker, D. P, Stout, R. J., Salas, E. Fowlkes, J. & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (1998).
The Utility o f Interviews and Guided Verbal Reports fo r  Knowledge Elicitation. 
Unpublished report.
Bentler, P.M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological 
Bulletin, 107, 238 -246.
Bentler, P. M., & Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit in 
the analysis of covariance strucutres. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 588-606.
Bentler, P. M. & Raykov, T. (2000). On measures of explained variance in 
nonrecursive structural equation models. Journal o f  Applied Psychology, 85, 135-131.
Biddle, B. J. (1979). Role theory: Expectations, identities and behaviors. New 
York: Academic Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
155
Billings, C. E. (1994). Situation awareness in complex systems: A commentary. In 
R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational awareness in complex 
systems (pp. 321-325). Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press.
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (1998). Statistical summary o f commercial 
je t airplane accidents: Worldwide operations 1959-1997. Seattle, WA: Airplane Safety 
Engineering, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group.
Bollen, K. A. (1989). A new incremental fit index for general structural equation 
models. Sociological Methods and Research, 15, 375-384.
Bolman, L. (1979). Aviation accidents and the theory o f the situation. Resource 
management on the fligh t deck. Moffett Field, C A: NASA Ames Research Center (NASA 
Conference Publication 2120), 31-58.
Bolstad, C. A., & Endsley, M. R. (1999). Shared mental models and shared 
displays: An empirical evaluation of team performance. Proceedings o f the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society 43rd Annual Meeting (pp. 213-217). Santa Monica, CA: 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Breaugh, J. A., & Colihan, J. P. (1994). Measuring facets o f job ambiguity:
Construct validity evidence. Journal o f  Applied Psychology, 79, 191-202.
Brickman, B. J., Hettinger, L. J., Stautberg, D. K., Haas, M. W., Vidulich, M. A.,
& Shaw, R. L. (1999). The Global Implicit Measurement of situation awareness:
Implications for design and adaptive interface technologies. In M. W. Scerbo & M. 
Mouloua (Eds.), Automation technology and human performance: Current Research and 
Trends (pp. 160-164). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
156
Carretta, T. R., Perry, D. C., & Ree, M. J. (1994). The ubiquitous three in the 
prediction o f situational awareness: Round up the usual suspects. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. 
Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational awareness in complex systems (pp. 125-137). 
Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press.
Chaparro, A., Groff, L., Tabor, K., Sifrit, K., & Gugerty, L. J. (1999). Maintaining 
situational awareness: The role of visual attention. Proceedings o f  the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 43rdh Annual M eeting (pp. 1343-1347). Santa Monica, CA: Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A (1973). Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology,
4, 55-81.
Companion, M. A. (1994). Situational awareness in emergency management 
systems: An overview. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational 
awareness in complex systems (pp. 282-289). Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University Press.
Comrey, A. L. (1973). A first course in factor analysis. New York: Academic
Press.
Cook, J. D., Hepworth, S. J., Wall, T. D., & Warr, P. B. (1981). The experience 
o f work. London: Academic Press.
Dansereau, F., Graen, G., & Haga, W.J. (1975). A vertical dyad approach to 
leadership within formal organizations. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 13, 46-78.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
157
Durso, F. T., & Gronlund, S. D. (1999). Situation awareness. In F. T. Durso, R. S. 
Nickerson, R. W. Schvaneveldt, S. T. Dumais, D. S. Lindsay & M. T. H Chi (Eds ), 
Handbook o f  applied cognition (pp. 283-314). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Earley, P. C., & Mosakowski, E. (2000). Creating hybrid team cultures: An 
empirical test o f transnational team functioning. Academy o f Management Journal, 43, 
26-49.
Endsley, M. R. (1988). Design and evaluation for situation awareness 
enhancement Proceedings o f the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society -  32nd Annual 
M eeting (pp. 97-101). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Endsley, M. R. (1989). A methodology for the objective measurement o f pilot 
situation awareness. In Situation awareness in aerospace operations (AGARD-CP-478, 
pp. 1.1-1.9). Copenhagen, Denmark: NATO-Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and 
Development.
Endsley, M. R. (1994). Addendum -  Situation Awareness: Some reflections and 
comments. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M Koonce (Eds.), Situational awareness in 
complex systems (pp. 315-317). Daytona, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Press.
Endsley, M. R. (1995a). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic 
systems. Human Factors, 37, 32-64.
Endsley, M. R. (1995b). Measurement o f situation awareness in dynamic systems. 
Human Factors, 37, 65-84.
Endsley, M. R. (1998). A comparative analysis o f  SAGAT and SART for 
evaluations o f situation awareness. Proceedings o f the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
158
Society 42nd Annual Meeting (pp. 82-86). Santa Monica, C A: Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society.
Endsley, M. R. (in press). Situation awareness in aircraft maintenance teams. 
International Journal o f Industrial Ergonomics.
Endsley, M. R., & Rogers, M. D. (1996). Attention distribution and situation 
awareness in air traffic control. Proceedings o f the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society 40th Annual Meeting, (pp. 82-85). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society.
Ericsson, F. A., & Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working memory.
Psychological Review, 102, 211-245.
Farley, T. C., Hansman, R. J., Endsley, M. R., & Amonlirdviman, K., (1999). The 
Effect o f Shared Information on Pilot-Controller Situation Awareness and Re-route 
Negotiation. Paper presented at the 10th International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, Columbus, OH.
Fink, A. A., & Major, D. A. (1999). A role theory approach to strategizing for 
team situation awareness. In M. Scerbo & M. Mouloua (Eds.) Automation technology and  
human performance: Current research and trends (pp. 171-175). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Flach, J. M. (1995). Situation awareness: Proceed with caution. Human Factors,
37, 149-157.
Foushee, H. C. (1984). Dyads and triads at 35,000 feet: Factors affecting group 
process and aircrew performance. American Psychologist, 59(8), 885-893.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
159
Fracker, M. L. (1989). Attention gradients in situation awareness. In Situation 
awareness in aerospace operations (AGARD-CP-478, pp. 6.1-6.10). Copenhagen, 
Denmark: NATO-Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development.
Gaba, D. M., & Howard, S. K. (1995). Situation awareness in anesthesiology. 
Human Factors, 37, 20-31.
Garland, D. J., Endsley, M.R., Andre, A. D., Hancock, P. A., Selcon, S. J., & 
Vidulich, M. A. (1996). Assessment and measurement of situation awareness.
Proceedings o f the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 40th Annual Meeting, (pp.
1170-1173). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Garonzik, R., Brockner, J., & Siegel, P. A. (2000). Identifying international 
assignees at risk for premature departure: The interactive effect o f outcome favorability 
and procedural fairness. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 85, 13-20.
Gilson, R. A. (1995). Special issue preface. Human Factors, 37, 3-4.
Golden, C. J., Sawicki, R. F., & Franzen, M. D. (1990). Test contruction. In G. 
Goldstein & M. Hersen (Eds.), Handbook o f psychological assessment (2nd ed.). New 
York: Pergamon Press.
Graen, G. (1976). Role making processes within complex organizations. In M.D. 
Dunnette (Ed), The handbook o f industrial and organizational psychology (pp. 1201- 
1245). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Graen, G. & Scandura, T.A. (1987). Toward a psychology of dyadic organizing.
In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 9, pp. 
175-208). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
Gugerty, L. T., & Tirre, W. C. (1996). Situation awareness: a validation study and 
investigation o f individual differences. Proceedings o f the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 40th Annual M eeting (pp. 1170-1173). Santa Monica, CA: Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., LePine, J. A., Colquitt, J. A., & Hedlund, J.
(1998). Extending the multilevel theory of team decision making: Effects o f feedback and 
experience in hierarchical teams. Academy o f  Management Journal, 41(2), 269-282.
Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., Sego, D. J., Hedlund, J., Major, D. A., & Phillips,
J. (199S). Multilevel theory o f team decision making: Decision performance in teams 
incorporating distributed expertise. Journal o f  Applied Psychology, 80, 292-316.
Hopkin, V. D. (1994). Situational awareness in air traffic control. In R. D. Gilson, 
D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational awareness in complex systems (pp. 171- 
197). Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press.
Ilgen, D. R., & Hollenbeck, J. R. (1991). The structure of work: Job design and 
roles. In M. D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook o f industrial and 
organizational psychology, (second ed. vol. 2, pp. 165-207). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press.
Jackson, S. E., & Schuler R. S. (1985). A meta-analysis and conceptual critique o f 
research on role ambiguity and role conflict in work settings. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 36, 16-78.
Jentsch, F., Barnett, J., Bowers, C., Hicks, J., & Sierra, C. (1997). An evaluation 
o f  commercially available simulation software fo r  team situation awareness research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
(NAWCTSD Report, No. 97-XXX). Orlando, FL: Naval Air Warfare Center Training 
Systems Division.
Kaempf, G. L., Klein, G., Thordsen, M. L., & Wolf, S. (1996). Decision making in 
complex naval command-and-control environments. Human Factors, 38, 220-231.
Kahn, R. L., Wolfe, D. M., Quinn, R. P., Snoek, J. D., & Rosenthal, R. A. (1964). 
Occupational stress: Studies in role conflict and ambiguity. New York. Wiley.
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978). The social psychology o f  organizations (2nd ed.) 
New York: Wiley.
Klein, G. A. (1989). Recognition-primed decisions. In W. B. Rouse (Ed.), 
Advances in man-machine systems research (vol 5; pp. 47-92). Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Klimoski, R. & Jones, R. G. (1995). Staffing for effective group decision making: 
Key issues in matching people and teams. In R. Guzzo & E. Salas (EdsJ, Team 
effectiveness and decision making in organizations (pp. 291-332). San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey Bass.
Kline, R. B. (1998). Principles and practice o f structural equation modeling. New 
York: Guilford Press.
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware o f it: How difficulties in 
recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal o f  
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1121-1134.
Major, D. A., & Fink, A. A. (1998). Linking situation awareness to hierarchical 
team decision making theory. Poster presented at the Twenty-fourth International 
Congress o f Applied Psychology, San Francisco, CA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 2
Major, D. A., Fink, A. A , & Stout, R. J. (1998/1999). The development of shared 
understanding: Exploring team situation awareness through role theory. Training 
Research Journal, 3, 27-55.
McGrath, J. E., Berdahl, J. L, & Arrow, H. (1995). Traits, expectations, culture 
and clout: The dynamics o f diversity in work groups. In S. E. Jackson & M. N. Ruderman 
(Eds ), Diversity in work teams (pp. 17-46). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association.
McIntyre, R.M., & Salas, E. (1995). Measuring and managing for team 
performance: Lessons from complex environments. In R.A. Guzzo & E. Salas (Eds ),
Team effectiveness and decision making in organizations (pp. 9-45). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.
Means, B., Salas, E., Crandall, B., & Jacobs, T. O. (1993). Training decision 
makers for the real world. In G. A. Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. E. Zsambok 
(Eds ), Decision making in action: Models and methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Meyer, D. E. & Schvaneveldt, R. W. (1971). Facilitation in recognizing pairs or 
words: Evidence o f a dependence between retrieval operations. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology, 90, 227-234.
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magic number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on 
our capacity for processing information. Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 90, 227- 
234.
Mogford, R. H. (1994). Mental models and situation awareness in air traffic 
control. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational awareness in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
complex systems (pp. 199-207). Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University Press.
Morgan, B. B., Jr., Glickman, A. S., Woodard, E. A., Blaiwes, A., & Salas, E. 
(1986). Measurement o f team behaviors in a Navy environment (NTSC Report, No. 86- 
014). Orlando, FL: Naval Training Systems Center.
Muniz, E. J., Stout, R. J., Bowers, C. A & Salas, E. (1997). A M ethodology fo r  
M easuring Team Situational Awareness. Paper presented at the 18th Annual 
Industrial/Organizational Psychology-Organizational Behavior Graduate Student 
Conference, Roanoke, VA.
Muniz, E. J., Stout, R. J., Bowers, C. A & Salas, E. (1998). A Methodology fo r  
M easuring Team Situational Awareness: Situational Awareness Linked Indicators 
Adapted to Novel Tasks (SALIENT). Orlando, FL: Naval Air Warfare Center Training 
Systems Division.
NovaLogic, (1995). Werewolf v. Comanche [computer software]. Calabasas, CA
Author.
Pew, R. W. (1994). An introduction to the concept o f situation awareness. In R. 
D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational awareness in complex 
systems (pp. 17-23). Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press.
Rantanen, E. (1994). The role of dynamic memory in air traffic controllers; 
situation awareness. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational 
awareness in complex systems (pp. 209-215). Daytona Beach, FL. Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
Richardson, G. (1990). Feedback thought in social science and systems theory. 
Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press.
Rizzo, J. R., House, R. J., & Lirtzman, S. I. (1970). Role conflict and ambiguity in 
complex organizations. Aministrative Science Quarterly, 15, 150-163.
Rodgers, M .D., & Duke, D. A. (1994). SATORI: Situation Assessment Through 
Re-Creation O f Incidents. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), 
Situational awareness in complex systems (pp. 217-225). Daytona Beach, FL: Embry- 
Riddle Aeronautical University Press.
Sarter, N. B., & Woods, D. D. (1991). Situation awareness: A critical but ill- 
defined phenomenon. The International Journal o f Aviation Psychology, 1, 45-57.
Schenk, T. L. (1994). Situation awareness in emergency services incident 
command. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds.), Situational awareness 
in complex systems (pp. 291-293). Daytona Beach, FL. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University Press.
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human 
information processing: I. Detection, search, and attention. Psychological Review, 84, 1-
66 .
Schrieber, B. T., Bell, H. N., & Raspotnik, W. B. (1998). Investigating 
communication and situation awareness. Proceedings o f the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 42nd Annual M eeting (pp. 21-25). Santa Monica, CA: Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Schreiber, B. T., Lee, K. M., Raspotnik, W. B., & Hubbard, D. C. (1996). 
Examining the relationship between communication and situation awareness (SA) in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
tactical air-to-air environment. Proceedings o f the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society 40th Annual Meeting (p. 1253) Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society.
Schuler, R. S., Aldag, R. J., & Brief, A. P. (1977). Role conflict and ambiguity: A 
scale analysis. Organization Behavior and Human Performance, 20, 111-128.
Schumacker, R. E., & Lomax, R. G. (1996). A beginner’s guide to structural 
equation modeling. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Seers, A. (1989). Team-member exchange quality: A new construct for role- 
making research. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 42, 118-135.
Selcon, S. J. & Taylor, R. M. (1989). Evaluation of the Situation Awareness 
Rating Technique (SART) as a tool for aircrew systems design. In Situation awareness in 
aerospace operations (AGARD-CP-478, pp. 5.1-5.8). Copenhagen, Denmark: NATO- 
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development.
Shrestha, L. B., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Salas, E. (1995). Understanding 
situation awareness: Concepts, methods and training. Human/Technology Interaction in 
Complex Systems, 7, 45-83.
Simon, H. A. (1960). The new science o f  management decision. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
SmallWaters Corporation (1999). AMOS 4.0 [computer program]. Chicago:
Author.
Smith, K., & Hancock, P. A. (1995). Situation awareness is adaptive, externally 
directed consciousness. Human Factors, 37(1), 137-148.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
166
Stout, R. J., Cannon-Bowers, J. A., & Salas, E. (1996/1997). The role o f shared 
mental models in developing team situational awareness: Implications for training.
Training Research Journal, 2, 85-116.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1983). Using multivariate statistics. New 
York: Harper & Row.
Taylor, R. M. (1989). Situation Awareness Rating Scale (SART): The 
development of a tool for aircrew systems design. In Situation awareness in aerospace 
operations (AGARD-CP-478, pp. 3.1-3.17). Copenhagen, Denmark: NATO-Advisory 
Group for Aerospace Research and Development.
Tenney, Y. J., Adams, M. J., Pew, R. W., Huggins, A. W. F., & Rogers, W. H. 
(1992). A Principled Approach to the Measurement o f Situation Awareness in 
Commercial Aviation (NASA Contractor Report 4451; Contract NAS 1-18788).
Hampton, VA: Langley Research Center.
Tracy, L., & Johnson, T. W. (1981). What do the role conflict and role ambiguity 
scales measure? Journal o f Applied Psychology, 66, 464-469.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing o f decisions and the 
psychology o f  choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
Ullman, J. B. (1996). Structural equation modeling. In B. G. Tabachnick & L. S. 
Fidell (Eds ), Using multivariate statistics (third ed., pp. 709-811). New York: Harper 
Collins.
Van Sell, M., Brief, A. P., & Schuler, R. S. (1981). Role conflict and ambiguity: 
Integration o f the literature and directions for future research. Human Relations, 34, 43-
71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Venturio, M., Hamilton, W. L., & Dvorchak, S. R. (1989). Performance-based 
measures of merit for tactical situation awareness. In Situation awareness in aerospace 
operations (AGARD-CP-478, pp. 4.1-4.5). Copenhagen, Denmark: NATO-Advisory 
Group for Aerospace Research and Development.
Wayne, S. J., & Liden, R. C. (1995). Effects of impression management on 
performance ratings: A longitudinal study. Academy o f Management Journal, 38, 232- 
260.
Wellens, A. R. (1993). Group situation awareness and distributed decision making 
From military to civilian applications. In N. J. Castellan, Jr. (Ed.), Individual and group 
decision making: Current issues (pp. 267-291). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Wickens, C. D. (1999). Cognitive factors in aviation. In F. T. Durso, R. S. 
Nickerson, R. W. Schvaneveldt, S. T. Dumais, D. S. Lindsay & M. T. H Chi (Eds.), 
Handbook o f applied cognition (pp. 247-282). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Wright, D. L., Pleasants, F. & Gomez-Meza, M. (1990). Use of advanced visual 
cue sources in volleyball. Journal o f Sport & Exercise Psychology, 12, 406-414.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
Appendix A
Situation Awareness Rating Scale 
(SARS)
Caretta, Perry & Ree, 1994
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General Traits
Discipline 
Decisiveness 
Tactical knowledge 
Time-sharing ability 
Reasoning ability 
Spatial ability 
Flight Management 
Tactical Game Plan
Developing plan 
Executing plan 
Adjusting plan on-the-fly 
System Operation 
Radar 
TEWS
Overall weapons system proficiency 
Communication
Quality (brevity, accuracy, timliness, completeness)
Ability to effectively use comm info 
Information interpretation 
Interpreting VSD 
Interpreting RWR
Ability to effectively use AWACS/GCI
Integrating overall information (cockpit displays, wingman comm, controller 
comm)
Radar sorting
Analyzing engagement geometry 
Threat prioritization 
Tactical Employment-BVR Weapons 
Targeting decisions 
Fire-point selection 
Tactical employment -  Visual Maneuvering 
Maintain track of bogeys/friendlies 
Threat evaluation 
Weapons employment 
Tactical employment -  general 
Assessing offensiveness/defensiveness
Lookout (VSD interpretation, RWR monitoring, visual lookout)
Defensive reaction (chaff, flares, maneuvering, etc)
Mutual support
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Appendix B
Items from Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
(SART)
Taylor, 1989
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Think about the game you have just played. Rate the game for:
1. Instability o f situation: Likeliness to change suddenly
2. Complexity of situation: degree of complication
3. Variability of situation: number of variable/factors changing
Think about the partner that you have just played this game with. Rate your partner on:
1. Arousal: degree of alertness: readiness for activity
2. Concentration of attention: degree to which thought was brought to bear
3. Division o f attention: distribution/spread o f focus of attention
4. Spare mental capacity: mental ability available for new information
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Situational Awareness Linked Indicators Adapted to Novel Tasks
(SALIENT)
Muniz, Stout, Bowers & Salas, 1997
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Please rate the extent to which your partner did each of the following things
1. Monitored environment for changes, trends, abnormal conditions
2. Demonstrated awareness o f where he/she was
3. Reported problems
4. Located potential sources o f problem
5. Demonstrated knowledge o f problem consequences
6. Resolved discrepancies
7. Noted deviations
8. Recognized a need for action
9. Anticipated consequences o f action and decisions
10. Informed other of actions taken
11. Monitored actions (self & others)
12. Demonstrated knowledge o f tasks
13. Exhibited skilled time sharing attention among tasks
14. Monitored workload (self & others)
15. Shared workload within station
16. Answered questions promptly
17. Communicated important information
18. Confirmed information when possible
19. Challenged information when doubtful
20. Re-checked old information
21. Provided information in advance
22. Obtained information of what is happening
23. Demonstrated understanding of complex relationships
24. Briefed status frequently
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Appendix D 
Communication Evaluation
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Definitions:
Communication Frequency:
Rate the frequency o f communication for each team member while performing the 
simulation. Rate a 10 for constant communication (the team member is talking 100% of 
the time), a 5 for frequent communication (the team member is talking 50% of the time) 
and a 0 for no communication (the team member says nothing. Do the same for both team 
members. Scores need not add up to 10.
On- Task Communication: Mundane
Rate the amount o f communication for each player that is on-task but mundane - issues 
such as speed, altitude, weapon status. Use the percentage rating scaling
On-Task Communication: Emergency
Rate the amount o f communication for each player that is on-task and in response to 
emergencies, such as attacks. Use the percentage rating scaling
Role Related Communication
Communication by the team members that indicate continued role negotiation or refer 
back to established roles. Use the percentage rating scaling.
Off-Task Communication: Team related (rapport building, support statements etc)
These are communications between team members that are essentially social in nature, but 
are not role negotiation-type statements. These might be congratulations, or other 
rapport-building inter-member communications. Use the percentage rating scale.
Closed loop Communication
Communication initiated by the team member which follows the following three step 
pattern: communication is initiated, receiver accepts the communication and provides 
feedback sender confirms (closing the loop). Use the percentage rating scale.
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Communication Scales:
Communication Frequency
Player A Player B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
On-Task Communication: Mundane
Player A Player B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
On-Task Communication: Emergency
Player A Player B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Role Related Communication
Player A Player B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Ojf-Task Communication: Team related (rapport building, support statements etc)
Player A Player B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Closed loop Communication
Player A Player B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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Communication Score Sheet
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Team No.:
Player A
Information Request
Situation Fact: Raw Data
Situation Fact: Processed
Other Communication
Player B
Information Request
Situation Fact: Raw Data
Situation Fact: Processed
Other Communication
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 7 9
Appendix F 
Participant Training Materials
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_________________________________ Project Fly_________________________________
Introduction
Thank you for participating in Project Fly.
Project Fly uses a team computer game, a helicopter flight simulator. We will teach you 
and your partner how to use the flight simulator. It is not necessary that you be 
experienced at computer games to participate in this project. You will have an 
opportunity to practice both the skills and the game.
Before we begin, take a moment to answer the pre-game questions. Then the experimenter 
will complete a brief demonstration mission. Please tell the experimenter when you are 
ready to see the demonstration mission.
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter.
_________________________________ Project_Fly_________________________________
The Game
The game you will be playing in Project Fly is a helicopter flight simulator. You and your 
partner will play together. That is, even though you and your partner are sitting at 
different computers, you will be teammates in the same scenario. Each o f you will play 
from a separate computer, but the computers are networked together. You are two 
separate helicopters on the same mission, with the same terrain, same targets and same 
threats. When your partner destroys a threat, it is destroyed for both o f you.
While you are playing the game, the experimenter will pause it occasionally, and ask you 
to answer a few questions about how the game is going at that point. The game will 
pick back up where it left off.
_________________________________ Project Fly_________________________________
Playing the Game -
The experimenter will walk you through the game to help you learn how it is played. The 
experimenter will also setup the computers to run in 2-player mode and will select the 
pre-arranged missions at the appropriate times.
It is important to remember that this flight simulator is a helicopter rather than an airplane, 
and they fly differently - you must control the collective for lift and the cyclic for 
direction. Fortunately, COMANCHE’S computer system automatically handles 
throttle.
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Basically, you will use the joystick to control the cyclic (the direction you fly) and the “+” 
and keys on the 10-key keypad to control the collective, or lift. Press the higher 
key (-) to go up, and the lower key (+) to go down. You need to press the higher 
key to take off at the beginning o f the simulation.
You will also need to become familiar with the weapons options available to you. You 
must use the keyboard to select weapons. The experimenter will assist you through 
another training mission so that you can become familiar with the weapons systems 
that you can use.
You have seven weapons options available on COMANCHE: 20 mm cannon, 70mm 
rockets, laser guided missiles, (hellfire), air-to-air missiles (stingers), artillery, 
wingman, two 70mm rockets at once. The artillery and wingman options are not 
available on every mission, and when available only require that you lock onto the 
target. The coordinates of your target are transmitted to your artillery or wingman 
support. Your currently selected weapon is displayed on the screen. These weapons 
options can be selected using the keys o f the bottom keyboard row:
Z = 20 mm cannon 
X = 70mm rockets 
C = laser guided missiles (hellfire)
V = air-to-air missiles(stingers)
B = artillery 
N = wingman
M = two 70mm rockets at once (salvo)
First, you and your partner will fly a training mission to become more comfortable with 
the simulation. Don’t worry too much about your performance or strategy just yet - focus 
on learning how to use the simulation. The experimenter will help you. <Play a mission - 
training goal is aircraft control. Note that a standardized cockpit will be used for all
players>
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Dear Ms. Thomas:
Per your request, here is my official request for permission to reproduce an APA 
copyrighted figure. The figure I wish to reproduce is Figure 4, Page 26 from:
McGrath, J. E., Berdahl, J. L, & Arrow, H (1995). Traits, expectations, culture 
and clout: The dynamics of diversity in work groups. In S E. Jackson & M. N. 
Ruderman (Eds.), Diversity in work teams (pp. 17-46). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association.
I discuss McGrath et al.’s work in the theory development section of my dissertation, 
which I am scheduled to defend in May, 2000. Figure 4 of the above-referenced chapter 
is a concise visual representation of the theory that McGrath et al. describe. For this 
reason, I would like to include a reproduction of the figure in my dissertation. I have 
spoken with Dr. McGrath, and he has given me permission to reproduce the figure. I 
have also made his co-authors aware of my conversation with Dr. McGrath.
If you need further information from me, I can be reached via e-mail at: 
alexisfink@erols.coni. Additionally, I can be reached via telephone during business hours 
at (973) 426 2170. Street mail can be addressed to me at 1333 Chetwynd Ave, Plainfield.
NJ 07060.
I appreciate your time and attention to this request. I look forward to your favorable 
reply.
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FROM: Alexis Fink, ph 973 426 2170, fix  973 426 6832 
DATE: Feb 23,2000 
RE: Permission to reproduce a figure
Ms. Thomas:
I request permission to reproduce, in my dissertation, figure 4, page 299, from the 
following article that appeared in an APA journal:
'  Hollenbeck, J. R, figen, D. R., Sego, D. J.. Hedlund, J, Major, D. A , & Phillips, J. 
(1995). Multilevel theory of team decision making: Decision performance in teams 
incorporating distributed expertise. Journal o f Applied Psychology. 80 292-316.
E have author permission to reproduce the figure (one of the authors is my dissertation 
committee chair, and it is at her request that the figure appear).
Thank you for your time and attention to this request. If you require further information 
from me, please do not hesitate to contact me. My telephone number is 973 426 2170,
my rax is x /  i  and my e-mail is alexisfinkiaerols com
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